Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H. Res. 557 and claim the time set aside for us under the rule, and I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, our President, having exhausted all other options, made the decision to take…
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H. Res. 557 and claim the time set aside for us under the rule, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, our President, having exhausted all other options, made the decision to take action against Saddam Hussein and the threat posed by his evil tyranny. During that course, the debate about that, this House was presented with an overwhelming body of evidence detailing the brutal inhumanity of Saddam Hussein and his regime, the suffering of the Iraqi people under his repressive dictatorship, the threat that Saddam presented to his neighbors and to the world, and indeed the piles of bodies in neighboring countries he left behind. Today, now that Saddam has been removed from power and the mass graves, the secret laboratories, the vast military stockpiles, missile capacities that he had, have all been exposed to the world, the world is a safer place. Certainly the Iraqi people, all Iraqi people, have a new hope for a better future today than they did just a year ago. Just a year ago. What a remarkable accomplishment by our troops and the coalition.
Yet we continue to hear claims from some that the liberation of Iraq, no matter how worthy the result, no matter how necessary to improving U.S. national security, was somehow a flawed endeavor. Yes, it was hard, but they claim it was a flawed endeavor because the intelligence that the United States had prior to the war was not perfect.
Some apparently feel that either the Intelligence Community was pressured by the administration into stating that Iraq was a threat or the Intelligence Community did not really believe Iraq was a threat but the administration misused the intelligence provided to it. The truth is neither of those are correct. But that has not deterred some conspiratorially critics from contorting themselves, trying to make both arguments simultaneously.
Looking back about a year and a half ago, while the Intelligence Community was focused heavily on Iraq, the President stated that Saddam was ``a grave and growing threat.'' And he was right. Today we have the benefit of hindsight, of a presence on the ground in Iraq, and of the thousands of hours of studying all there is to study on the prewar intelligence picture of Iraq, and we have barely begun to get that job finished.
Taking advantage of all these benefits, I would like to share my assessment so far, and I would note that the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House, and I know of the Senate also, is underway in coming forward with a formal review of all this, which I hope we will be able to share with our colleagues before too long. That is our plan.
The intelligence picture of Iraq, of the threat Iraq posed to its neighbors and to the United States, including the assessment of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, was entirely consistent over a period of almost a decade. The assessment is consistent in the finished intelligence and the daily current intelligence pieces from the mid- 1990s onward. It is consistent in the classified records that have been provided to the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence over the past year. So I have to conclude on that basis alone, if the intelligence adjustments regarding Iraq were the result of political pressure or manipulation, any such machinations must have occurred in the middle of the 1990s. But I do not believe that that is the case. Therefore, if the intelligence picture is unchanging, was there a change in the substance or tone used by this administration to describe that threat? We do not need to go to the Intelligence Community or to any classified records to answer that question. We just need to compare public statements that have been made, and they are available to the world.
In 2003 President Bush said this: ``Today, the gravest danger in the war on terror, the gravest danger facing America and the world, is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. These regimes could use such weapons for blackmail, terror, and mass murder. They could give or sell those weapons to terrorist allies who would use them without the least hesitation.''
In 1998 then President Bill Clinton said: ``In the next century,'' which is now, ``the community of nations may see more and more the very kind of threat Iraq poses now, a rogue state with weapons of mass destruction, ready to use them or provide them to terrorists . . . who traveled the world . . . if we fail to respond today, Saddam . . . will be emboldened tomorrow by the knowledge that they can act with impunity.''
And again in 1998, then President Bill Clinton said: ``There should be no doubt, Saddam's ability to produce and deliver weapons of mass destruction poses a grave threat to the peace of that region and the security of the world . . . His regime threatens the safety of his people, the stability of his region and the security of all the rest of us.'' President Clinton, 1998.
Fast forward, 2003, President Bush: ``Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike . . . Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option.''
Actually, there is not a lot of difference in the leadership that was taking place in this country on the question of the threat that Saddam Hussein and his regime and weapons of mass destruction that might be at his disposal were to the rest of us. It is pretty clear that that was a consistent view.
