Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time, and I rise today to bring some more facts to the debate over industrial loan companies. ILCs are well regulated, both at the State and Federal levels. They have played an…
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time, and I rise today to bring some more facts to the debate over industrial loan companies.
ILCs are well regulated, both at the State and Federal levels. They have played an important part in our country's financial system for over 100 years. I have a letter from the chairman, Donald Powell, of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and I will provide it for the Record, but I also thought I would just read some of the observations that Chairman Powell makes about ILCs.
Chairman Powell says that industrial loan companies and industrial banks have existed since the early 1900s, and overall it is the FDIC's view that ILC charters pose no greater safety and soundness risk than other charter types. As with any other insured institution, ILCs are subject to examinations and other supervisory activities. The FDIC's authority to pursue formal or informal enforcement actions against an ILC is the same as the FDIC authority with respect to any other State nonmember bank, with limited exceptions. In short, the FDIC does not believe that there are any compelling safety and soundness reasons to impose constraints on this charter type that are not imposed on other charter types.
Chairman Powell of the FDIC goes on to say that the FDIC and the State chartering authorities directly supervise insured ILCs, which must comply with the FDIC's rules and regulations, including those requirements for capital standards, safe and sound operations, and consumer compliance and community reinvestment. Further, as he says, the FDIC has the authority to examine any affiliate of an ILC, including its parent company, as may be necessary, to determine the relationship between the ILC and the affiliate, and to determine the effect of such relationship on the ILC.
I thought I would bring those facts to light. I know that some competitors of ILCs worry because they do not want more competition in the banking marketplace, but we all know that competition is good for consumers, it is good for businesses, and it is good for our economy as a whole. And since I have heard other companies make the argument that ILCs are not safe and sound, I wanted to respond by saying that ILCs are heavily regulated financial institutions, ILCs are regulated by the FDIC and by State banking regulators in every State in which they operate, and I think we should judge ILCs on the facts.
To that end, Mr. Chairman, I submit the letter of Chairman Donald Powell for the Record herewith:
Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation,
Washington, DC, April 30, 2003.
Hon. Edward R. Royce,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Congressman Royce: Thank you for your recent letter
concerning industrial loan companies. We are closely
monitoring the recent attention that industrial loan
companies are receiving and appreciate your questions.
Industrial loan companies and industrial banks
(collectively, ILCs) have existed since the early 1900s.
States with existing insured ILCs include California,
Colorado, Indiana, Minnesota, Nevada, and Utah. There are 51
insured ILCs, with the vast majority operated from Utah (24)
and California (17). The charters are unique in that, as long
as they meet certain criteria (typically, not accepting
demand deposits), they are not considered ``banks'' under the
Bank Holding Company Act. As a result, an ILC's parent
company is not subject to supervision by the Federal Reserve.
Just as is true of unitary thrift holding companies and
parent companies of limited-purpose credit card banks,
the parent companies of ILCs include a diverse group of
financial and commercial firms.
Overall, it is the FDIC's view that ILC charters pose no
greater safety and soundness risk than other charter types.
As with any other insured institution, ILCs are subject to
examinations and other supervisory activities. The FDIC's
authority to pursue formal or informal enforcement actions
against an ILC is the same as the FDIC's authority with
respect to any other state nonmember bank, with limited
exceptions. Those exceptions pertain to cross-guaranty
authority and golden parachute payments, and legislative
changes to eliminate those exceptions are being pursued in
H.R. 1375, the proposed Financial Services Regulatory Relief
Act of 2003. In short, the FDIC does not believe there are
compelling safety and soundness reasons to impose constraints
on this charter type that are not imposed on other charter
types.
The risk posed by any insured depository institution
depends on the appropriateness of the business plan and
model, management's competency in administering the
institution's affairs, and the quality and implementation of
risk management programs. Similar to institutions with other
charter types, an ILC's capital adequacy and overall safety
and soundness is driven by the composition and stability of
its lending, investing and funding activities and the
competence of management.
The FDIC and the state chartering authorities directly
supervise insured ILCs, which must comply with the FDIC's
Rules and Regulations, including, but not limited to, those
requirements for capital standards, safe and sound
operations, and consumer compliance and community
reinvestment. ILCs also are subject to Sections 23A and 23B
of the Federal Reserve Act, which restrict or limit
transactions with a bank's affiliates and the Federal Reserve
Board's Regulation O, which governs credit to insiders and
their related interests. Further, the FDIC has the authority
to examine any affiliate of an ILC, including its parent
company, as may be necessary to determine the relationship
between the ILC and the affiliate and to determine the effect
of such relationship on the ILC.
