Mr. Speaker, I truly wish that I could support this rule. National security is a bipartisan, or actually a nonpartisan, issue. And when we commend the troops, all of us, all of us have a stake. Every congressional district has a stake in…
Mr. Speaker, I truly wish that I could support this rule. National security is a bipartisan, or actually a nonpartisan, issue. And when we commend the troops, all of us, all of us have a stake. Every congressional district has a stake in commending the troops.
As a matter of fact, small town and rural America have furnished 46 percent and 43 percent of the deaths in Afghanistan and in Iraq. So all of us, whether we are from small towns or large cities, have a stake in a resolution commending the troops, and we should have been consulted about it. I am sorry for that.
Now, more than that, while we commend the troops, I would also have, had I been consulted, recommended that we do our best to protect our troops by including more body armor and extra up-armored Humvees, of which we still do not have enough in Iraq. As a matter of fact, Mr. Speaker, I received from the United States Army a letter indicating that there are unfunded requirements for the extra up-armored Humvees and the body armor, which is so necessary.
I would also have recommended that we have complete, timely, and high-quality health care to treat the wounds and injuries for those who have served, and to recognize those who pay the sacrifice, whether it be in wounds, injuries, or, sadly, deaths.
I would also have recognized the contributions of and the sacrifices of the families of our servicemen and -women, particularly in the Guard and Reserve. I would have recognized the efforts to improve our intelligence gaps that our troops need and so that they be better protected in the future. And I would have recognized and recommended the sufficient up-front funding for our military operations so we can ensure the safety and well-being of our troops.
Mr. Speaker, I would also have included the fact that there should have been better planning for the postwar period. I sent two letters to the President, one on September 4, 2002, and another 2 days before the attack on Iraq, both of which I include in the Record.
Mr. Speaker, I think that all of us should have been at least brought to the table and all of us had an opportunity to write this resolution. I am so proud of our troops, whether they be from Missouri or Maine or wherever they are from. This is the best military our country has ever seen. And I think every Member of Congress, both sides of the aisle, should have had the opportunity to say thank you, we are proud of you, and God bless you.
Mr. Speaker, here follows the letters to which I referred earlier in my comments:
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, September 4, 2002.
The President,
The White House,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. President: Thank you for inviting me to the
briefing this morning. I share your concern about the
continuing threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his efforts to
produce weapons of mass destruction (WMD). I would like to
offer my assistance as the administration considers how to
deal with this threat.
Before Congress can authorize any military action that
might be part of the administration's plan, we must have
answers to more questions than were able to be raised at
today's meeting. Our constitutional duty requires us to
ensure that all implications of such action are considered in
advance. The case has not yet been fully made as to what the
threat is, why military force is an appropriate way of
addressing the threat, and why action must occur now. In
short, Congress and the American people must be clear on your
strategic vision before we can authorize a specific course of
action. I believe, like Clausewitz, that in strategy there is
an ``imperative . . . not to take the first step without
considering the last.''
Your strategy for dealing with Iraq must address the
fundamental questions of the threat, the method of acting,
and the timing. Furthermore, any strategy to eliminate Iraqi
WMD must also address several component issues, each of which
raises critical questions.
1. How to manage Iraq's transition to a stable post-Saddam
regime
As I mentioned to you this morning, this is a crucial
question for administration strategy to answer in advance of
any military action. I have no doubt that our military would
decisively defeat Iraq's forces and remove Saddam. But like
the proverbial dog chasing the car down the road, we must
consider what we would do after we caught it.
As Sun-Tzu said in the classic strategic treatise, The Art
of War, ``To win victory is
easy; to preserve its fruits, difficult.'' Military planners
and political leaders alike new this in World War II.
Planning for the occupation of Germany and Japan--two
economically viable, technologically sophisticated nations--
took place well in advance of the end of the war. The
extreme difficulty of occupying Iraq with its history of
autocratic rule, its balkanized ethnic tensions, and its
isolated economic system argues both for careful
consideration of the benefits and risks of undertaking
military action and for detailed advanced occupation
planning if such military action is approved.
