Mr. Speaker, let me just be sure of the procedure here so that we are clear. I want to be sure that all the Members who want to speak on both sides of this have a chance to do so. I think the way we worked this out, the gentleman from…
Mr. Speaker, let me just be sure of the procedure here so that we are clear. I want to be sure that all the Members who want to speak on both sides of this have a chance to do so. I think the way we worked this out, the gentleman from California (Mr. Stark) would go next, and after the gentleman from California (Mr. Stark), the gentleman from California (Mr. Thomas) will go, and then I will go.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 25 minutes to my distinguished colleague from California (Mr. Stark).
Yes, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Clearly, the Chile and Singapore Free Trade Agreements have many strong provisions, including comprehensive commitments by Chile and Singapore to open their goods, agricultural and services markets. This will be beneficial to American businesses, workers and farmers, commitments that will increase regulatory transparency and act to the benefit of U.S. investors, intellectual property holders, businesses, workers and consumers.
So what is the major source of controversy, especially since the economic impact of the two agreements combined will account for less than one-
quarter of 1 percent of U.S. GDP? I believe that it is mainly the potential and the existing inappropriate use by this administration of provisions in these agreements as models for other agreements.
For example, the Singapore FTA includes an integrated sourcing initiative. As first drafted, ISI would have allowed in listed instances components from any country in the world imported directly into Singapore to be treated as Singapore content, i.e., Singapore as a proxy for other nations not signatory to the FTA. This local content feature has been restricted through amendments to the agreement and by this legislation at our instigation, making it difficult to use as a practical matter. And, importantly, Democrats took the initiative to prevent any expansion of the ISI list without congressional approval. These efforts should send a clear message: Do not negotiate a similar provision in any future FTA.
Second, both agreements contain provisions relating to the temporary entry of nationals which required the creation of a new H1B visa program for workers from these countries. We were able through the implementing legislation on a bipartisan basis to significantly tighten these provisions. As a result, they are not now, in my judgment, a sufficient reason to vote against these agreements. But in this day and age of heavy loss of American jobs, the changes insisted on by this House must send a clear message to the administration not to negotiate immigration provisions in future FTAs, especially where the number of such visas involved would be larger without the active involvement of Congress.
Third, both agreements contain separate dispute settlement rules that place arbitrary caps on the enforcement of the labor and environmental provisions. This is a mistaken approach, the difficulties of which would only be magnified if used as a precedent for future FTAs involving very different circumstances.
Fourth, while substantial progress was made in the critical area of investment, these agreements should not be a model for all future FTAs. Additional steps should be included in future trade negotiations to ensure fully that foreign investors have no greater rights than U.S. citizens have under U.S. law.
Fifth, of great concern about these agreements is the actual use by USTR in the ongoing Central American negotiations of the ``enforce your own laws'' standard in the Singapore and Chile FTAs relating to basic labor standards. The laws of Chile and Singapore incorporate five internationally recognized core labor standards, prohibition against child labor, forced labor, discrimination, and, vitally, the right to associate and bargain collectively; and they basically enforce them, though there are cultural differences in their doing so.
In clear contrast to Chile and Singapore, the laws of most Central American countries irrefutably do not embody these five standards and the inadequate laws that exist are poorly enforced. Indeed, there is a pervasive antiworker-rights culture that prevents workers from getting a livable piece of the economic pie and climbing the economic ladder to the middle class.
So use of an ``enforce your own law standard'' where opposite conditions exist is a contradiction that would lead to contradictory results.
Central America does not need to suppress its workers to compete. To say that it does, whether with neighbors or with China, is untrue, and such an argument only gives ammunition to those who say that expanded trade, indeed globalization, inevitably leads to helping the rich and continuing to exploit the poor.
CAFTA is the real test and provides a real opportunity to shape expanded trade so that it leads to a leveling up, not a leveling down, with FTAA following next. So there is not a race to the bottom. So people in developing nations, as is basically true now in Chile and Singapore, can move up the ladder. So it is clear to workers in our Nation that when they compete, it is not with workers in other nations suppressed of their basic rights to associate and bargain together to get a decent piece of the economic action.
There are two ways to respond to this situation.
One is to acknowledge the many positives in these agreements, voting a green light while making very clear a red light against misapplication of Chile and Singapore to CAFTA, FTAA, and other future agreements where the conditions are very different. Different conditions, different agreements. Or, to vote ``no.''
My judgment is that the message is more clear, the distinctions between different situations remain starker and less blurred, and efforts to make these distinctions more likely to succeed with a ``yes'' vote in the manner described above. Either way, there must be a similar message: Do not negotiate an agreement with Central American nations on the assumption that conditions are like those in Chile or Singapore when they are not.
We oppose such efforts. They would not lead to the breakthroughs that Central American or FTA nations need in access to U.S. markets. They would result, in my judgment, in the eventual defeat of CAFTA. And they would throw away an opportunity, a major opportunity for those Central American nations and others, and for ours, and an opportunity to move U.S. trade policy forward, with the broad base of support necessary for a healthy future for expanded trade.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDermott), my distinguished colleague on the Committee on Ways and Means.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Ortiz).
(Mr. ORTIZ asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. Blumenauer).
Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Stenholm).
(Mr. STENHOLM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. Becerra), a colleague on the Committee on Ways and Means.
Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Frank).