Mr. Speaker, this is not the first nor will it be the last time that we take the floor of the House here in the well of the House to address a problem that is of great concern to all of us, and that is the budget deficit. This year past,…
Mr. Speaker, this is not the first nor will it be the last time that we take the floor of the House here in the well of the House to address a problem that is of great concern to all of us, and that is the budget deficit. This year past, it was $412 billion and while it appears to be improving, thankfully, a bit for the current fiscal year, it still will come in likely in the range of $350 billion, and that will make it the third-largest deficit in our Nation's history, the third in a row where we have approached the pinnacle, the largest deficits we have run in our country's history.
We are not here to score political points. We are here to call attention to a problem that we think has grave consequences. It may be that we do not feel or see the consequences right now, but we feel that a day of reckoning lies on or just over the horizon. I believe that, because sooner or later the fundamentals in any market begin to take hold. It happened to the dot coms; it could happen again to us with the budget deficit that we are running today and the trade deficit we are running also today. It could hammer the dollar. After all, the fundamental is, simply stated, like this. When you raise the demand for credit, which is what you do when the government runs a deficit of $312 billion, $412 billion, when you raise the demand for credit, eventually you raise the price of credit. In other words, you raise interest rates. What do interest rates do when they go up? They stifle growth in the economy, long-term growth and short-term growth. They could have devastating consequences, for example, on the housing market, on the automobile market. That is a likely consequence of the policies we are running today.
For the time being, we have not felt or seen the results, the consequences, and largely that is due to the fact that this country is running large current account deficits, which means we are pumping dollars into the world economy which come back here, are recycled here by the purchase of our Treasury bonds and Treasury notes. So for now, foreigners are lending us the money to bridge our budget, which is sparing us the effect of high interest rates.
But at the same time, debt means dependence, and over the course of years if we continue this practice, we will find ourselves having undercut our independence in foreign policy which is something none of us wants. Even when foreigners buy our debt and spare us the outlay for now, we still have to pay the interest. We still have debt service. The debt service in the total budget this past year was $165 billion, $170 billion, and it is going up inexorably because we have got more debt, and interest rates are rising again. As those two factors converge, you are going to see the debt service, the interest we pay on the national debt, go up to $200 billion, $225 billion, $250 billion within the foreseeable future. This is an obligation that has to be paid. Indeed, there is no other item in the budget that is more obligatory. The United States of America has to pay its interest on its national debt or otherwise our currency and our credit would collapse. But once we pay the debt, once we pay the debt service, the effects are that priorities in the budget we could otherwise afford and fund and increase, such as medical research and scientific research and education for our children and Social Security and Medicare for the elderly become all the harder to fund because the interest has to be paid first.
This deficit problem is all the more distressing because it did not have to be. Just a few short years ago in the year 2000, the last full fiscal year of the Clinton administration, this country was running a surplus of $236 billion. It is a fact. You can look it up. Every year the Clinton administration was in office due to two budget plans we adopted, one in 1993, another in 1997, the bottom line of the budget got better and better and better.
The President came to office and inherited a deficit of $290 billion. He sent us on February 17 a deficit reduction plan that barely passed the House, a one-vote margin, barely passed the Senate, the Vice President's tie-breaking vote.
But look what happened, as this chart here shows. The deficit every year came down and down and down to the point where in the year 2000, we had a surplus, without including Social Security, a unified surplus of $236 billion. Unprecedented. This was the surplus that President Bush inherited when he came to office in the year 2001. And that is why I say this did not have to be. We did not just fall out of the sky with these enormous deficits. We did it because of policies that were adopted and passed in this House. Not by all of us. Most of us on our side of the aisle voted against them. Foreseeing this problem and knowing how difficult it had been to move the budget finally back into the black again for the first time in 30, 40 years, we did not want to see us backslide into deficit, but that is exactly what happened.
What we have seen now is that we have gone from a surplus, projected, of $5.6 trillion between 2002 and 2011. That was the 10-year projection that Mr. Bush's own economists made at the Office of Management and Budget when he took office, $5.6 trillion. We have gone from a projected surplus of $5.6
trillion to a projected deficit of $3.8 trillion over that same 10-year period of time. That is a swing of $9.4 trillion in the wrong direction. We have never seen a fiscal reversal like this, at least since the Great Depression, $9.4 trillion in the wrong direction, and much of that was policy driven.
