Mr. Speaker, the State Department also released today a report titled, ``Documenting Atrocities in Darfur.'' The report documents over 1,100 interviews with refugees in Chad. The report says that in over \3/4\ of the attacks, the…
Mr. Speaker, the State Department also released today a report titled, ``Documenting Atrocities in Darfur.'' The report documents over 1,100 interviews with refugees in Chad.
The report says that in over \3/4\ of the attacks, the Government of Sudan was directly involved and that the attacks were systematic and widespread.
I submit for the Record a copy of this report.
The evidence of the atrocities which have been committed is now clear. It is now time for the international community to act. There is now the chance to stop genocide in its tracks. We must keep pressure on Khartoum. The people living in the camps have little time left. Many are already gone.
The international community must come together to save lives. We must not fail the people of Darfur.
Again, I commend the administration for documenting the horrific evidence of genocide. The U.S. has spoken the truth. The international community must now do the same. There is little time to waste.
Documenting Atrocities in Darfur
[State Publication 11182, Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research September
2004]
Summary
The conflict between the Government of Sudan (GOS), and two
rebel groups that began in 2003 has precipitated the worst
humanitarian and human rights crisis in the world today. The
primary cleavage is ethnic: Arabs (GOS and militia forces)
vs. non-Arab villagers belonging primarily to the Zaghawa,
Massalit, and Fur ethnic groups. Both groups are
predominantly Muslim.
A U.S. Government project to conduct systematic interviews
of Sudanese refugees in Chad reveals a consistent and
widespread pattern of atrocities committed against non-Arab
villagers in the Darfur region of western Sudan. This
assessment is based on semi-structured interviews with 1,136
randomly selected refugees in 19 locations in eastern Chad.
Most respondents said government forces militia fighters, or
a combination of both had completely destroyed their
villages. Sixty-one percent of the respondents witnessed the
killing of a family member, 16 percent said they had been
raped or had heard about a rape from a victim. About one-
third of the refugees heard racial epithets while under
attack. Four-fifths said their livestock was stolen; nearly
half asserted their personal property was looted. This
assessment highlights incidents and atrocities that have led
to the displacement of large portions of Darfur's non-Arabs.
An Atrocities Documentation Team, assembled at the
initiative of the US Department of State's Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL), conducted interviews
in Chad in July and August. The team was primarily composed
of independent experts recruited by the Coalition for
International Justice (CIJ), and also included experts from
the American Bar Association (ABA), DRL, and the State
Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) as
well as the US Agency for International Development (USAID).
INR was responsible for compiling the survey data and
producing the final report. USAID met the costs of the CIJ
and ABA.
Humanitarian Crisis
As of August 2004, based on available information, more
than 405 villages in Darfur had been completely destroyed,
with an additional 123 substantially damaged, since February
2003. Approximately 200,000 persons had sought refuge in
eastern Chad as of August, according to the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); the UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports another 1.2
million internally displaced persons (IDPs) remain in western
Sudan. The total population of Darfur is 6 million. The lack
of security in the region continues to threaten displaced
persons. Insecurity and heavy rains continue to disrupt
humanitarian assistance. The UN World Food Program provided
food to nearly 940,000 people in Darfur in July. Nonetheless,
since the beginning of the Darfur food program, a total of 82
out of 154 concentrations of IDPs have received food, leaving
72 locations unassisted. Relief and health experts warn that
malnutrition and mortality are likely to increase as forcibly
displaced and isolated villagers suffer from hunger and
infectious diseases that will spread quickly among densely
populated and malnourished populations. The health situation
for the 200,000 refugees in Chad is ominous. The U.S. Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention estimate that one in three
children in the refugee settlements in Chad is suffering from
acute malnutrition and that crude mortality rates are already
well above emergency threshold levels (one per 10,000 per
day).
Human Rights Crisis
The non-Arab population of Darfur continues to suffer from
crimes against humanity. A review of 1,136 interviews shows a
consistent pattern of atrocities, suggesting close
coordination between GOS forces and Arab militia elements,
commonly known as the Jingaweit (Janjaweed). (``Jingaweit''
is an Arabic term meaning ``horse and gun.'')