Specifically, your strategy must consider the form of a
replacement regime and take seriously the possibility that
this regime might be rejected by the Iraqi people, leading to
civil unrest and even anarchy. The effort must be to craft a
stable regime that will be geopolitically preferable to
Saddam and will incorporate the disparate interests of all
groups within Iraq--Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurd. We must also plan
now for what to do with members of the Baath party that
continue to support Saddam and with the scientists and
engineers who have expertise born of the Iraqi WMD program.
All these efforts require careful planning and long-term
commitment of manpower and resources. The American people
must be clear about the amount of money and the number of
soldiers that will have to be devoted to this effort for many
years to come.
2. How to ensure the action in Iraq does not undermine
international support for the broader war on terrorism
In planning for military operations in Iraq, we cannot
ignore the lack of international support to date. Pre-emptive
action against Iraq is currently vocally opposed by many of
our allies and friends throughout the world and particularly
in the Middle East.
When we are seen as acting against the concerns of large
numbers of our friends, it calls into question the ``humble''
approach to international relations you espoused during the
presidential campaign. More than that, it has several
potentially damaging long-term consequences. First, it risks
losing the large number of partners needed to prosecute the
global war on terrorism. To ferret terrorists groups out of
their many hiding places, we must have broad allied support.
Second, it risks seriously damaging U.S. moral legitimacy,
potentially providing states like India and Pakistan with a
preemptive option that could drive long-standing conflicts
beyond containable bounds.
Finally and perhaps most dangerously, actions without broad
Arab support may inflame the sources of terrorism, causing
unrest and anger throughout the Muslim world. This dynamic
will be worse if Iraq attacks Israel--perhaps with weapons of
mass destruction--and draws them into the conflict. Iran,
which has the potential to seize a reformist path, may well
move away from the United States in the face of attacks that
could next be taken against them. Together, these dynamics
will make achieving peace in the Middle East more difficult
and may well provide the rationale for more terrorist attacks
against Americans.
These concerns do not make military action in Iraq
untenable. They do, however, highlight the depth and
importance of the issues to be addressed before we strike. We
need to ensure that in taking out Saddam, we don't win the
battle and lose the war.
3. How to ensure that the United States can execute this
operation successfully as well as its other military
missions
As you are well aware, Mr. President, the consideration of
military action against Iraq comes at a time when U.S. forces
are actively engaged throughout the world in a range of
missions. Given the operational pressures these forces
currently face, we must ask what the risks and trade-offs
will be of defeating Iraq, particularly if Iraqi forces mass
in Baghdad for urban operations. How many casualties must the
American people be prepared to take in a worst-case scenario?
What will the impact of sustained operations be on so-called
high-demand, low-density assets? What military operations
might we have to forego because of continued demands in Iraq?
Will we still be prepared for the range of other threats that
might emerge throughout the world? With little allied support
and contributions, will we still be able to maintain military
spending on transformational technologies and on sound
quality of life for our forces if we are bearing a huge
wartime cost alone? What will be the impact on the domestic
economy of these resources drains and of the long-term costs
of reconstructing Iraq? These questions must be answered
before any military action commences so that the American
people understand the risks and the sacrifices involved.
I ask these questions only to highlight the complexity of
the undertaking and the need for Congress, the American
people, and our friends around the world to understand
exactly what is at stake and why we must act now. Only such a
comprehensive strategic approach will ensure that we commit
U.S. troops consciously and with full knowledge of the range
of challenges we face--both in the initial campaign and in
the long aftermath to follow. Even a strategy that has
military action as its centerpiece will require great
diplomatic efforts to ensure its success. I look forward to
hearing the administration's answers and to working with you
to find the best course of action.
Sincerely,
Ike Skelton,
Ranking Democrat.
Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Speaker, I would have thought it a mere courtesy of saying, Would the gentleman from Missouri like to read this over and add or make recommendations? I would love to have been there in order to support the gentleman from California.