Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume and rise in support of H.R. 2417. First, I want to thank the chairman of our committee for the way he runs the committee. His approach is constructive, collaborative and cooperative…
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume and rise in support of H.R. 2417.
First, I want to thank the chairman of our committee for the way he runs the committee. His approach is constructive, collaborative and cooperative and shows a real willingness to work with every member of the committee. I have had the privilege of serving on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for 6 years. Chairman Goss has gracefully and competently chaired the committee since 1997 and my predecessors as ranking member during my service include the late and great Julian Dixon and our able leader the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi). The membership of our committee is truly talented, diverse and hardworking, and deeply committed to fulfilling its oversight duties and responsibilities to the House. By the way, Mr. Chairman, so is our staff. Committee members and staff worked closely together to craft a bill that provides new and better capabilities to fight the war on terrorism as well as address a range of global challenges. As we have just heard from our chairman, it is a good bill and it received the unanimous vote of our committee.
An excellent summary of the public portions of our bill has been presented by the chairman, so I will not repeat it. The committee made thorough but sensible decisions to focus resources on the highest priority intelligence collections programs and placed limitations on certain new programs until they are defined in more detail. The bill also supports the strategic vision of the committee for strengthening the Intelligence Community. It provides additional support for all- source analysis and encourages virtual reorganization for better information sharing and collaboration across the agencies.
Mr. Chairman, whatever the details of this intelligence authorization bill, we all know that it was developed at a time of heightened concern about the nature and quality of the intelligence that led to the decision to go to war in Iraq. I know that there are questions on both sides of the aisle about this intelligence, questions which our committee is already asking. While an independent commission or other mechanism might be needed at some later date, the members of our committee have now initiated an investigation and I would like to spend a few minutes discussing our effort.
As our colleagues know, I voted to authorize the use of military force against Iraq because I believed the intelligence case was compelling. The Intelligence Community judged that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and the danger, in the President's words, was grave and gathering. The aftermath of the war has revealed just how brutal Saddam Hussein's regime was. The discovery of mass graves in Iraq and the gut-wrenching grief of families victimized by the regime speak for themselves.
To date, however, coalition forces have only uncovered two suspected Iraqi mobile biological warfare agent production plants. Coalition forces have yet to uncover chemical or biological weapons or further evidence of Iraqi links to terrorism. Where are Iraq's chemical and biological weapons? Why can't our forces find them? For our committee, these questions have loomed over the preparation of this authorization bill. It has been anything but business as usual.
On May 22, Chairman Goss and I sent a letter to the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, expressing the committee's interest in learning in detail how the intelligence picture regarding Iraq's WMD and ties to terrorism was developed. The chairman and I have also met twice with the Director on this subject. In response to our request, the Intelligence Community has provided 19 volumes of information on Iraq's WMD programs and ties to terrorism. On June 12, the chairman and I announced the bipartisan and unanimous commitment of our committee to a serious, focused, comprehensive review of the quality and objectivity of prewar intelligence. We announced that we would hold hearings, closed and open--open means public--to question senior administration and intelligence officials about the prewar intelligence on Iraq's WMD and its links to terrorism.
I think it is very important that the committee hold public hearings, and I have the gentleman from Florida's (Chairman Goss) personal commitment that we will. I hope our first hearing will occur in July. Our committee also decided to produce a written, unclassified report as promptly as possible, and in addition we agreed to give all House Members access to the materials provided by the intelligence community in response to the committee's request, under appropriate security conditions and House rules.
Last week our committee held two hearings in connection with our investigation, one examining the October, 2002, National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and the other on the current search for Iraq's weapons. While we are still at an early stage in this investigation, I want to comment on what we have reviewed so far.
First, past possession of WMD. We know that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons in the past. In the 1980s the Iraqi military used chemical weapons against Iran and the Kurds. In the 1990s Iraq admitted to U.N. weapons inspectors that it had produced over 8,400 liters of anthrax and 3.9 tons of the chemical warfare agent VX. Drawing on both direct and circumstantial evidence collected over many years, the intelligence community also concluded that Iraq had people, planning documents, and equipment to support WMD production.
Number two, hiding WMD. The agents that comprise weapons of mass destruction are exceedingly easy to hide, a point neither the administration nor the intelligence community made adequately clear before the war in Iraq. Five hundred metric tons of bulk chemical agents would fill a backyard swimming pool. Biological agents can be hidden in small vials in private residences. But it is not so easy to hide delivery vehicles like unmanned aerial drones, missiles, or munitions. That none of these other harder-to-hide items has been found is cause for real concern.