Despite the current cease-fire and UN Security Council
Resolution 1556, Jingaweit violence against civilians has
continued (cease-fire violations by both the Jingaweit and
the rebels have continued as well). Media reports on August
10, 16, and 19 chronicled GOS-Jingaweit attacks in Western
Darfur. In addition to their work on the survey, the
interviewers had the opportunity to speak with newly arrived
refugees who provided accounts that tended to confirm press
reports of continuing GOS participation in recent attacks.
Refugees who fled the violence on August 6 and 8 spoke with
the team, providing accounts consistent with media reports:
joint GOS military and Jingaweit attacks; strafing by
helicopter gunships followed by ground attacks by the GOS
military in vehicles and Jingaweit on horseback; males being
shot or knifed; and women being abducted or raped.
Respondents reported these attacks destroyed five villages.
Multiple respondents also reported attacks on the IDP camp of
Arja.
The UN estimates the violence has affected 2.2 million of
Darfur's 6 million residents. The GOS claims it has been
unable to prevent Jingaweit atrocities and that the
international community has exaggerated the extent and nature
of the crisis. The GOS has improved international relief
access to IDPs in Darfur since July, but problems, including
lack of security and seasonal rains, have hampered relief
programs. Survey results indicate that most Sudanese refugees
state that Jingaweit militias and GOS military forces
collaborate in carrying out systematic attacks against non-
Arab villages in Darfur.
Ethnographic Background
Darfur covers about one-fifth of Sudan's vast territory and
is home to one-seventh of its population. It includes
a mixture of Arab and non-Arab ethnic groups, both of
which are predominantly Muslim (see map, p. 6). The Fur
ethnic group (Darfur means ``homeland of the Fur'') is the
largest non-Arab ethnic group in the region. Northern
Darfur State is home to the nomadic non-Arab Zaghawa but
also includes a significant number of Arabs, such as the
Meidab. Sedentary non-Arabs from the Fur, Massalit, Daju,
and other ethnic groups live in Western Darfur State. The
arid climate and the competition for scarce resources over
the years have contributed to recurring conflict between
nomadic Arab herders and non-Arab farmers, particularly
over land and grazing rights. Various ethnic groups have
fought over access to water, grazing rights, and prized
agricultural land as desertification has driven herders
farther south.
Political and Military Conflict
Ethnic violence affected the Darfur region in the 1980s. In
1986, Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi armed the ethnic-Arab
tribes to fight John Garang's Sudanese People's Liberation
Army (SPLA). After helping the GOS beat back an SPLA attack
in Darfur in 1991, one of these Arab tribes sought to resolve
ancient disputes over land and water rights by attacking the
Zaghawa, Fur, and Massalit peoples. Arab groups launched a
campaign in Southern Darfur State that resulted in the
destruction of some 600 non-Arab villages and the deaths of
about 3,000 people. The GOS itself encouraged the formation
of an ``Arab Alliance'' in Darfur to keep non-Arab ethnic
groups in check. Weapons flowed into Darfur and the conflict
spread. After President Bashir seized power in 1989, the new
government disarmed non-Arab ethnic groups but allowed
politically loyal Arab allies to keep their weapons.
In February 2003, rebels calling themselves the Darfur
Liberation Front (DLF) attacked GOS military installations
and the provincial capital of A Fashir. The DLF complained of
economic marginalization and demanded a power sharing
arrangement with the GOS. In March 2003, the DLF changed its
name to the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLMIA),
intensified its military operations, unveiled a political
program for a ``united democratic Sudan,'' and bolstered its
strength to some 4,000 rebels. The Justice and Equality
Movement, with fewer than 1,000 rebels, was established in
2002 but has since joined the SLM/A in several campaigns
against GOS forces.
The GOS has provided support to Arab militiamen attacking
non-Arab civilians, according to press and NGO reports.
