Mr. Speaker, I would like to submit for the Congressional Record a statement by former special representative on Sudan, Roger P. Winter. This statement was delivered at a hearing on the current situation in Sudan--the House International…
Mr. Speaker, I would like to submit for the Congressional Record a statement by former special representative on Sudan, Roger P. Winter. This statement was delivered at a hearing on the current situation in Sudan--the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on Africa.
Roger's testimony is compelling and I encourage all members to read it. The warning signs are written on the wall; if the international community fails to act, the genocide in Darfur can and will get worse.
The statement of Roger P. Winter, October 20, 2006, follows:
Statement of Roger P. Winter, Former Special Representative on Sudan of
the Deputy Secretary of State
Sudan's National Congress Party is controlled by an
intellectually-capable, radically-committed, conspiratorial
and compassionless nucleus of individuals, long referred to
as the National Islamic Front (NIF). In the seventeen years
since they came to power by coup to abort an incipient peace
process, they have consistently defied the international
community and won. As individuals, the NIF has never paid a
price for their crimes. Almost all of them are still in
important positions.
The NIF core is a competent cadre of men who have an
agenda, the pursuit of which has killed millions of Sudanese
and uprooted and destroyed the lives of millions more. While
their agenda is radically ideological, it is equally about
personal power and enrichment. They are not at all suicidal,
but they respond only to credible threats against their power
and prosperity. The international community with its
limitless posturing and (too often) empty words has, to date,
never constituted a credible threat. During its seventeen-
year reign, the NIF engaged seriously with critics only once,
that being when confronted by a strong Sudanese Peoples
Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A) and an energetic
international coalition led by the United States. The result
was the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), an incredible,
detailed document that ended a twenty-two year war between
the NIF government and the people of southern Sudan, the Nuba
Mountains, Southern Blue Nile and Abyei. Despite Khartoum's
deliberately slow and selective implementation, in my view,
the CPA is now at very serious risk of survival.
Power and wealth in Sudan have historically been
concentrated in ``the center'', in fact in just a few tribes.
All the peripheral populations--North, South, East and West--
have, as a result, been marginalized, largely destitute,
powerless and lacking development, regardless of their
religious, cultural or ethnic background. The U.S. initiative
beginning in 2001 made rather incredible progress in ending
hostilities between the SPLM and the NIF government and
opening up humanitarian access to war-affected people,
raising the hopes and expectations of a better life for
almost all Sudanese. That the peace process took four years
is not surprising, given the egregious history to be overcome
and the quality of the final text. The CPA was signed in
January 2005. In April an SPLM delegation went to Khartoum to
begin implementation arrangements. On landing at Khartoum's
airport they were engulfed by joyous throngs of Sudanese of
all backgrounds--Muslims, Christians, Africans, Arabs and
others--hoisting the delegation onto their shoulders and
dancing in the streets. They understood the implications of
the CPA to be for all Sudanese. On July 8 when Dr. John de
Mabior, chairman of the SPLM and Commander-in-Chief of the
SPLA arrived in Khartoum to sign the Interim Constitution
that was to implement the CPA, huge crowds of Northerners and
Southerners estimated by some at 6-8 million came out to meet
him. His popularity was such that, in a free election, it is
likely that he could be elected President of Sudan by all the
people. A New Sudan was being born.
But Darfur was in flames.
In February 2003, perhaps seeing the progress of CPA
negotiations and concerned about being left out of the
benefits of the CPA, ``rebels'' from Darfur's
marginalized populations who were considered ``African''
as distinct from ``Arab'' initiated hostilities against
the NIF government, The NIF responded precisely as it had
in the war against the SPLA. This involved destruction of
civilian populations, denial of humanitarian assistance to
war-affected civilians, utilization of surrogate Arab
militias in coordination with formal government military
forces and pretence of themselves being the aggrieved
party, being the ``sovereign'' government. The violence
exhibited a character far beyond that which could fairly
be described as ``military''. Ethnic cleansing was clear.
Genocide was its truer name.
The CPA includes a provision that the South and potentially
Abyei can legally secede from the Sudan state if a referendum
in those areas, scheduled for 2011, so decides. (The people
of Southern Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains, to their great
dismay, have no similar option and fear being overwhelmed by
Khartoum eventually). The NIF committed itself to make unity
attractive but the war in Darfur has demonstrated to the SPLM
that unity in a state dominated by the NIF would be anything
but attractive. Many core NIF adherents were appalled by this
provision, not just at the potential dismemberment of the
Sudanese state but also because a large percentage of Sudan's
known oil reserves, now increasingly coming on line, are
located in the South. If the South legally seceded, that oil
would then belong to it as a new separate country. Those NIF
personnel also saw other CPA interim provisions as
contemptible: that Dr. Garang would become Sudan's First Vice
President, that the South would have its own government, that
the SPLA would continue to exist as a component of ``the
national army'', but separate from the Government's army, and
that national elections would be held.
So, why did the NIF government sign the CPA? With its very
limited allegiance from the Sudanese public and increasing
military threats from Sudan's other disaffected marginalized
populations, with the international war on terror potentially
having
implications for Sudan itself, being on the U.S. list of
state sponsors of terrorism and also being the political
birthing place for Osama bin Laden, not to mention the NIF's
own brand of radical politics, the NIF needed to buy time. It
also hadn't, despite a twenty two year war, been able to
defeat the SPLA. It was in their interests, at least ``for
now'', to sign. At least signing guaranteed it six and one-
half years of protected existence. Who could know what
opportunities for a course-correction might materialize
within that timespan?
On July 30, 2005 Dr. John de Mabior, the embodiment of the
possibility of a united New Sudan, was killed in a helicopter
crash. The opportunity had arrived. That very day, I believe,
the NIF recalculated its future course of action.
