Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to claim time in opposition. I want to thank my friend and indicate that I rise in opposition. This rhetoric that we are hearing on the House floor from people who I have to say I do respect greatly…
Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to claim time in opposition.
I want to thank my friend and indicate that I rise in opposition.
This rhetoric that we are hearing on the House floor from people who I have to say I do respect greatly is eerily reminiscent of the debate in this House prior to the United States authorizing an attack on Iraq. I think we can look back today and say that the U.S. rushed into war against Iraq, only to find that there were no weapons of mass destruction.
Madam Speaker, I will include for the Record an article from the Washington Post dated August 2, 2005, which says, ``A major U.S. intelligence review has projected that Iran is about a decade away from manufacturing the key ingredients for nuclear weapons, roughly doubling the previous estimate of 5 years.'' It goes on to say that ``this carefully hedged assessment, which represents consensus among U.S. intelligence agencies, contrasts with forceful public statements by the White House. Administration officials have asserted but have not offered proof that Tehran is moving determinedly toward a nuclear arsenal.''
I also include for the record the remarks of Angela Merkel, who is the leader of Germany, who says that we have not used all of our available windows of opportunity. She saw an opportunity for a negotiated settlement. As a matter of fact, in this news dispatch out of Berlin from yesterday, the German chancellor says there are real chances for a diplomatic deal to defuse the ongoing crisis over Iran's nuclear program.
Madam Speaker, I include for the record a news report out of Moscow and Tehran of yesterday which says that Iran and Russia will hold talks on Monday on a Russian offer to conduct uranium enrichment for Iran in the Russian territory. This would avert what is a building crisis.
Madam Speaker, I include for the record an analysis that was done of the joint resolution on Iraq, this was done by myself, that pointed out the flaws in a resolution that was presented to this House. This is an analysis from October 2, 2002, that relates to analyzing the Iraq resolution. I think this would be very valuable when you compare it side by side with the resolution that we have now.
Madam Speaker, I want to call to the Members' attention the same article that Mr. Paul called to Members' attention, section 3 of the enactment clause, which calls on members of the United Nations Security Council, particularly the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, to expeditiously consider and take action in response to the report of Iran's noncompliance. This is in response to a report of Iran's noncompliance and fulfillment of the mandate of the Security Council to respond and deal with situations bearing on the maintenance of international peace and security.
The importance of this point and this amendment is that this point undermines and sets aside the only possibility for a peaceful resolution of this crisis, namely the offer by Russia to enrich uranium for Iran to use in its nuclear power plants. Iran would not operate any enrichment processing facilities of its own, so we have an opportunity to put aside this crisis if we see what is developing now. This resolution, unfortunately, would scuttle the Russian-led negotiated settlement. I ask Members to consider that this resolution would put us on the threshold of war.
Now, I stand with Mr. Lantos in defense of the right of Israel to survive. I voted for legislation yesterday that challenges any nation that would call for the destruction of Israel, and we should do that. But we don't have to go to war against Iran or to set the stage for a war against Iran when we have diplomatic means of resolving this. We should continue to pursue diplomacy.
Madam Speaker, I include the articles referred to earlier for the Record.
[From washingtonpost.com, Aug. 2, 2005]
Iran Is Judged 10 Years From Nuclear Bomb
(By Dafna Linzer)
A major U.S. intelligence review has projected that Iran is
about a decade away from manufacturing the key ingredient for
a nuclear weapon, roughly doubling the previous estimate of
five years, according to government sources with firsthand
knowledge of the new analysis.
The carefully hedged assessments, which represent consensus
among US. intelligence agencies, contrast with forceful
public statements by the White House. Administration
officials have asserted, but have not offered proof, that
Tehran is moving determinedly toward a nuclear arsenal. The
new estimate could provide more time for diplomacy with Iran
over its nuclear ambitions. President Bush has said that he
wants the crisis resolved diplomatically but that ``all
options are on the table.''
The new National Intelligence Estimate includes what the
intelligence community views as credible indicators that
Iran's military is conducting clandestine work. But the
sources said there is no information linking those projects
directly to a nuclear weapons program. What is clear is that
Iran, mostly through its energy program, is acquiring and
mastering technologies that could be diverted to bombmaking.
The estimate expresses uncertainty about whether Iran's
ruling clerics have made a decision to build a nuclear
arsenal, three U.S. sources said. Still, a senior
intelligence official familiar with the findings said that
``it is the judgment of the intelligence community that, left
to its own devices, Iran is determined to build nuclear
weapons.''
At no time in the past three years has the White House
attributed its assertions about Iran to U.S. intelligence, as
it did about Iraq in the run-up to the March 2003 invasion.
Instead, it has pointed to years of Iranian concealment and
questioned why a country with as much oil as Iran would
require a large-scale nuclear energy program.
The NIE addresses those assertions and offers alternative
views supporting and challenging the assumptions they are
based on. Those familiar with the new judgments, which have
not been previously detailed, would discuss only limited
elements of the estimate and only on the condition of
anonymity, because the report is classified, as is some of
the evidence on which it is based.
Top policymakers are scrutinizing the review, several
administration officials said, as the White House formulates
the next steps of an Iran policy long riven by infighting and
competing strategies. For three years, the administration has
tried, with limited success, to increase pressure on Iran by
focusing attention on its nuclear program. Those efforts have
been driven as much by international diplomacy as by the
intelligence.