Refugee accounts corroborated by US and other independent
reporting suggest that Khartoum has continued to provide
direct support for advancing Jingaweit. Aerial bombardment
and attacks on civilians reportedly have occurred widely
throughout the region; respondents named more than 100
locations that experienced such bombardment (see map, p. 8).
The extent to which insurgent base camps were co-located with
villages and civilians is unknown. The number of casualties
caused by aerial bombardment cannot be determined, but large
numbers of Darfurians have been forced to flee their
villages. According to press and NGO reports, the GOS has
given Jingaweit recruits salaries, communication equipment,
arms, and identity cards.
Current International Response
On July 30, 2004, the UN Security Council adopted
Resolution 1556, which demanded that the GOS fulfill
commitments it made to
disarm the Jingaweit militias and apprehend and bring to
justice Jingaweit leaders and their associates; it also
called on the GOS to allow humanitarian access to Darfur,
among other things. The UN placed an embargo on the sale or
supply of materiel and training to non-governmental entities
and individuals in Darfur. The resolution endorsed the
African Union deployment of monitors and a protection force
to Darfur. It requested the Secretary-General to report on
GOS progress in 30 days and held out the possibility of
further actions, including sanctions, against the GOS in the
event of non-compliance.
The Security Council has expressed its deep concern over
reports of large-scale violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law in Darfur. The main protection
concerns identified by the UN and corroborated by the
Atrocities Documentation Team include threats to life and
freedom of movement, forced relocation, forced return, sexual
violence, and restricted access to humanitarian assistance,
social services, sources of livelihood, and basic services.
Food security has been precarious and will probably worsen as
the rainy season continues. Many displaced households no
longer can feed themselves because of the loss of livestock
and the razing of food stores.
Relief agencies' access to areas outside the state capitals
of Al Junaynah, Al Fashir, and Nyala was limited until late
May. Visits by UN Secretary-General Annan and Secretary of
State Powell in June 2004 brought heightened attention to the
growing humanitarian crisis. As a result, the GOS lifted
travel restrictions and announced measures to facilitate
humanitarian access. Nonetheless, serious problems remain,
specifically capacity, logistics, and security for
relief efforts. USAID's Disaster Assistance Response Team
and other agencies have deployed additional staff to
increase emergency response capacity.
Refugee Interviews--Survey Results
The Atrocities Documentation Team conducted a random-sample
survey of Darfurian refugees in eastern Chad in July and
August 2004. The team interviewed 1,136 refugees, many of
whom had endured harsh journeys across the desolate Chad-
Sudan border.
A plurality of the respondents were ethnic Zaghawa (46
percent), with smaller numbers belonging to the Fur (8
percent) and Massalit (30 percent) ethnic groups. Slightly
more than half the respondents (56 percent) were women. (See
map, p. 6, showing ethnicity of respondent refugees.)
Analysis of the refugee interviews points to a pattern of
abuse against members of Darfur's non-Arab communities,
including murder, rape, beatings, ethnic humiliation, and
destruction of property and basic necessities. Many of the
reports detailing attacks on villages refer to government and
militia forces, preceded by aerial bombardment, acting
together to commit atrocities. Respondents said government
and militia forces wore khaki or brown military uniforms.
Roughly one-half of the respondents noted GOS forces had
joined Jingaweit irregulars in attacking their villages.
Approximately one-quarter of the respondents said GOS forces
had acted alone; another 14 percent said the Jingaweit had
acted alone. Two-thirds of the respondents reported aerial
bombings against their villages; four-fifths said they had
witnessed the complete destruction of their villages. Sixty-
one percent reported witnessing the killing of a family
member. About one-third of the respondents reported hearing
racial epithets while under attack; one-quarter witnessed
beatings. Large numbers reported the looting of personal
property (47 percent) and the theft of livestock (80
percent).
Most reports followed a similar pattern:
(1) GOS aircraft or helicopters bomb villages.
(2) GOS soldiers arrive in trucks, followed closely by
Jingaweit militia riding horses or camels.