Answers to your specific questions are enclosed. If you
would like additional information, please do not hesitate to
contact me or Alice Goodman, Director of our Office of
Legislative Affairs, at (202) 898-8730.
Sincerely,
Donald E. Powell,
Chairman.
Enclosure.
Response of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection to Questions Concerning Industrial
Loan Companies
In what banking activities are these institutions engaged? Do
they have the authority to provide services that may not
be offered by full-service commercial banks?
Generally, the authority of industrial loan companies and
industrial banks (collectively, ILCs) to engage in activities
is determined by the laws of the chartering state. The
authority granted to an ILC may vary from one state to
another and may be different from the authority granted to
commercial banks. Except for offering demand deposits, an ILC
generally may engage in all types of consumer and commercial
lending activities and all other banking activities
permissible for banks in general.
Core ILC functions are traditional financial activities
that can generally be engaged in by institutions of all
charter types. The exception would be institutions organized
and chartered as limited-purpose institutions, which
generally focus on credit card or trust activities.
Existing ILCs can generally be grouped according to one of
four broadly defined business models:
Institutions that are operated as community-focused
institutions, including stand-alone institutions and those
serving a community niche within a larger organization. These
institutions often provide credit to consumers and small- to
medium-sized businesses. In addition to retail deposits (many
ILCs offer NOW accounts), funding sources may include
commercial and wholesale deposits, as well as borrowings.
Institutions that operate within a larger corporate
organization may also obtain funding through the parent
organization.
Independent institutions that focus on specialty lending
programs, including leasing, factoring, and real estate
activities. Funding sources for this relatively small number
of institutions may include retail and commercial deposits,
wholesale deposits, and borrowings.
Institutions that are embedded in organizations whose
activities are predominantly financial in nature, or within
the financial services units of larger corporate
organizations. These institutions may serve a particular
lending, funding, or processing function within the
organization. Lending strategies can carry greatly, but,
within a specific institutions, are often focused on a
limited range of products, such as credit cards, real estate
mortgages, or commercial loans. Corporate strategies play a
larger role in determing funding strategies in these cases,
with some institutions periodically selling some or all
outstanding loans to the parent organization. Parent
assessments of funding options across all business units
frequently determine the specific tactics at the ILC level. A
few institutions restrict themselves to facilitating
corporate access to the payment system or supporting cash
management functions, such as administering escrowed funds.
Institutions that directly support the parent
organizations' distinctly commercial activities. These
institutions largely finance retail purchases of parent
company products, ranging from general merchandise to
automobiles, truck stop activities, fuel for rental car
operations, and heating and air conditioning installations.
Loan products might include credit cards, lines of credit,
and term loans. Funding is generally limited to wholesale or
money center operations, borrowings, or other options from
within the parent organization.
From a federal law perspective, one of the primary
differences between an ILC charter and other depository
institution charters is that certain ILCs have a
grandfathered exemption from the requirements and
restrictions of the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA).
Generally, an LIC can maintain its exemption so long as it
meets at least one of the following conditions: (1) the
institution does not accept demand deposits, (2) the
institution's total assets are less than $100,000,000, or (3)
control of the institution has not been acquired by any
company after August 10, 1987.
How does the FDIC go about regulating ILCs? What authority
does the FDIC have to examine ILC parent companies? Does
the FDIC feel it has the tools necessary to adequately
and comprehensively regulate ILCs and their relationship
to their owners?
The FDIC regulates ILCs in the same manner as other state
nonmember institutions. ILCs are subject to the FDIC's safety
and soundness regulations (with two exceptions discussed
below), as well as federal consumer protection regulations.
Like all insured depository institutions, ILCs receive
regular examinations, during which compliance with the
regulations is reviewed and overall performance and condition
are analyzed. For FDIC-insured, state-chartered institutions
that are not members of the Federal Reserve System, the FDIC
and/or the state authority will conduct the examination. The
FDIC has agreements with most states to conduct examinations
under alternating schedules, although in the case of a
troubled institution, the FDIC and the estate authority
generally conduct joint or concurrent examinations.