The NIE, ordered by the National Intelligence Council in
January, is the first major
review since 2001 of what is known and what is unknown about
Iran. Additional assessments produced during Bush's first
term were narrow in scope, and some were rejected by
advocates of policies that were inconsistent with the
intelligence judgments.
One such paper was a 2002 review that former and current
officials said was commissioned by national security adviser
Stephen J. Hadley, who was then deputy adviser, to assess the
possibility for ``regime change'' in Iran. Those findings
described the Islamic republic on a slow march toward
democracy and cautioned against U.S. interference in that
process, said the officials, who would describe the paper's
classified findings only on the condition of anonymity.
The new estimate takes a broader approach to the question
of Iran's political future. But it is unable to answer
whether the country's ruling clerics will still be in control
by the time the country is capable of producing fissile
material. The administration keeps ``hoping the mullahs will
leave before Iran gets a nuclear weapons capability,'' said
an official familiar with policy discussions.
Intelligence estimates are designed to alert the president
of national security developments and help guide policy. The
new Iran findings were described as well documented and well
written, covering such topics as military capabilities,
expected population growth and the oil industry. The
assessments of Iran's nuclear program appear in a separate
annex to the NIE known as a memorandum to holders.
``It's a full look at what we know, what we don't know and
what assumptions we have,'' a U.S. source said.
Until recently, Iran was judged, according to February
testimony by Vice Adm. Lowell E. Jacoby, director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, to be within five years of the
capability to make a nuclear weapon. Since 1995, U.S.
officials have continually estimated Iran to be ``within five
years'' from reaching that same capability. So far, it has
not.
The new estimate extends the timeline, judging that Iran
will be unlikely to produce a sufficient quantity of highly
enriched uranium, the key ingredient for an atomic weapon,
before ``early to mid-next decade,'' according to four
sources familiar with that finding. The sources said the
shift, based on a better understanding of Iran's technical
limitations, puts the timeline closer to 2015 and in line
with recently revised British and Israeli figures.
The estimate is for acquisition of fissile material, but
there is no firm view expressed on whether Iran would be
ready by then with an implosion device, sources said.
The time line is portrayed as a minimum designed to reflect
a program moving full speed ahead without major technical
obstacles. It does not take into account that Iran has
suspended much of its uranium-enrichment work as part of a
tenuous deal with Britain, France and Germany. Iran announced
yesterday that it intends to resume some of that work if the
European talks fall short of expectations.
Sources said the new timeline also reflects a fading of
suspicions that Iran's military has been running its own
separate and covert enrichment effort. But there is evidence
of clandestine military work on missiles and centrifuge
research and development that could be linked to a nuclear
program, four sources said.
Last month, U.S. officials shared some data on the missile
program with U.N. nuclear inspectors, based on drawings
obtained last November. The documents include design
modifications for Iran's Shahab-3 missile to make the room
required for a nuclear warhead, U.S. and foreign officials
said.
``If someone has a good idea for a missile program, and he
has really good connections, he'll get that program
through,'' said Gordon Oehler, who ran the CIA's
nonproliferation center and served as deputy director of the
presidential commission on weapons of mass destruction. ``But
that doesn't mean there is a master plan for a nuclear
weapon.''
The commission found earlier this year that U.S.
intelligence knows ``disturbingly little'' about Iran, and
about North Korea.
Much of what is known about Tehran has been learned through
analyzing communication intercepts, satellite imagery and the
work of U.N. inspectors who have been investigating Iran for
more than two years. Inspectors uncovered facilities for
uranium conversion and enrichment, results of plutonium
tests, and equipment bought illicitly from Pakistan--all of
which raised serious concerns but could be explained by an
energy program. Inspectors have found no proof that Iran
possesses a nuclear warhead design or is conducting a nuclear
weapons program.
The NIE comes more than two years after the intelligence
community assessed, wrongly, in an October 2002 estimate that
then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass
destruction and was reconstituting his nuclear program. The
judgments were declassified and made public by the Bush
administration as it sought to build support for invading
Iraq five months later.
At a congressional hearing last Thursday, Gen. Michael V.
Hayden, deputy director of national intelligence, said that
new rules recently were imposed for crafting NIBs and that
there would be ``a higher tolerance for ambiguity,'' even if
it meant producing estimates with less definitive
conclusions.
The Iran NIE, sources said, includes creative analysis and
alternative theories that could explain some of the
suspicious activities discovered in Iran in the past three
years. Iran has said its nuclear infrastructure was built for
energy production, not weapons.
Assessed as plausible, but unverifiable, is Iran's public
explanation that it built the program in secret, over 18
years, because it feared attack by the United States or
Israel if the work was exposed.
In January, before the review, Vice President Cheney
suggested Iranian nuclear advances were so pressing that
Israel may be forced to attack facilities, as it had done 23
years earlier in Iraq.
In an April 2004 speech, John R. Bolton--then the
administration's point man on weapons of mass destruction and
now Bush's temporarily appointed U.N. ambassador--said: ``If
we permit Iran's deception to go on much longer, it will be
too late. Iran will have nuclear weapons.''
But the level of certainty, influenced by diplomacy and
intelligence, appears to have shifted.
Asked in June, after the NIE was done, whether Iran had a
nuclear effort underway, Bolton's successor, Robert G.
Joseph, undersecretary of state for arms control, said: ``I
don't know quite how to answer that because we don't have
perfect information or perfect understanding. But the Iranian
records what the Iranian leaders have said . . . lead us to
conclude that we have to be highly skeptical.''