(3) GOS soldiers and militia surround and then enter
villages, under cover of gunfire.
(4) Fleeing villagers are targets in aerial bombing.
(5) The Jingaweit and GOS soldiers loot the village after
most citizens have fled, often using trucks to remove
belongings.
(6) Villages often experience multiple attacks over a
prolonged period before they are destroyed by burning or
bombing.
When describing attacks, refugees often referred to GOS
soldiers and Jingaweit militias as a unified group; as one
refugee stated, ``The soldiers and Jingaweit, always they are
together.'' The primary victims have been non-Arab residents
of Darfur. Numerous credible reports corroborate the use of
racial and ethnic epithets by both the Jingaweit and GOS
military personnel; ``Kill the slaves; Kill the slaves!'' and
``We have orders to kill all the blacks'' are common. One
refugee reported a militia member stating, ``We kill all
blacks and even kill our cattle when they have black
calves.'' Numerous refugee accounts point to mass abductions,
including persons driven away in GOS vehicles, but
respondents usually do not know the abductoes' fate. A few
respondents indicated personal knowledge of mass executions
and gravesites.
A subset of 400 respondents were asked about rebel activity
in or near their villages. Nearly nine in 10 said there was
no rebel activity before the attack. Nine percent noted
rebels were in the vicinity; 2 percent said the rebels were
present in their villages. The overwhelming majority (91
percent) said their village was not defended at all against
the attack. One percent asserted their village had been
successfully defended and another 8 percent cited an
unsuccessful defense.
Respondents reported ethnic tensions in the region had
risen over the past few years. For example, markets in which
non-Arabs and Arabs had previously interacted have become
segregated, and almost all villages are now said to be
ethnically homogenous. According to many of the interviewees,
GOS soldiers and Jingaweit attacked villages because of their
non-Arab populations; men of fighting age have been abducted,
executed, or both; and women and girls have been abducted and
raped.
Refugee Interviews--Survey Methodology
This report is based on results from personal interviews
conducted by three teams between July 12 and August 18, 2004.
DRL, USAID, and the Coalition for International Justice
jointly designed the questionnaire in conjunction with other
NGOs. INR provided technical assistance on questionnaire
design and survey methodology. The teams used a semi-
structured interviewing approach that permitted the refugees
to give the broadest possible accounts of the events they had
experienced. The interviews were conducted in 19 locations in
eastern Chad, including UNHCR camps and informal settlements.
Refugees were selected using a systematic, random sampling
approach designed to meet the conditions in Chad.
Interviewers randomly selected a sector within a refugee camp
and then, from a fixed point within the sector, chose every
10th dwelling unit for interviewing. All adults were listed
within the dwelling unit, and one adult was randomly
selected. This methodology ensures the results are as
representative as possible in light of refugee conditions.
Interviews took place in private, with only the refugee, a
translator, and the interviewer present.
Several characteristics of the survey must be underscored.
First, accounts of atrocities may be dated, depending on when
the individual refugee fled his or her village. Second, the
data may actually undercount the extent of atrocities because
mass attacks often leave few survivors. Third, most
respondents come from villages within 50 miles of the border
in Western Darfur and Northern Darfur States. Fourth, it is
very likely that rapes are underreported because of the
social stigma attached to acknowledging such violations of
female members of one's family.
The results are broadly representative of Darfurian
refugees in Chad but may not be representative of internally
displaced persons still in Darfur because they were not
included in the sample. A margin of error for this sample
cannot be calculated because of the lack of accurate
demographic information about the refugee camps and
settlements. The methodology was designed to achieve as
broadly representative a sample as was feasible under the
prevailing conditions. Dates of events reported by refugees
frequently utilized the Islamic calendar; these dates were
then converted to dates on the Gregorian calendar. (See map,
p. 6, showing interview locations.)
The field data for the 1,136 interviews were compiled using
a standardized data entry process that involved the
collection and coding of detailed information from each
refugee respondent's set of answers. The researchers then
used a statistical program to aggregate the data and analyze
the results.