Mr. Speaker, I submit into the Record the following statement of Professor Harley Shaiken, excerpted from the statement submitted in connection with the House Committee on Ways and Means hearing of April 21, 2005 on the Dominican…
Mr. Speaker, I submit into the Record the following statement of Professor Harley Shaiken, excerpted from the statement submitted in connection with the House Committee on Ways and Means hearing of April 21, 2005 on the Dominican Republic--Central America Free Trade Agreement.
The Dominican Republic--Central America Free Trade Agreement
(By Harley Shaiken)
statement for the house committee on ways and means, april 2005
The standard by which to judge this agreement is
straightforward: does the Dominican Republic-Central America
Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) promote development and
democracy, or does it create a small circle of wealthy
winners and a far larger group of impoverished losers?
Expanded trade has the potential to propel the former, but
this agreement delivers the later. The result threatens
rather than benefits U.S. workers. It's not that the train is
moving too slowly, it's that DR-CAFTA is running in the wrong
direction.
Plaguing the agreement is an unnecessary tradeoff: DR-CAFTA
opens trade while locking in the labor status quo or worse.
For citizens of Central America and the Dominican Republic,
the tradeoff represents a squandered opportunity; for U.S.
workers and their communities, it means an assault on wages
and working conditions; for firms it may mean easier access
to markets tomorrow but diminished markets in the coming
years. DR-CAFTA provides strong language and tough penalties
in all areas related to investment--at times riding roughshod
over the six countries--but abandons labor rights largely to
rhetoric and good intentions.
In some areas tough provisions favor special interests at
the expense of the Central American countries and the
Dominican Republic. Consider agriculture. The rural
population ranges from 34 percent in the Dominican Republic
to 60 percent in Guatemala. See Ferranti, D., G. Perry, W.
Foster, D. Lederman, A. Valdez, ``Beyond the City: The Rural
Contribution to Development,'' (Washinton D.C.: World Bank,
2005). How are small farmers supposed to compete with heavily
subsidized U.S. exports? Due to subsidies for rice
production, the U.S. exported paddy rice to Central America
at a price that was 18-20 percent lower than its cost of
production. See Oxfarn International, ``A raw deal for rice
under DR-CAFTA,'' November 2003, (5), http:// www.oxfam.org.uk/what__we__do/issues/trade/downloads/ bp68__Price. pdf. In pharmaceuticals, Professor Angelina
Godoy has found that ``the intellectual-property provisions
in CAFTA actually extend the length of time during which the
major pharmaceutical companies' products are guaranteed sole
access to markets'' which, in her view as well as that of
many other observers such as Amnesty International, ``just
may be a death sentence for many in the Dominican Republic
and Central America.'' See Angelina Godoy, ``What makes free
trade free?'' Seattle Times, April 14, 2005, http:// seattletimes.nwsource.com/htmllopinion/ 2002240604__nocafta14.html; and Amnesty International,
``Guatemala, Memorandum to the Government of Guatemala:
Amnesty International's concerns regarding the current human
rights situation,'' (Washington D.C.: Amnesty International,
April 20, 2005) http://web.amnesty.org/library/lndex/ ENGAMR340142005. Many Latin Americans are likely to view
provisions such as these as indicating that the U.S. is
more serious about strong-arming weaker neighbors than
sustainable economic integration.
Let's be clear from the start. This is not a debate about
``free trade'' versus ``protectionism.'' Instead, the
challenge is defining free trade for the twenty-first
century. The right trade agreement could both encourage
growth and move towards a more broadly shared prosperity,
defining what one might call ``smart trade.'' To do this,
comparative advantage must be defined by innovation rather
than repression. Labor standards are vital for protecting
workers, but they also can help expand purchasing power,
build healthier markets, and lay the basis for more robust
trade.
What then is wrong with the labor provisions in DR-CAFTA?
They send a clear message to the governments involved: the
current situation on labor rights is acceptable and even
fewer rights for workers will do. The agreement lays out
lofty labor rights goals and then backs them up with weak,
convoluted language and meager resources. Moreover, these
inadequate provisions replace language that has had a modest
positive impact. Consequently, firms willing to travel the
low road will define competitiveness, cutting off those who
want to do the right thing.
In this testimony, I plan to explore three themes: labor
laws and their enforcement, the promotion of reform, and
finally ``smart trade.''
labor laws and their enforcement
For millions throughout Central America and the Dominican
Republic, the issue of labor rights is not an abstraction but
an urgent need. Although labor laws differ among these six
countries, there is little serious debate among scholars as
to the situation on the ground. The issue is not simply
selective abuses but a systematic denial of the right to
freely join a union or the right to bargain collectively.
