Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 3 minutes. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment that would adopt the recommendation of the Congressional Budget Office to restructure our missile defense programs, specifically,…
Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 3 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment that would adopt the recommendation of the Congressional Budget Office to restructure our missile defense programs, specifically, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense System. The amendment would instruct the Secretary of Defense not to deploy any Ground-based Midcourse Defense System beyond the authorized systems that are now at Fort Greeley, Alaska and, the Vandenberg Air Force Base in California or any space-based interceptors of intercontinental ballistic missiles.
It would reduce funding for the research, development, test and evaluation for the defense agencies by $4,747,000,000.
Under the Congressional Budget Office's ``evolutionary alternative,'' the Department of Defense would fund the capabilities planned for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense System through 2007.
Money would continue to be provided to pursue upgrades to the elements of the ground-based missile defense initial defense capability, would continue testing its components and would explore other missile defense concepts.
But the savings on the midcourse missile defense under the Congressional Budget Office alternative would total $29 billion on a Department of Defense-wide basis through 2007.
I commend to my colleagues no less than seven reports released in the last 2 months critical of various aspects of the ballistic missile system, and I will introduce copies for the Record. Two of them are from the General Accountability Office, two from the Department of Defense's own Inspector General's Office, one from the Congressional Research Office, one from the Congressional Budget Office and one from the Pentagon's own Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.
All of them raise doubts about the feasibility of missile defense. And as a group they offer a damning indictment of the missile defense system that supposedly, but not actually offers the United States an initial defense capability.
The Center for Defense Information states in its analysis, changes are imperative. If the Missile Defense Agency continues in the same vein it has been, the United States will see itself saddled with a missile defense system that costs tens of billions, possibly hundreds of billions of dollars, yet provides no actual defense.
What is more, by diverting that money to an unfeasible system, the United States will miss out on the protection it could be getting from weapons systems that actually work.
Mr. Chairman, the moneys are important, of course, but having a false sense of security is dangerous. And not investing these moneys in needed security systems, systems to protect our space and domestic assets and for homeland security risk is criminally negligent.
The General Accountability reports note that if the Pentagon does not move away from its spiral development or acquisition policy where a system's progress is never held to any sort of accountability, has no defined parameters, the Department of Defense will continue to start more programs for more money and create the next set of case studies for future defense reform reviews.
Fielding systems that still are in early developmental cycles, rushing them into the field where they have very serious problems with every component, that is a recipe for disaster. Immature technologies are not perfected, integration of the systems is not happening, testing in real-life scenarios is lacking, information assurance controls that were built to the network are sadly out of date.
This report shows poor quality control, unreasonable, in fact outrageous, cost growth, and schedule slips and inferior performance.
An ``F'' for Missile Defense: How Seven Government Reports in Two
Months Illustrate the Need for Missile Defense To Change Its Ways
(By Victoria Samson, CDI Research Analyst)
A certain amount of optimism is required to successfully
guide a weapon system through its development to completion.
However, at a certain point, reality needs to poke through so
that program and service officials can make relatively
objective assessments. Is it working? Is it going to work? Is
it staying on budget and schedule? If not, can it get back on
track? And finally, the most difficult question to ask of a
program: Should it continue?
The multi-faceted missile defense program, currently the
Pentagon's golden child, has effectively avoided any and all
tough questions. Over $92 billion has been spent on missile
defense systems since the Ronald Reagan administration, to
little avail. While the architecture still has not been
finalized, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) envisions a
system of systems, where there are ground-, sea-, and air-
based interceptors supported by a yet-to-be-built satellite
system, new X-band radars that are still being put in place,
and a command and control system that is not secure to
outside interference.
President George W. Bush announced in December 2002 that,
within two years, the United States would have deployed an
initial missile defense system that could defend the United
States against a limited ICBM attack. With that pressure from
above, MDA focused its efforts on the fielding interceptors
in Alaska and California the Ground-based Midcourse Defense
(GMD) system. As of writing, 13 interceptors have been
emplaced in missile silos. As well, MDA is working on a sea-
based interceptor that is carried on the Aegis ship, a sea-
based X-band radar that is slowly floating to its home port
in Alaska, a giant command and control module based out of
Colorado, a satellite network that could track enemy missiles
as they approach the U.S. homeland, and systems that are
geared toward providing defense against shorter-range
ballistic missiles (Theater High Altitude Area Defense
system, or THAAD, and the Patriot Advanced Capability PAC-3
system). In the long run, MDA is building a modified Boeing
747 airplane that would carry lasers in its nose and kinetic
kill vehicles which theoretically could obliterate multiple
targets.
MDA has been entrusted with a great deal of responsibility.
