Mr. Speaker, one of the most concise rebuttals that I have read to the notion that Japanese Americans were placed in the camps because they either posed a national security threat or for their own safety comes from a law professor from the…
Mr. Speaker, one of the most concise rebuttals that I have read to the notion that Japanese Americans were placed in the camps because they either posed a national security threat or for their own safety comes from a law professor from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill in a letter dated February 7, 2003. 1 would like to submit this letter at this point in the Record.
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Chapel Hill, North Carolina, February 7, 2003.
Hon. Howard Coble,
U.S. House of Representatives, Rayburn House Office Building,
Washington, DC.
Dear Representative Coble: I am a professor of law at the
University of North Carolina School of Law in Chapel Hill. My
areas of expertise include constitutional law and especially
the story of the internment of Japanese Americans during
World War II. My book on the subject, Free to Die for their
Country: The Story of the Japanese American Draft Resisters
in World War 11 (Univ. of Chicago Press, 2001), was named one
of the Washington Post's Top Nonfiction Titles for 2001.
I have followed with interest and concern the story about
your comments on the radio on Tuesday morning to the effect
that you support the internment of Japanese Americans during
World War II, and that the Roosevelt administration interned
Japanese Americans to protect them.
I note that you were quoted in the High Point Enterprise as
saying the following: ``I still stand by what I said . . .
that, in no small part, it (internment) was done to protect
the Japanese-Americans themselves.'' The article further
states that you said that if it were proven to you that
protecting Japanese Americans was not one of FDR's
motivations, you will apologize.
Here is the proof.
Just after the Pearl Harbor attack, FDR, asked Navy
Secretary Frank Knox to investigate the possibility, that
Fifth Column work by people of Japanese ancestry in Hawaii
had contributed to the success of the Japanese sneak attack.
Knox reported his conclusions to FDR by December 15, and on
that day, said to reporters that he thought ``the most
effective Fifth Column work of the entire war was done in
Hawaii with the possible exception of Norway.'' J. Edgar
Hoover immediately registered his strong disagreement with
Knox's conclusions, and it turns out that Knox was wrong and
Hoover was right. But it was Knox's views that were made
public, and they triggered hysteria on the West Coast.
Well before the war, FDR, anticipating a possible war with
Japan, had commissioned his own secret intelligence
investigation of Japanese aliens and their loyalties. Leading
this effort were John Franklin Carter (an author and
columnist) and Curtis Munson (a prominent Republican
businessman). And the Office of Naval Intelligence (``ONI'')
and the FBI were for quite some time before Pearl Harbor,
gathering names of Japanese aliens who might need to be
apprehended in the event of war. ONI and the FBI actually
compiled a list of such aliens which came to be called the
``ABC'' list--so named because the list presented three
categories (Category A, Category B, and Category C) of
potentially dangerous aliens. (In the days after Pearl
Harbor, all of the aliens in these three categories were in
fact arrested--a total of some 1500.)
Carter and Munson's investigations had led them to conclude
that the overwhelming majority of Japanese aliens and an even
greater percentage of American citizens of Japanese ancestry
were in fact loyal to the United States, and that of those
whose loyalty was even questionable, few could be expected
even to consider actually doing something to support Japan or
undermine the United States. Carter and Munson grew alarmed
by Knox's report and the anti-Japanese outcry that followed
it.
Carter and Munson quickly put together a plan for FDR's
consideration that was designed to bolster the Japanese
American communities of Hawaii and the West Coast. Their plan
called for a number of things: FDR was urged to go on record
as believing in the loyalty of American citizens of Japanese
ancestry (the ``Nisei''). The Nisei should be invited to
volunteer (and then should be accepted) for patriotic service
in the Red Cross and civilian defense. The Nisei should be
encouraged to take control of their alien parents' property.
Once investigated, the Nisei should be allowed to take jobs
in defense plants. Carter and Munson also urged the
government to work closely with the Japanese American
Citizens League, which had indicated its willingness to serve
as a loyal liaison with the Japanese American community.
The goals of the Carter-Munson plan were many, but they
included the discouragement of vigilante violence against
Japanese Americans and Japanese aliens. The hope was that if
FDR came out quickly and loudly in support of people of
Japanese ancestry, and involved them quickly in activities
that would permit their loyalty and patriotism to shine
through, others would not see them as a threat.
The Carter-Munson plan was submitted to Roosevelt before
Christmas. By mid-January, it was completely forgotten--
suspended by other pressures that I'll detail in a moment.
And here's the important point: the Carter-Munson plan was
the only plan for dealing with Japanese Americans that
took their security into account in any way. It never got
off the ground.
Why didn't it get off the ground? For four main reasons.
First, by late January 1942, General John DeWitt (the
commanding officer of the West Coast Defense Command) and his
advisor Karl Bendetsen had become persuaded that mass action
to remove all people of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast
was necessary for military reasons. Their viewpoint was fed
largely by outrageous rumors of Japanese American subversion,
none of which ever panned out.
Second, by mid-January, a rabidly racist press along the
Coast had begun campaigning for the eviction of all ``Japs''
from the area--not for their protection, but because they
could not be trusted.
Third, white farmers in California began lobbying
ferociously for the removal of all people of Japanese
ancestry--not to protect them, and not even really for
national security reasons, but to drive the very successful
Japanese farming industry out of business.
And fourth, their lobbying, and the voices of the
editorialists, succeeded in pushing most of the congressional
delegations of the West Coast states to demand mass
exclusion.
As Professor Greg Robinson says in his authoritative
treatment of the subject, ``By Order of the President; FDR,
and the Internment of Japanese Americans'' (Harvard U. Press,
2001). ``the binding factor among these disparate social,
economic, and military forces was racial animosity toward
Japanese Americans.'' (p.90)
Through late January and early February, Attorney General
Francis Biddle, and his staff fought with the military to
prevent mass action against Japanese Americans. But it was
too late. On February 11, 1942, Secretary of War Henry
Stimson sent FDR a memo asking whether he'd be willing to
support ``mov[ing] Japanese citizens as well as aliens from
restricted areas.'' Getting no response, Stimson phoned FDR
on February 15 to ask for a meeting on the memo. FDR said he
was too busy for a meeting, but in ``very vigourous'' tones
told Stimson that the military should do whatever they
thought best. FDR predicted that ``there would probably be
some repercussions but it has got to be dictated by military
necessity.''
On February 19, 1942, FDR signed Executive Order 9066,
which gave the military cart blanche to do what they wished
with Japanese, aliens and American citizens of Japanese
ancestry along the West Coast.
There is the proof. A concern for protecting Japanese
Americans had nothing whatsoever to do with the decision to
force Japanese Americans behind barbed wire. Nothing.
(My sources for this account include Greg Robinson's book,
Peter Irons's Justice at War, and Personal Justice Denied,
the report of Congress's Commission on the Wartime Internment
and Relocation of Civilians. This, you'll recall, was the
fact-finding Commission that Congress created in the early
1980s to investigate the internment. Their report, condemning
the internment, led to the passage of the Civil Liberties Act
of 1988, signed into law by President Reagan, which
apologized to surviving internees for the internment, and
authorized the payment to each of them of a token $20,000
redress payment. You will also recall that you spoke and
voted against this bill.
I hope that you will take this opportunity to admit the
mistake in your comments of Tuesday morning and apologize for
them.
Thank you for considering this.
Sincerely,
Eric L. Muller,
Professor of Law.