Numerous reports from the ILO, Human Rights Watch, the United
Nations, and the United States Department of State confirm
the seriousness of the problems. See U.S. State Department
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, ``Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices 2004,'' for Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua,
February 29, 2005, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/ cI4138.htm; Human Rights Watch, ``Deliberate Indifference: EI
Salvador's Failure to Protect Workers' Rights,'' vol. 15, no.
5, December 2003, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/ elsalvador1203/; Human Rights Watch, ``CAFTA's Weak Labor
Rights Protections: Why the Present Accord Should be
Opposed,'' March 2004, http://hrw.org/englishl/docs/2004/03/ 09/cafta90days.pdf; ILO, ``Fundamental Principals and Rights
at Work: A Labour Law Study,'' (Geneva, International Labour
Office, 2003), http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ download/cafta.pdf.
When it comes to making the choice on whether or not to
join a union, workers currently risk dismissal, blacklist,
violence, and even death. The results are readily apparent in
the low union density. In Guatemala less than 3 percent of
the workforce belongs to a union. See U.S. State Department,
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, ``Guatemala
Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2004,'' February
29, 2005, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/ 41762.htm. In El Salvador, no independent trade unions
have been formed in the last four years.
The low trade union density is only the tip of the iceberg.
The unions that do exist tend to be fragmented, weak, and
isolated. Effective collective bargaining has become a rarity
rather than the norm. The percentage of workers covered by
collective bargaining agreements in three ofthe six DR-CAFTA
countries based on 2003 data ranges from a low end of 1.4 and
1.5 percent in Honduras and Nicaragua, respectively, to 4.3
percent in El Salvador--not exactly a critical mass for
effective collective bargaining. See International Labour
Organization Decent Work Indicators Database http:// www.oit.or.cr/estad/td/indexe.php
A trade agreement should stimulate positive change, not
ratify the status quo or worse. What type of labor standards
might be rigorous enough to improve the conditions of work
yet flexible enough to recognize different levels of
development? One model is the five core labor standards
developed by the International Labor Organization (ILO). See
International Labor Organization, ``Fundamental ILO
Conventions,''
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/norm/whatare/ fundam/index.htm. particularly the right of association
(Convention 87) and the right to organize and bargain
collectively (Convention 98).
Although DR-CAFTA pays rhetorical homage to these
standards, in practice it throws them overboard. The
agreement calls for each country to enforce its existing
labor codes, no matter how inadequate or distant from the ILO
standards. The agreement recognizes ``the right of each Party
to establish its own domestic labor standards, and to adopt
or modify accordingly its labor laws.'' It then goes on to
state that ``each Party shall strive to ensure that its laws
provide for labor standards consistent with the
internationally recognized labor rights. . . . and shall
strive to improve those standards in that light.'' See United
States Trade Representative, ``The Dominican Republic-Central
America Free Trade Agreement,'' August, 5, 2004, http:// www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/DR-CAFTA/ DRCAFTA_Final_Texts/Section_Index.html. ``Strive to ensure''
and ``strive to improve''? This is the kind of language many
would like to see on April 15 when they have to pay their
taxes since it is virtually unenforceable. A standard based
on effort is hardly a serious standard. Instead of ``striving
to ensure'' international standards are met, the agreement
could commit to upholding them and provide clear penalties if
they are not upheld.
The domestic laws often read as if they are designed to
thwart the formation of unions, and slipshod enforcement
hardly improves the situation. Companies wanting to avoid
unions can do just about anything; workers seeking to join
unions face threats and intimidation. Protection against
anti-union bias is akin to snow in San Francisco; it happens
but not frequently. ``In practice, labor laws on the books in
Central America are not sufficient to deter employers from
violations,'' an International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF) study
found. See International Labor Rights Fund, ``An
Examination of Six Basic Labor Rights--Executive Summary
of Reports on Honduras, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador
and Guatemala,'' based on a study by Asociacion Servicios
de Promocion Laboral (ASEPROLA), April 5, 2005, http:// www.laborrights.org/. Byzantine regulations tend to tie
unions into knots, laying out registration procedures that
are more maze than procedure. In Honduras, for example,
the ILRF found ``obstacles and delays in union
registration constitute a violation of ILO Convention 87
on the right to associate.'' Ibid. Weak as labor rights
are, the track record hardly inspires confidence that they
won't be ratcheted downwards in response to globalization.
Enforcement is squeezed by impunity and corruption,
ineptitude and fear. In Guatemala, the U.S. State Department
concluded in its 2005 human rights report that ``Workers had
little confidence that the responsible executive and judicial
institutions would effectively protect or defend their rights
if violated.'' The report stated that ``the weakness of labor
inspectors, the failures of the judicial system, poverty, the
legacy of violent repression of labor activists during the
internal conflict, the climate of impunity, and the long-
standing hostility between the business establishment and
independent and self-governing labor associations all
constrained the exercise of worker rights.'' See U.S. State
Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor,
``Guatemala Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2004,''
February 29, 2005, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/ 41762.htm.
