Mr. Speaker, many questions are swirling around the country about whether President Bush and members of his Administration knowingly misled the American people into believing that Iraq was an imminent threat to our security and that we had…
Mr. Speaker, many questions are swirling around the country about whether President Bush and members of his Administration knowingly misled the American people into believing that Iraq was an imminent threat to our security and that we had no choice but to invade and occupy that nation. That is why I rise today to call my colleagues' attention to an editorial that appeared in today's Chicago Tribune, entitled ``Questioning the Case for War.''
The editorial states: ``Instead of dodging questions and branding critics `revisionist historians,' Bush must cooperate with congressional inquiries and diligently work to set the record straight. Bush has enjoyed the patience and the support of a majority of the American public. But that patience can run thin.''
It continues, ``The American people deserve a full accounting of the evidence. Were mistaken assertions based on faulty intelligence reports or was there a deliberate effort to trump up evidence to make the case for war?''
For the sake of his credibility, President Bush ``must put to rest any suspicions that Americans accepted an argument for war that was built on a lie,'' the editorial concludes.
The American people deserve answers and that is why I strongly support H.R. 2625, a bill sponsored by Representative Waxman that would establish an independent commission to respond to the questions raised today by the Chicago Tribune. We need to get to the truth. President Bush's credibility and America's standing in the world are at stake.
[From the Chicago Tribune, July 10, 2003]
Questioning the Case for War
Like any good salesman, President Bush highlighted the
facts that made the most compelling case as he sold the
American people on the urgent need for war against Iraq. In
his State of the Union address in January, he spoke of 38,000
liters of the deadly botulinum toxin and as much as 500 tons
of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent--all unaccounted for by
Saddam Hussein. He spoke of Hussein's continued quest to
build nuclear weapons.
He and his administration made the case forcefully for
months, at the United Nations and elsewhere, using an
impressive array of intelligence reports and satellite
photos. Many Americans were convinced, as was this editorial
page.
For several weeks, however, the case that Bush & Co. made
has been coming under intense scrutiny, with suggestions that
the president deliberately exaggerated some evidence or
misrepresented intelligence reports to gild the arguments for
war.
After weeks of denying those charges, the White House
acknowledged Monday that one of the president's points in his
State of the Union address may have been mistaken. That
claim: that Hussein had attempted to buy uranium for a
nuclear weapon from a nation in Africa.
White House officials wouldn't say how the president came
to use the erroneous information or when he knew that the
assertion was probably wrong. Bush and his team didn't fess
up voluntarily. They were compelled to respond to an account
in Sunday's New York Times by Joseph Wilson, a former
American ambassador who was enlisted by the CIA last year to
travel to Niger to investigate claims that Hussein had tried
to buy the uranium.
Wilson wrote that he found no evidence for those claims and
shared his skepticism in briefings with the CIA and other
agencies. Nevertheless, almost a year later, Bush cited that
information in his speech. Top officials, including National
Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, deny that they or the
president knew of Wilson's findings before he delivered the
speech.
But Wilson wrote that ``Based on my experience . . . I have
little choice but to conclude that some of the intelligence
related to Iraq's nuclear weapons program was twisted to
exaggerate the Iraqi threat.''
That is a logical--and deeply distrubing--conclusion.
The African uranium claim is not the only statement in
question. The president asserted that Hussein had attempted
to buy high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear
weapons production. That claim was disputed by the
International Atomic Energy Agency, and now is widely viewed
as doubtful. The Pentagon has acknowledged that a Defense
Intelligence Agency study last December couldn't pinpoint
evidence of Iraqi weapons sites, though administration
pronouncements at the time seemed far more certain of their
existence.
With all those questions, it's natural to wonder what other
errors--intentional or not--crept into the president's case
for war. Prime Minister Tony Blair faces similar scrutiny in
Britain.
Bush insists that those who raise such questions are
ignoring the preponderance of the evidence, which clearly
showed Hussein posed a threat to the world. There was,
indeed, a strong case, starting with Hussein's longstanding
defiance of U.N. resolutions and cat-and-mouse game with U.N.
weapons inspectors.
Bush also complains that this debate is charged with
political partisanship. Yes, in some quarters, it surely is.
But Bush seriously miscalculates if he chalks up the rising
din of questions only to those who opposed the war. This
debate goes to the president's most precious asset: his
credibility.
The American people deserve a full accounting of the
evidence. Were mistaken assertions based on faulty
intelligence reports or was there a deliberate effort to
trump up evidence to make the case for war?
It's time for the administration to scrub down every piece
of evidence it made public and level with the American public
about what, if anything, was exaggerated to make the case for
war. Instead of dodging questions and branding critics
``revisionist historians,'' Bush must cooperate with
congressional inquiries and diligently work to set the record
straight.
Bush has enjoyed the patience and the support of a majority
of the American public. But that patience can run thin.
Americans know the hunt for weapons of mass destruction
isn't over yet. They realize that no intelligence report is
perfect; that such reports can be misleading or flat-out
wrong. They understand that mistakenly using a faulty
intelligence report does not automatically lead to the
conclusion that much of the evidence for war was twisted or
intentionally misused.
But they also know a too-slick sales job when they see one.
History is full of presidents who fudged facts to advance
objectives--be it declaring a war or more mundane domestic
matters.
These questions will not fade. If anything, as the
presidential campaign heats up, these kinds of questions will
only grow louder.
If some of the intelligence Bush used was faulty or
incomplete--as it seems to have
been--he should say so and explain why. If he made mistakes,
he should admit them. Bluster and bravado will not suffice.
He must put to rest any suspicions that Americans accepted an
argument for war that was built on a lie.