Transactions with affiliates are reviewed during each
examination. An ILC's transactions with its affiliates are
restricted by Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve
Act, which are made applicable to state nonmember banks in
general by section 18(j) of the FDI Act, 12 U.S.C.
Sec. 1828(j). Section 23A essentially limits the total amount
of loans to affiliates and limits other transactions between
a bank and its affiliates. These restrictions also apply to
loans to third parties to pay debts to or purchase goods and
services from an affiliate. Section 23B generally prohibits
any transaction with an affiliate on terms or conditions less
favorable to the bank than a transaction with an unrelated
third party.
While the FDIC does not have statutory authority to
supervise the parent companies of ILCs, the FDIC does have
the authority, in examining any insured depository
institution, to examine any affiliate of the institution
(under 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1820(b)(4)), including its parent
company, as may be necessary to determine the relationship
between the institution and the affiliate and to determine
the effect of such relationship on the institution. In the
case of a parent subject to the reporting requirements of
another regulatory body covered under the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act of 1999, such as the Securities and Exchange
Commission or a state insurance commissioner, the FDIC has
agreements in place to share information with the
functional regulator.
In determining whether to grant deposit insurance to an
ILC, the FDIC must consider the same statutory factors of
section 6 of the FDI Act, 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1816, that it
considers for all other applications for deposit insurance.
These factors are:
The financial history and condition of the depository
institution;
The adequacy of its capital structure;
Its future earnings prospects;
The general character and fitness of its management;
The risk presented by such depository institution to the
deposit insurance fund;
The convenience and needs of the community to be served by
the depository institution; and
Whether its corporate powers are consistent with the
purposes of the Act.
The FDIC has determined that there are two limitations in
our authority regarding ILCs as compared to other
institutions. These two limitations would be addressed by
remedies included in the Financial Services Regulatory Relief
Act of 2003, as proposed. These are:
Amendment to clarify the FDIC's cross-guarantee authority:
As part of the Federal Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Congress
established a system that generally permits the FDIC to
assess liability across commonly controlled institutions for
FDIC losses caused by the default of one of the institutions.
Currently, cross-guarantee liability is limited to insured
depository institutions that are commonly controlled as
defined in the statute. The definition of ``commonly
controlled'' limits liability to insured
depository institutions that are controlled by the same
depository institution holding company, i.e., either a bank
holding company or a savings and loan holding company. Since
the parent company of an ILC is neither a bank holding
company nor a savings and loan holding company, ILCs that are
owned by the same parent company would not be ``commonly
controlled.'' As a result, cross-guarantee liability may not
attach to ILCs that are owned by the same parent company. The
Financial Services regulatory Relief Act of 2003 contains
language that would enhance the FDIC's efforts to protect the
deposit insurance funds by establishing parity with other
charter types. This discretionary authority would extend only
against an insured depository institution under common
control with the defaulting institution.
Amendment to clarify the FDIC's Golden Parachute
authority: As part of H.R. 1375, there also is an amendment
to section 18(k) of the FDI Act, 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1828(k), to
clarify that the FDIC could prohibit or limit a nonbank
holding company's golden parachute payment or indemnification
payment. In 1990 Congress authorized the FDIC to prohibit or
limit prepayment of salaries or any liabilities or legal
expenses of an institution-affiliated party by an insured
depository institution or a depository institution holding
company. Such payments are prohibited if they are made in
contemplation of the insolvency of such institution or
holding company or if they prevent the proper application of
assets to creditors or create a preference for creditors of
the institution. Due to the existing statutory definition of
a depository institution holding company, it is not clear
that the FDIC is authorized to prohibit these types of
payments made by nonbank holding companies (such as ILC
parent companies).
What differences, if any, exist between the manner in which
the FDIC regulates industrial loan banks compared with
commercial banks?
As indicated above, the FDIC regulates ILCs in the same
manner as all other state nonmember institutions.
In your view, would ILCs pose a greater risk to the safety
and soundness of the banking system than traditional
banks if both received enhanced de novo interstate
branching authority?
We do not believe that ILCs would pose a greater risk to
the safety and soundness of the banking system than
traditional banks if both received enhanced de novo
interstate branching authority. As described above, insured
ILCs are subject to the same Federal supervisory regime that
applies to other insured institutions. ILC transactions with
their parent companies are subject to the same restrictions
that apply to transactions between other insured institutions
and their parent companies.