The President says we have got to get our hands around spending, but a large part of this problem was driven by his insistence that we have unprecedentedly large tax cuts, and when the surpluses that we thought were going to obtain over that 10-year period of time appeared to be overstated substantially, by some estimates as much as 50 percent, the President charged ahead with his tax cuts. In 2002, 2003, in addition to 2001, there were substantial tax cuts, and the loss of revenues has had a big impact on the bottom line and has helped put the deficit almost intractably in the red again.
But most of the spending increases have come on the discretionary side of the budget in the appropriation bills that we adopt every year in four different accounts, four different programmatic areas, which is important to know, because all of these areas are areas where the President has sought and we have provided what he has sought in the way of additional increases in spending.
If you look at the increases in spending over and above current services, and that is the amount of money necessary to maintain the government services at their existing level, if you look at those spikes in the budget that rise above funding for current services alone, you will find the landscape for 4 years dotted by the same increases, namely, defense, homeland security, the response to 9/11, they account for 90 to 95 percent of the increases in spending.
So, while the President is saying that Congress needs to tighten spending, in truth much of the spending that has driven the budget into deficit is spending that has been called for for defense and homeland security and for the response to 9/11, called for by the President, passed by the Congress, and the fact of the matter is we are simply not paying the tab for these necessary expenses.
I am not disputing the need for this money. What I am disputing and calling attention to is the fact that we are taking the tab for defense in our time against terrorists in the Middle East and elsewhere and shoving this tab off onto our children.
That is why I often say that the deficit is a problem for the economy because eventually it will raise interest rates and stifle long-term growth, eventually it will affect the priorities in the budget because debt service is obligatory and has to be paid; and as debt service increases, other things get eclipsed and shoved aside. But the biggest problem with the deficit in my book is moral, because what we are doing is instead of paying for defense in our time, we are telling our children they have got to pay for defense in their time and our time, too, or at least the incremental cost of it.
This is the concern that we would like to address tonight, the fact that we are not facing up to the situation that confronts us and the fact that we have a budget deficit of enormous proportions and by any honest, fair, and accurate calculation or projection of what it is likely to be, it shows little signs of abating over the next 10 years, as this particular chart right here will show.
This chart shows where we believe, using Congressional Budget Office numbers, the President's budget, if implemented over the next 10 years, will take us. The budget deficit will get a bit better, as indeed it is scheduled to improve this year, probably $350 billion. Good news. The bad news is that the President in projecting the future course of the deficit, number one, is only giving us a 5-year projection; and, number two, he has left out some significant costs, such as the cost of maintaining troops in Afghanistan and Iraq after the year 2005, such as the cost of fixing Social Security, such as the cost of repairing something we call the alternative minimum tax, which actually raises tax revenues above the level that would otherwise exist if people were not required to pay this alternative minimum tax. It will soon, by 2010, affect 30 million tax filers as opposed to 4 million this year.
I do not think politically that is likely to happen, and if you fix it to avert that problem, the problem of having the alternative minimum tax apply to middle-income families, for whom it was never intended, then you get a result here of a deficit, 10 years from now, equal to $621 billion. No improvement; and indeed after a few years of slight moderation, a worsening deficit every year to the point where at the end of our 10-year time frame, it is up to $621 billion.
Let me just wrap up this introductory presentation of what concerns us about the budget by showing you sort of the back-of-an-envelope, the easiest way I know to explain what I think is an out-of-control situation. Back in 2001 when the Bush administration was pushing its tax cuts, they came to us and they said, The future looks so rosy that you can pass these tax cuts, you can pass these defense increases, you can pass our budget, and we won't be back to ask you to increase the debt ceiling of the United States, a legal limit beyond which we cannot borrow. We won't be back until 2008, 2010.
Well, the Republicans in the House and the Republicans in the Senate passed the President's budget pretty much as he requested, with a few moderations. The next year they were back, hat in hand. 2002, notwithstanding what they told us the previous year, they needed an increase in the debt ceiling of the United States of $450 billion. The following year, 2003, they were back again. This time they wanted a phenomenal increase in the debt ceiling of the United States, $984 billion, an increase in 1 year of $984 billion. How much is that? That amount is equal to the entire debt of the United States the year that Ronald Reagan took office. It is a bit more than that, as a matter of fact. The following year, having obtained a $984 billion increase on May 26, 2003, the following September, 2004, Secretary Snow was back saying, I need $800 billion more.