Number three, overstating the case. When discussing Iraq's WMD, administration officials rarely included the caveats and qualifiers attached to the intelligence community's judgments. Secretary of State Powell, for example, told the U.N. Security Council that ``we know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction . . . '' On the eve of war, President Bush said, ``Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised.'' And on a March 30 Sunday news show, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld said that he knew where the WMD were located. Bogus information on Iraq's alleged nuclear connection to Niger was even included in the President's State of the Union Address. For many Americans, the administration's certainty gave the impression that there was even stronger intelligence about Iraq's possession of and intention to use WMD.
Number four, circumstantial evidence. The committee is now investigating whether the intelligence case on Iraq's WMD was based on circumstantial evidence rather than hard facts and whether the intelligence community made clear to the policy-makers and Congress that most of its analytic judgments were based on things like aerial photographs and Iraqi defector interviews, not hard facts. This is an issue that we have to explore.
And, finally, number five, weak ties to al Qaeda. Iraq did have ties to terrorist groups, but the investigation suggests that the intelligence linking al Qaeda to Iraq, a prominent theme in the administration's statements prior to the war, contradictary contrary to what was claimed by the administration. Much remains to be investigated in this area.
Mr. Chairman, the highest priority of our committee, and I think of our Nation, remains finding and dismantling Iraq's WMD. It is counterintuitive to think that Iraq destroyed its weapons and did not report this to the United Nations. It is conceivable that Saddam destroyed them on the eve of or even after the start of the war once he recognized the futility of using them and the political advantage of keeping the United States from finding them; but the more likely scenario is that he buried or dispersed his weapons of mass destruction and that some may now be in the hands of terrorist groups outside of Iraq or counterinsurgents in Iraq who continue to harm and kill U.S. and British troops.
But even if Iraq's chemical and biological weapons are found tomorrow, and I hope they are, these issues warrant scrutiny by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. It is already clear that there were flaws in U.S. intelligence. Iraq's WMD was not located where the intelligence community thought it might be. Chemical weapons were not used in the war despite the intelligence community's judgment that their use was likely. I urge this administration not to contemplate military action, especially preemptive action, in Iran, North Korea or Syria until these issues are cleared up. Certainly this Member would not support such action until these matters are cleared up.
As the committee moves forward with its investigation, we need also be mindful of the burden the intelligence agencies are carrying, not only in Iraq but also in the war on terrorism in other areas of the world. Our Nation is best served by an effective intelligence community, not one hobbled by risk aversion and finger-pointing. The committee's review must be based on facts, which I and others intend to follow unflinchingly wherever they may lead.
Our Nation needs a robust intelligence budget, which this authorization bill supports. At the same time, the committee's immediate priority is to resolve the questions regarding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and ties to terrorist groups. If the answers dictate changes in the future intelligence budgets or policy, I am committed to bringing those recommendations forward. Meanwhile, this authorization bill deserves our strong support.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes), a very valuable member of our committee.
Mr. Chairman, I would say to the gentleman, I have great faith that the WMD will be found too, and in the seriousness and responsibleness of the Members of the House.
Mr. Chairman, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Boswell), who is ranking member of the Subcommittee on Human Intelligence, Analysis and Counterintelligence.
(Mr. BOSWELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Peterson), a valued member of our committee.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Cramer), the distinguished ranking member of our subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence, TNT, who became a grandfather for the second time yesterday.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 15 seconds. The 15 seconds is to tell the prior speaker, our wonderful colleague, that I totally agree with him. As the representative from the district in America that probably makes most of our intelligence satellites and has fabulous technology, that is great; but we need more investment in human intelligence. And he is right.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Eshoo), a classmate and good friend, one of the rookies on our committee, but already the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Policy, and National Security.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his comments. We are all proud to serve on this committee. It is now my pleasure to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger), the rookie on the committee and a rookie in Congress, but he is no rookie to these issues.
Mr. Chairman, we have no further speakers except for me and I have some brief closing remarks. So I would yield if there are speakers over there and perhaps speak just before our chairman closes this debate.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
This debate has been friendly, collaborative, supportive, not just of each other but our staffs. It is clear that committee members are putting the country first in our service on the committee. I believe that our authorization bill is putting the country first in terms of the priorities it chooses, and I believe further, Mr. Chairman, that our investigation of the quality of intelligence supporting the war in Iraq is also putting the country first.
Our investigation has a long way to go but it is serious, collaborative, and bipartisan. We will do as much as possible in public, and we will report to the public on our findings.
Should we hit the wall and fail in our endeavor, then it may be time for a commission or an alternative committee or set of committees of Congress to take over. But meanwhile, I
want to commend the Members of this committee who serve with great distinction, and I urge the passage of this authorization bill, H.R. 2417.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.