Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act For Defense And For The Reconstruction Of Iraq And Afghanistan, 2004
Mr. Chairman, let me say at the outset that I have the utmost respect for the previous speaker on the floor this evening. He has been a champion throughout his career for freedom and for regime change in this particular instance, and I…
Mr. Chairman, let me say at the outset that I have the utmost respect for the previous speaker on the floor this evening. He has been a champion throughout his career for freedom and for regime change in this particular instance, and I salute him for that, although I disagree with the amendment that he has offered.
The gentleman from California stated that the issue concerning whether there is a government which can indeed enter into a loan agreement, he considered to be flimsy. I would submit to Members of the House, Mr. Chairman, that that issue has certainly been called into question and is far from settled at this point. The fact remains that a loan can be made only with a binding agreement between an agency of the U.S. Government and a willing borrower with the authority to commit the Iraqi people to repayment. I question whether a binding commitment can be undertaken by the Iraqi Governing Council or by Ambassador Bremer on Iraq's behalf. Certainly members of the administration who have brought this to our attention are not at all convinced that a loan can even be effected in a binding way.
But, Mr. Chairman, beside this technical point, let me make a couple of policy arguments as to why I oppose the amendment and why I support the President in his effort to keep this a grant package. Iraq already has well over $100 billion in outstanding debt. Obviously, we are working to get this debt restructured. But still, the nation will be left with enormous obligations for past borrowing. Creating a new U.S. debt will dampen our efforts to get others to forgive debt. We have seen what has happened in the past few days, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Powell and others are going to Madrid to get donors to contribute to the reconstructing of Iraq. Japan is talking about contributing a substantial amount of money, it may be $1.5 billion, in grants. We are hoping that it will more closely approach the figure of $5 billion in grants. If we were to enter into a policy of loans even for a portion of this, then the Madrid conference would be changed to a loaners conference rather than a donors conference, and we would lose a great opportunity.
Why is Japan considering doing this? They are considering doing this in their national interest. It is in their interest just as it is in the interest of the United States taxpayers to have a stable, peaceful, democratic and economically viable Iraq. I think we are going to approve this money, Mr. Chairman, and I think we will get our repayment. We are going to be repaid in an invaluable way. By getting water, power and infrastructure reestablished in Iraq, we
will help to create a peaceful, stable and democratic Iraq government and a more secure America, and it is hard, Mr. Chairman, to put a price tag on that.
The cost of the Marshall Plan was $13 billion in 1948, or some 5 percent of our gross domestic product. This entire package in front of us, reconstruction for Iraq and Afghanistan, represents only one-fifth of 1 percent of our GDP. The reality is that we are trying to rebuild an Iraq and an Iraqi economy that has suffered from decades of a corrupt Saddam Hussein regime. We must achieve peace in Iraq. We cannot allow Iraq to become a failed state or to disintegrate into several states that foment terrorism and instability.
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Regula), a subcommittee chairman.
(Mr. REGULA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra).
Mr. Chairman, it is my pleasure to yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Leach).