They ran through $984 billion of debt ceiling in 1 fiscal year and came back hat in hand and asked for $800 billion more, which the Congress passed in late November of last year. And then when the budget resolution was brought to the floor this year, the Republican budget resolution, when it passed the House and passed the Senate, buried in it was a provision that called for another increase in the debt ceiling of $781 billion.
This is a budget which they claim will eventually move us to halving the deficit over 5 years. At the same time they make that claim, they bury in that budget a request provision that Congress increase the debt ceiling by $781 billion. Add those together, 4 fiscal years, we get an increase in the deficit, an increase in the national debt of $3.015 trillion. That is just phenomenal.
There it is on the back of an envelope. It sums up the fiscal course and policy of this administration as succinctly as anything we can present: $3 trillion of additional debt-borrowing capacity, which will basically all be used up by the end of this fiscal year, and they will be back again asking for more.
So this is what concerns us. We frankly do not think the country can continue on this course. And that is why we are here tonight to talk about a problem that we think should be a front-burner problem for both parties, both Houses, both executive branch and the Congress. It needs more attention than it is now receiving.
Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Maine.
Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, the chart we have here shows graphically exactly what the gentleman is saying, namely, interest just a bit over $150 billion in 2004, the last fiscal year; but by 2010 if the Bush policies are completely implemented over the next 6 years, look what happens to debt service. That big rising red spike goes from $150 billion to over $300 billion, and it eclipses everything else in the budget.
I yield to the gentleman from Maine.
Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Maine for his comments.
Mr. Speaker, I now yield to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott).
Mr. Speaker, PAYGO is shorthand for a rule we adopted in 1991 and helped us achieve the phenomenal fiscal results I just showed the Members, where every year from 1993 to the year 2000, we had a better bottom line and a surplus of $236 billion in the year 2000. PAYGO simply provides that if we want to have a tax cut when we have got a deficit, it has to be deficit neutral. That is to say the tax cut must be offset by a tax increase somewhere else within the Tax Code, or we must go to an entitlement program, which is permanent spending, and cut it enough to offset the loss of revenues. By the same token, if we want to increase or improve a new entitlement, we have to identify a revenue stream or other entitlement cuts to pay for it. It has to be, bottom line, deficit neutral.
Reclaiming my time, Mr. Speaker, the blue line, believe it or not, is the path the Bush administration plotted when it was trying to sell its initial budget, its tax cuts, its defense increases, to the Congress of the United States. They said even with these policies, this is the budget we foresee. This is the bottom line that we foresee between 2005 and 2011.
Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, I do not think, given his budget policies, it is a realistic statement of what is likely to happen. One can call it a goal if they will, but I do not think it is a goal that is likely to be achieved under the policies that are now being furthered by this administration.
Reclaiming my time, Mr. Speaker, the gentleman is holding a chart there that indicates the likely path that we think the budget will follow if we factor everything into it that is politically realistic: a fix in Social Security, a fix to the alternative minimum tax, and some reasonable provision for maintaining troops in Afghanistan and Iraq after 2005.
Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, I said earlier that one reason we do not have the sort of moral outrage in the country about the deficit, that people are concerned about it but they do not quite feel and see it, this is the reason why.
Foreigners have been buying our debt in copious quantities, relieving us of, for now, the outlay that we would have to make, digging out of our own capital and our own savings, they are picking it up, for now. But what this means is that over time, debt means dependence, and we are incurring dependence to our debtors, and this has happened increasingly since the year 2000.
In the year 2000, foreigners held 30 percent of our Federal debt. Today, at least at the end of the last fiscal year, that had risen by 50 percent, almost 50 percent, or 44 percent; almost half of our debt is held today by foreigners, and that is a matter of some concern. It has to be one of the reasons that we do not need to be running persistent, perennial, huge deficits.
We did. We offered it on the House floor this past budget season, and we will put it up again. As my colleagues will see, it involves foregoing some of the tax cuts that the Bush administration has pushed through Congress, primarily for the reason that the projections upon which those tax cuts were based have not been obtained, they have not come about, they are a fraction of what was forecasted and expected.
So, we have to adjust our budget, our taxes, back to fiscal reality. If we do that, by the year 2010, 2012, we are back in the black again. But it is a big decision. It is a big decision. It can be done, and that was one of the purposes of our budget presentation, was to show that it can be done. We can argue about how to do it, but it is certainly feasible.
Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Virginia, and I now yield to the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Moore).
Mr. Speaker, I recognize the gentleman and yield to the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Cooper).
Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Tennessee.
I now yield to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Price).