It has not lived up to its tasks. In the past two months, no
less than seven reports have been released that were critical
of various aspects of the Ballistic Missile Defense System
(BMDS). For clarity's sake, this analysis will focus largely
on MDA's flagship program, the GMD system, whose existence is
used to falsely claim that the United States has an initial
defensive capability against ICBMs. And to head off
allegations of bias, it must be noted that these reports were
written by non-partisan government agencies. Two reports by
the Government Accountability Office (GAO), two from the
Defense Department (DOD)'s own Inspector General's office,
and reports by the Congressional Research Service (CRS),
Congressional Budgetary Office ``(CBO), and the Pentagon's
Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E) all raise
doubts about the feasibility of missile defense. As a group,
they offer a damning indictment of the missile defense system
that supposedly offers the United States an initial defensive
capability.
overshooting cost goals, falling short of planned achievements
Missile defense programs have featured prominently in two
recent reports by the GAO. The first, ``Assessment of
Selected Major Weapons Programs,'' examines the cost growth
of many Pentagon weapon systems. It notes, ``DOD often
exceeds development cost estimates by approximately 30 to 40
percent and experiences cuts in planned quantities, missed
deadlines, and performance shortfalls.'' The GAO points out,
``Programs consistently move forward with unrealistic cost
and schedule estimates, use immature technologies in
launching product development, and fail to solidify design
and manufacturing processes at appropriate points in
development.'' The missile defense system prides itself on
its ``spiral development'' or acquisition policy that is
constantly evolving, under which a system's progress is never
held to strictly defined parameters.
``Programs consistently move forward with unrealistic cost
and schedule estimates, use immature technologies in
launching product development, and fail to solidify design
and manufacturing processes at appropriate points in
development.''
The GAO takes this type of acquisition policy to task. In
fact, David Walker, comptroller-general of the United States,
warns that if the Pentagon doesn't move away from it, DOD
``will continue to start more programs than it can finish,
produce less capability for more money, and create the next
set of case studies for future defense reform reviews.''
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has argued that the
missile defense program needs the flexibility of spiral
development to allow it to mold itself to future threats and
to incorporate lessons learned while testing. Why other
Pentagon programs somehow manage to hold themselves
accountable and still meet evolving threats is never
discussed by MDA officials. Instead, MDA promotes the idea
that all possible missile defense candidate technologies will
be put through their paces, and eventually testing will prove
the winners and losers. Again, MDA has never stated at which
point it will definitively decide to drop a flagging program.
The closest it has come is in giving one of its programs
(Airborne Laser) what it calls ``knowledge parameters,'' in
an attempt to prove to critics that, despite outward
appearances, there is indeed progress toward development.
Another key part of spiral development is that weapon
systems will be fielded when they are still early in their
development cycles. The intent is that they can continue to
grow and presumably advance while providing some sort of
military utility. What ends up happening is that systems--
the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system most
noticeably--are rushed out into the field even when there
are very serious problems with their components... or
indeed, are crucial elements to their architecture still
lacking. For example, the GMD interceptor suffered a
flight test failure in February 2005 due to poor quality
control by its contractor for the arm that holds the
missile up in its silo. In testimony to the Senate Armed
Services Committee on April 4, 2006, Obering acknowledged
this problem and stated that this component would be
replaced on the interceptors that have already been
fielded. Nonetheless, the $40 million missile as
originally designed continues to be built at a rate of one
every two months or so.
The GAO notes that weapon systems development programs
progress much better and keep costs lower if technology is
allowed to mature before being brought into a developmental
or initial operating system. GAO observes that program
acquisition unit costs for programs with mature technologies
increase by less than one percent over original cost
estimates, while the program acquisition unit costs for
programs with immature technologies increase by 27 percent
over the first full estimate.
The report goes on to review various weapon systems to
assess their level of technological maturity and cost growth.
The GMD system's ``concurrent testing and fielding efforts
may lead to additional design changes,'' warns the GAO, and
the program's ``prime contract could overrun its target cost
by as much as $1.5 billion. Boeing, GMD's prime contractor,
has already overrun its budget by $600 million as a result of
quality control issues. As what seems to be the standard for
missile defense, program officials differ from outsiders
about the program: while program officials rate GMD's needed
10 technologies as mature, the GAO differs, stating that
``four have not been demonstrated in an operational
environment and we believe that they cannot be considered
fully mature.'' And since the GAO's last assessment of GMD,
the program's planned budget through fiscal year 2009 (FY 09)
has risen by $2.9 billion, or 11.2 percent.
GMD's cost growth is bad enough, but as it turns out, the
United States is paying more and getting less than
anticipated. In another GAO report, the title says it all:
``Missile Defense Agency Fields Initial Capability but Falls
Short of Original Goals.'' MDA's accelerated development of
the GMD program in order to reach an initial capability by
the end of 2004 caused the agency to run over that portion of
its budget by $1 billion. For FY 05, GMD contractors had
exceeded anticipated costs by 25 percent. The GAO also took
to task the forced reliance by MDA upon spiral development
``[I]t allowed the GMD program to concurrently mature
technology, complete design activities, and produce and field
assets before end-to-end testing of the system--all at the
expense of cost, quantity, and performance goals.''