To seize the opportunity, the NIF needed to eliminate the
Darfur opposition (civilian and military), destabilize the
SPLM, corrupt or abort any potential for a viable referendum.
maintain possession of the oil fields of Abyei, and ensure
the degradation of the SPLA. The NIF has seen progress on all
of these in the last fourteen months.
We are currently witnessing the NIF's attempt to achieve
the elimination of its Darfur opposition. Khartoum is
attempting to change the realities on the ground in Darfur
before the international community gets serious, if that is
possible. They believe they have ``read'' us, the
international community, all accurately, the U.S. included.
They believe there will be a continued slow response on our
part to Darfur's genocide and acceptable limits to whatever
actions are ultimately taken. After all, that's been pretty
much the case throughout their tenure. Thus, the liquidation
of the Darfur opposition is now in motion.
The NIF has successfully marginalized the SPLM within the
``Government of National Unity'' created by the CPA. The SPLM
is largely powerless to affect significant national policy.
The NIF has ``bought'' several SPLM officials and also
inserted into the SPLM apparatus other key individuals whose
loyalty is to Khartoum. Several veteran SPLM leaders,
brilliant, capable men who were critical in achieving the
CPA, have now left the country in despair.
The process for undermining the referendum is now underway.
The first elections, preliminary to any referendum, are
scheduled for 2008. To prepare for them, basic elements, laws
and structures must be put in place, especially in a context
where there is no history of elections. For example, there
has been no proper census in Sudan since 1983. Thus, the
architecture for elections is being put in place in a context
largely controlled by Khartoum loyalists. And, too, the
international community is being of only limited assistance
to the SPLM in its conversion from a rebel movement into a
nationally competitive political party, a serious
shortcoming.
The future of Abyei, a place little understood by
outsiders, is a critical issue as it is the repository of a
significant amount of Sudan's oil; most of Abyei is an oil
field. Currently that oil is being extracted under Government
contracts with oil companies from China, with its UN Security
Council veto power, Malaysia, India and Sudan itself. Its
products are fueling the NIF's war in Darfur. The CPA
provided for an Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) to
determine Abyei's actual borders, so that oil revenues can be
properly allocated. The ABC determined the boundaries but
President Beshir has rejected it and also the appointment of
an interim local government as provided in the CPA. To buy
time as the clock ticks, he refuses to proceed. The highly
volatile Abyei area, thus, remains largely in the hands of
the Sudanese Army.
The Sudan Peoples Liberation Army is, in many ways, the
reason the CPA exists. This rebel army, with very limited
resources, could not be defeated by the Sudan army. But that
was then; this in now. The balance may be changing. The
riches of Khartoum are being used to modernize and equip the
Sudan Army. The SPLA is largely as it was several years ago,
perhaps even less so. In significant part, this is due to us.
Endless debating regarding what the U.S. is authorized to do
to the help in the transformation of the SPLA into a modern
military force is very dangerous. It could cost South Sudan
and potentially all of Sudan tragically in the future.
Transformation of the SPLA is the surest guarantee that the
CPA will survive.
It is my view the war in Darfur and the survival of the CPA
are inextricably entwined, and the NIF sees it. If, through
weak international responses to genocide, the NIF succeeds in
eliminating its Darfur opposition, and that reality is
combined with the reality of the loss of Dr. Garang, the only
southern leader who had the stature to compete successfully
with Khartoum, the stage is set for the NIF to entirely
undermine the CPA. The SPLM can again compete, and its
current leadership is trying to so position it, but its
recovery from the loss of Dr. Garang and from the
destabilization efforts of the NIF will take time. And the
clock is ticking.
Based on this analysis, I encourage the following urgent
steps:
1. Deploy non-consentually the now-stymied UN protection
force. In fact, some of the UN force already in the South, in
such places as Wau virtually next door to Darfur, could be
moved there quickly. In the meantime, declare and enforce a
no-fly zone for Sudan military aircraft throughout Darfur.
U.S. resources exist in Djibouti that could be used for
enforcement purposes.
2. Provide substantial assistance to the SPLM to empower
its participation in governance at all levels. to be
seriously competitive as a national political party and to
effectively govern the South. The Government of South Sudan
also needs assistance in anticorruption efforts. such as
setting up an office of Inspector General of Government. Some
of these issues were discussed by Salva Kiir, President of
South Sudan, when he met with President Bush in July.
3. Focus now urgently on the upcoming interim elections and
ultimately the referendum. Time is flying by, given what
needs to be accomplished. Monitor preparations in detail and
equip the SPLM to be able to fully participate in
preparations.
4. Take Abyei seriously. If war breaks out again between
the NIF and the SPLM, it will in my estimation likely begin
in Abyei. Expose President Beshir's perfidy in delaying.
Raise the issue at the UN Security Council and other
appropriate forums.
5. Seriously assist the SPLA in its conversion from a rebel
force to a modern military, The delays already caused by U.S.
persistent bureaucratics have the potential for actually
encouraging war and the ultimate loss of life and of the CPA.
6. Finally, given the ``no negative consequences'' pattern
experienced by the NIF for crimes committed, accountability
for past, current and future crimes is a critical issue.
Unfortunately for Sudanese, the International Criminal Court
seems to have disappeared. An internationally agreed-on
system of accountability is desperately needed for Sudan's
atrocities. The U.S. should actively take leadership in
addressing this crying need.
Believe me, we are in really dangerous times regarding
Sudan. It could happen that the CPA is stamped ``CANCELLED'',
along with an incredible additional number of Sudanese lives.
And if that happened, it would blot out one of the finest
U.S. initiatives of the last decade.