We say we have gone from a projected surplus between 2002 and 2011 of $5.6 trillion to a cumulative deficit, over the same time period, of $3.8 trillion. That is your $9.4 trillion.
Yes, sir
I thank the gentleman for his insights into this very critical problem. And I yield again to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott.)
Well, the administration avows its aversion to debt. And yet it keeps tacking debt on top of debt. The deficit in the year 2003 of $378 billion, a record. A deficit the next year of $412 billion, another record. A deficit this year of $350 billion. And they claim to be cutting it in half, but it does not appear that way if you accurately project it.
And then the Bush administration begins it second term with this policy initiative, the first that the President brought forth, namely, to privatize Social Security. In order to privatize Social Security, the Bush administration would allow workers today to take up to a third of their payroll taxes, take them out of the Social Security trust fund account where they accumulate to a surplus, and put them instead into private accounts.
That means a diversion of well over $3 trillion over the next 10 years, or the first 10 years during which that program would be implemented. And here is a depiction in bar graphs of how much additional debt would be stacked on top of the enormous mountain of debt already accumulated if privatization took place as the President proposed it. As you can see by the year 2025, 2028, we would have racked up $4.9 trillion in additional debt on top of even more debt incurred in the ordinary budget of the United States.
So the Bush administration claims that it does not like debt any more than anyone else, but its policies contradict that claim; and the Social Security proposal coming on top of an already out-of-control deficit-ridden budget just leaves one incredulous as to what they say about their fiscal policy.
This would clearly make the problem worse, probably 100 percent worse over this 20-year period of time
What we have seen in the 1980s and 1990s in coming to grips with the budget deficit, a compelling problem that nevertheless eluded a solution for years, is that unless the administration, the President and the leadership of the Congress, is focused upon this problem and there is a driving priority, it simply will not be resolved.
And that is the problem we have today. When we finally put the budget to bed, the deficit to bed, got rid of the remaining deficit in 1997, it was because President Clinton had not only made that his number one priority for his second term, but he put his first team on the field.
Every time we met for negotiations, Frank Raines was there, Bob Ruben was there, Erskine Bowles was there, everyone in the room had the President's proxy and could speak for him; and the participants, the budget principals, knew that the administration was pushing hard.
Unless everybody pulls hard in that same direction, there are too many otherwise outside forces that stray you off course. So you have got to have leadership to get this done. And we do not have that leadership.
Well, if the gentleman will recall, in the late 1980s, we came to this conclusion that we had to have Presidential leadership as well as congressional leadership solidly behind us. And so we sponsored resolutions several years in a row which called for a budget summit.
We finally passed such a resolution, convened a summit, they met at Andrews Air Force Base something like 60 different days, and once again they succeeded. They capped discretionary spending; they devised the PAYGO rule. They reduced entitlements, rates of growth, did all of the things you needed to do.
The results were obscured by the fact that we had a recession. But the Clinton administration built upon the successes and upon the processes of the Bush administration, the Bush budget that moved us from a $290 billion deficit, to a $236 billion surplus. That was built on that foundation.
Well, the chart that the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott) is holding tells an awful lot. Every year during the Clinton administration, due to those three budget agreements, which the gentleman just described, the bottom line of the budget got better and better to the point where we finally had the budget in surplus for the first time in 30 years.
Every year since the Bush administration came to office in 2001, the bottom line has gotten worse to the point where today we have record deficits, three in a row, record deficits: 378 last year, 412 in the year 2004, it looks like 350 this year. There have been changes made in the margins, but nothing as dramatic and emphatic as what we did in 1993 and 1997, and that is why you do not see any real results of any substance on the bottom line.
In 1995?
Well, in 1995 and in 1996 we had better and better bottom lines because we had a PAYGO rule, and we had discretionary spending caps.
He did indeed. And then we had a point where we could not come to a conclusion on the budget. As a consequence, the whole government was shut down and President Clinton, upon being reelected said, I do not want to go through that again. I would like to see the budget principals get together with the White House budget principals and try to negotiate a deal earlier in the fiscal year, as opposed to near the end of the fiscal year with our backs against the wall.
Absolutely not. And then took the situation by the scruff of the neck the next year and saw to it that we finally brought it to a successful resolution, a phenomenal resolution: a surplus of $236 billion in the year 2000.
On that high point, since we are just about out of time, let me thank the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott), the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Price) and the others who participated, about a subject that is of great concern to all of us. We all have this feeling that the day of reckoning awaits us, and we would like to see this done consensually, with good policy.