The promotion of reform
There is little dispute that labor conditions are bad
today; the real question is will DR-CAFTA make them better?
In fact, it will make them worse. What makes the DR-CAFTA
approach particularly problematic is that it replaces the
modest existing protections for labor rights embedded in two
unilateral trade preference programs: the Generalized System
of Preferences (GSP) and the Caribbean Basin Initiative
(CBI). Much of the halting, modest reform that has taken
place in the region over the last 15 years stems from the
pressure brought through these programs. For example, EI
Salvador was put on GSP review for abusing worker rights in
1992 and labor law reform followed within two years. See AFL-
CIO, ``The Real Record on Workers' Rights in Central
America,'' (Washington D.C.: AFL-CIO, April 2005), http:// www.aflcio.org/issuespolitics/globaleconomy/upload/ CAFTABook.pdf.
What impetus is supposed to change destructive practices
this deeply rooted? The core problem is one of political
will, not lack of technical resources. The most powerful
incentive for change is conditioning U.S. ratification on
domestic labor law reform. Unfortunately, that horse has
already left the barn. Some proponents argue expanded trade
will result in more democratic rights. Burgeoning trade does
not seem to have done much in Mexico--especially in the
export sector--in the first decade of NAFTA. Cross border
trade between the U.S. and Mexico has tripled yet the number
of independent unions remains in single digits.
Realistically, powerful elites retain a strong hold on the
DR-CAFTA economies. If expanded trade simply translates to
expanded income for these elites, a small number of wealthy
families may become wealthier and happier, but little will
be passed along to the majority of the people of these
countries. The growth of the middle class will be thwarted
and, ironically, the potential market for U.S. goods
dampened. By the same token, the pressure will
correspondingly increase on the wages and working
conditions for U.S. workers. The goal should be to
harmonize standards upwards not the other way around.
Smart trade
The entire ratification process has caused severe strains
and protests in civil society throughout Central America.
Reflecting the gap between the ratification process for
DRCAFTA and popular sentiment is the fact that legislatures
often had to pass the agreement in the dead of night. The
Honduran Congress ratified CAFTA in an early morning surprise
vote specifically because protests were expected. The
Guatemala Congress approved CAFTA in emergency session and
under exceptional circumstances also because of anticipated
protests. It passed by a lopsided vote of 126-12 on March 10;
a Gallup poll carried out two weeks later (March 14-23) found
that 65 percent of those polled felt that the agreement would
harm the country. See Matthew Kennis, ``Despite Ratification
Anti-CAFTA protests Continue in Guatemala,'' IRC Americas
Program, (Silver City, NM: International Relations Center,
April 13, 2005), http://www.americaspolicy.org/pdf/ commentary/0504guatcafta.pdf.
When it came to the issue of labor rights, tough
negotiating dissolved into acceptance of the status quo. The
danger, according to former President of Costa Rica Rodrigo
Carazo Odio, is that ``corporations take advantage of cheap
labor, operating in enclaves with limited links to the
national economy, trapping the region in a spiral of low
salaries, low aggregate value and lack of compliance with
basic labor standards, such as the freedom of association and
the right to collective negotiation.'' See Rodrigo Carazo
Odio, letter to the Members of the United States Congress
Washington, DC, May 27, 2004.
We need to reframe the debate on the issues of labor rights
and development. It is not a question of free trade versus
protectionism, but rather ``smart trade'' versus ``polarizing
trade.'' Smart trade recognizes rights, spurs economic growth
with equity, and promotes democracy; polarizing trade might
spur trade in the short run but the benefits go to the
winners' circle while the number of losers grows far larger.
Democracy itself could be a casualty.
Smart trade requires four provisions:
1. Upward harmonization of domestic labor law to match the
core ILO conventions as the goal of a three-year phase-in
period. The granting of trade and investment benefits would
follow agreed upon reform in a country's labor law. See Carol
Pier, ``The Right Way to Trade,'' Washington Post, August 1,
2003.
2. The ILO five core labor rights embedded in the core
agreement, subject to strong enforcement provisions and
penalties.
3. A development fund targeted for infrastructure and
education. This fund would reinforce competitiveness in the
six countries and place them on the ``high road.''
4. Expanded adjustment assistance for U.S. workers
negatively impacted by trade. This assistance should also be
proactive in industries threatened by trade.
No trade agreement can solve all the problems of
development and globalization, but it should point in the
right direction. A trade agreement that fosters prosperity
and promotes democracy is possible and essential for the
region and for the United States. Smart trade lays the basis
for growing incomes and markets in Central America and the
Dominican Republic and expanded U.S. exports and jobs. It
begins to define a better model for integrating into the
global economy. Unfortunately, that model is not this