So, were the intelligence assessments perfect? No. In fact, comparing the intelligence assessment to what has been found in Iraq today, it is clear there were insufficiencies in our intelligence capabilities and they are of concern to us, and on a bipartisan basis we are looking into that. What was the cause of these insufficiencies? Perhaps Iraq, under Saddam, was a difficult target. It was sort of a denied area. There was a ruthless security apparatus there that made information gathering inside the country extremely difficult, very dangerous. We also know that Iraq instituted a truly massive denial and deception program designed to mislead anyone attempting to learn about Saddam's weapons of mass destruction and related programs. Virtually everybody who tried found out that he was involved in denial and deception. So these factors made intelligence collection a little difficult, but it is the tough job that intelligence is there for.
So, what else? I found that cuts in intelligence resources, personnel, and political support in the mid-1990s made many aspects of the intelligence mission in Iraq even more impossible than what we are up against.
Where were these cuts most severe? In the case of Iraq, it turns out it was the decline in our intelligence capabilities that hurt the most. Human intelligence is where we get more than pictures, more than fragments. We get insight into the plans and intentions of our target. What is going on in the minds of the troublemakers? And without good human intelligence, HUMINT, as we call it, it is very difficult indeed to get an accurate picture of what an adversary is up to.
Yet from 1991 to 1998, a time of cutbacks for military and intelligence resources across the board, our human intelligence capabilities suffered dramatically. The number of officers collecting information shrank by about a quarter; the number of operating locations overseas dropped by about a third; reporting sources declined by almost 40 percent; and the number of intelligence reports produced were cut in half or thereabouts.
So we add on top of that the politically correct ``nice spies'' guidelines that were posed in 1995, the risk aversion problem, and we begin to see why information in Iraq was so hard to come by. Good information about plans and intentions, the eyes and ears, just were not sufficient.
So despite these severe limitations, I think the scorecard shows that the United States Intelligence Community provided the best assessment it could. And referring Members to the Director of Central Intelligence's recent speech at Georgetown, the assessments were not as far wrong as some critics of the war would have us believe.
In the final analysis, I think it is important that we get it right. Saddam was a threat. The United Nations believed he was a threat. The vast majority of the Western nations, even those outside of the U.S.- led coalition, believed he was a threat. The U.S. Intelligence Community assessed consistently that Saddam was a threat. The previous administration told the American people that Saddam was a threat. And it has been the official policy of the United States to seek regime change in Iraq since 1998 across two administrations. The difference between 1998 and 2003 is that President Bush took the bold action necessary to address a grave threat where others before him did not. The world is a safer place for it.
Freedom is not free. The purpose of this resolution is to recognize the hardships that the men and women who are doing the dangerous, risky work of protecting our freedoms, the people in our military services, the people in the coalition, the people who are taking risks. After a year, we are here to say, you are doing great work, keep it up, we are so grateful.
We are also including some applause for the people of Iraq who have gone through miserable times and now have some hope, and they have completed the remarkable achievement of a temporary constitution already. This is the sign of a spirited people who are looking for a better life.
This resolution simply says that and commends that. I believe we can all agree that these are the times that we can get together and say, well done, more to do, let us get on with it.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra), and chairman of one of our critical subcommittees.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Gibbons), a member of our committee and the chairman of a subcommittee as well.
(Mr. GIBBONS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood), who is also a subcommittee chairman of the committee.
(Mr. LaHOOD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter), the vice chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Cunningham), a member of the committee.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\3/4\ minutes to the gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. Bass), a former member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the remaining 45 seconds.
Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to have the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) working as the ranking member on our committee to improve our Intelligence Community and to build support for the Intelligence Community in this House. It is important that we deal with a subject like this on a bipartisan basis. I know the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) is anxious and sincere in her call for action. I am too.
I believe we did have a call for action after 9/11, and I think that call for action has led us to go forth as the United States of America and to try to do the right thing on the war on terror. And I think from time to time as we go through that war, it is fine for us to say to the troops, well done, God bless you, and it is time to say to people involved in places like Iraq, we know it is tough, thanks for hanging in there, you have a better future ahead.
That is what this is about. I thank all Members for having that kind of understanding and looking ahead. We have a lot to do; we have got to get along and get it done.