Can you comment generally on the capital adequacy and safety
and soundness record of the ILCs and compare these to the
performance of commercial banks?
ILCs currently have an examination rating distribution
that is similar to the insured banking universe. Similar to
institutions with other charter types, an ILC's capital
adequacy and overall safety and soundness is driven by the
composition and stability of its lending, investing and
funding activities as well as competence of management.
For troubled ILCs, several common issues have generally
been evident, each reflecting faulty strategic or tactical
decisions rather than issues of permissible activities,
commercial affiliations, or the regulatory regime over the
larger corporate organization:
Poorly conceived lending strategies, characterized by
concentrations in relatively higher-risk loan problems,
economic sectors, or borrowers, have resulted in an excessive
volume of poor quality credits.
Less than satisfactory internal processes have hampered
institutions' ability to identify and respond to changing
circumstances, including deterioration in credit quality,
which have thwarted timely corrective actions or collection
efforts.
Reliance on potentially volatile funds management
strategies, including wholesale deposit solicitations,
borrowings, and large-scale loan sales, have placed
additional strain on the institutions' earnings performance
and liquidity posture.
If any institution is identified as troubled, the FDIC
modifies its supervisory strategy. In addition, these
institutions are generally subject to formal and informal
enforcement actions. As a rule, the FDIC's supervisory
strategies and specific actions are coordinated with those
of the chartering state authority. Further, in those
situations in which the parent organization controls
multiple insured institutions, the FDIC also coordinates
with the other state authorities or primary federal
regulators to ensure that a comprehensive strategy is
implemented.
Given the concerns some observers have raised about the
ILCs' ability to affiliate with a commercial entity, it is
important to note that the current group of troubled ILCs
have problems that are not unique to the ILC charter, nor do
the troubled ILCs have a history of unusual influence from
parent companies or affiliates. As described above, the
issues facing the troubled institutions are not dissimilar to
those encountered under all charter types, including those in
a traditional bank holding company framework.
Can you describe the regulatory framework that addresses
safety and soundness concerns, or potential conflicts of
interest, that may arise from the relationship of ILCs to
their parent companies?
In general, the regulatory framework used to address safety
and soundness concerns and potential conflicts of interest
regarding an ILC and its parent is the same as that
applicable to any insured state bank. For example, with
regard to safety and soundness, section 8 of the FDI Act, 12
U.S.C. Sec. 1818, generally provides the FDIC with the
authority to (i) terminate or suspend the insurance of an ILC
for unsafe or unsound practices or unsafe or unsound
condition, and (ii) order the ILC to cease and desist from
engaging in an unsafe or unsound practice, or from the
violation of any law, rule, regulation, written condition
imposed in connection with the granting of any application,
or any written agreement with the FDIC.
We do not believe that the potential for conflicts of
interest is any greater for ILCs than for other FDIC-insured
institutions operating in a holding company structure. For
example, an ILC and its parent company are subject to the
tying restrictions of section 106 of the Bank Holding Company
Act Amendments of 1970 to the same extent as if the ILC were
a ``bank'' and the parent company were a ``bank holding
company.'' Generally, the tying restrictions provide that a
bank may not extend credit, sell or lease property, or
furnish any service, or fix or vary the consideration for any
of the foregoing based upon any of five specific conditions.
Those conditions include, for example, that the customer
obtain some additional credit, property or service from the
holding company or an affiliate.
In order to ensure sufficient autonomy and insulation of
the bank from the parent, the state authority or the FDIC
typically imposes some or all of the following controls:
Executive ILC management is onsite at the ILC, as opposed
to the sometimes distant location of the parent and
affiliates;
The ILC Board of Directors consists of local
representatives who are capable of providing strong oversight
over the operations of the bank and establishing prudent
policies and procedures;
Lending files, credit documentation and ILC policies are
maintained at the institution and not the parent;
Lending policies and authorities are established and
enforced by the ILC;
The bank's policies, processes and activities are
consistent with regulatory laws, regulations, policy
statements and other regulatory guidance;
Definitive bank-level business plans are established and
followed by the bank;
All transactions with the parent or affiliate pass the
strictest arms-length scrutiny; and
Sufficient resources are available at the ILC to carry out
ILC activities.
With the above-noted prudential factors in place and
experienced bankers at the helm of ILCs, we have not noted
problems or issues unique to the ILC charter.