In addition, for the initial defensive capability stated as
the goal of the rapid fielding of the overall missile defense
network, MDA fell quite short of what it had hoped to have
accomplished. ``Compared to its original goals set in 2003,
MDA fielded 10 fewer GMD interceptors than planned, two fewer
radars, 11 fewer Aegis BMD missiles, and six fewer Aegis
ships,'' lists the GAO report. The United States has
officially fielded elements of the ballistic missile defense
system architecture, but these are really token efforts. Even
if the systems had proved themselves during testing and
development--which they have not--and even if they had all
their needed components at the ready--which they do not--this
system would be a feeble shadow of what planners had hoped
for.
Spiral development ``allowed the GMD program to
concurrently mature technology, complete design activities,
and produce and field assets before end-to-end testing of the
system--all at the expense of cost, quantity, and performance
goals.''
Another result of rushing the missile defense elements out
into the field is that workmanship has been shoddy, at best.
Poor quality control has been listed time and again as an
explanation for cost growth, schedule slips, and inferior
performance. The GAO report explains, ``According to MDA's
own audits, the interceptor's design requirements were
unclear and sometimes incomplete, design changes were poorly
controlled, and the interceptor's design resulted in
uncertain reliability and service life.'' The GMD interceptor
was not tested to ensure its parts could withstand the harsh
environment in space--which could result in catastrophic
failures after launch as the interceptors are supposed to
impact their targets outside the Earth's atmosphere. Further,
the failures of two recent flight tests--1FT-10 and 1FT-14--
were due to poor quality control procedures. The development
of some parts for the GMD interceptor has been so careless
that, according to the GAO, the parts in question would
have to be replaced and thus ``the interceptors will be
removed from their silos.'' Neither GAO nor MDA, has yet to
explain at what cost such repairs will have to be made.
Unfortunately, cost growth, schedule slips, and faulty
parts are not specific to missile defense programs. One can
see that easily in every branch of the Pentagon. Where the
missile defense program differs is in the extent of autonomy
and decision-making freedom given to MDA officials managing
the various pieces of the program. Given the pressure they
were under from President George W. Bush's December 2002
announcement that an initial capability would be in place by
the end of 2004, managers decided that the development and
fielding process required a speedier schedule to meet that
deadline. As a result, the GAO recounts, ``MDA officials told
us that because the agency was directed to field a capability
earlier than planned, it accepted additional risks.''
The agency was able to accelerate fielding because MDA
officials have been given unprecedented liberties with
acquisition planning and scheduling. They are further allowed
to shift around funding from one program element to another
as they see fit, under special rules set up by DOD. According
to the GAO, ``Compared with other DOD programs, MDA has
greater latitude to make changes to the BMDS [Ballistic
Missile Defense Program] program without seeking the approval
of high-level acquisition executives outside the
program.'' Because of this flexibility, while MDA does
inform Congress and DOD of funding rearrangements,
accountability is practically nil; instead, its version of
it has ``thus become broadly applied as to mean delivering
some capability within funding allocations.''
MDA is also free of requirements that all other major DOD
acquisition programs must undertake in regards to
establishing baseline estimates of cost, performance and
schedule. If other programs slip in meeting those
predetermined requirements, Pentagon and/or service managers
must alert Congress. If any program sees cost growth up to a
certain amount in one quarter, it is considered to have
suffered a so-called Nunn-McCurdy breach, which means DOD
must alert Congress of the problem. If the cost growth is
over 25 percent in a single quarter, DOD then must overhaul
and justify the offending program. The Ballistic Missile
Defense System, however, is exempt from these requirements.
MDA officials have much more flexible baselines for their
programs. MDA can avoid having to report programs' quarterly
cost growth simply by changing cost goals and estimates.
Also, MDA has the responsibility of deciding when it will
alert Congress to schedule slips or cost growths, since
``there are no criteria to identify which variations are
significant enough to report. Instead, MDA's Director, by
statute, has the discretion to determine which variations
will be reported.''
MDA officials do not have to hold themselves accountable to
any particular standard or report if certain achievements
have not been met. And Congress has, up to now, refrained
from complaining about its lack of oversight over the $10
billion dollar a year MDA budget.
Up to now, the only ``achievements'' reported by MDA have
been the flight test failures. The MDA has even stopped
announcing when it has emplaced new interceptors at missile
silos in Alaska and California. Ostensibly, this is because
of operational security needs, but in actuality, it is more
likely a move designed to avoid bad press as testing and
deployment goes forward.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlemen from New Jersey (Mr. Holt).
Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.