Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr.…
Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, this amendment addresses the April 16, 2002, Supreme Court decision in Ashcroft versus Free
Speech Coalition. That decision struck down in 1996 a law written to combat computer-generated pornography because it was too broad.
The overturning of this law to combat child pornography has emboldened those who would have used children. Regrettably, the prediction of the president of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children has come true. He said, ``The court's decision will result in the proliferation of child pornography in America unlike anything we have seen in more than 20 years.''
A Government Accounting Office report just 2 weeks ago found that in the weight of the Supreme Court decision, child pornographers now are increasing their presence on the Internet and are engaging in their depraved actions with relative ease. The Internet has proved a useful tool for pedophiles and sex predators as they distribute child pornography, engage in sexually explicit conversations with children, and hunt for victims in chat rooms.
Every parent should know what their children see and do online. Unfortunately, the new playground for child pornographers is the Internet.
Our children are the most vulnerable among us, and we need to protect them. If this amendment becomes law, child pornographers will be a mere click away from a lengthy prison sentence. This amendment increases penalties and provides prosecutors with the tools they need to win convictions against child pornographers, and it responds to the Supreme Court's constitutional concerns by narrowing the definition of child pornography and includes an affirmative defense when real children are not depicted.
This amendment passed the House as separate legislation last year by a vote of 413 to 8, but the Senate failed to act. I hope my colleagues again will support the provisions in this amendment which will reduce child pornography on the Internet.
Mr. Chairman, I insert for the Record the analysis of the constitutionality of this legislation.
Constitutional Analysis of the Smith Amendment to H.R. 1104--the
``Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention Act''
On April 16, 2002, the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition, held that two of Federal definitions of
child pornography unconstitutional. Sec. 18 U.S.C.
Sec. 2256(8)(B), defined child pornography to include wholly
computer generated pictures that appear to be of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Sec. 18 U.S.C.
Sec. 2256(8)(D), defined child pornography to include a
visual depiction where it is advertised, promoted, or
presented, to convey the impression that the material
contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct.
The Court's decision does not bar Congress from outlawing
virtual child pornography when the prohibition is narrowly-
drawn to promote a compelling government interest. In fact,
the Court in its opinion, expressly left that option open for
Congress. The Court stated: ``We need not decide, however,
whether the Government could impose this burden on a speaker.
Even if an affirmative defense can save a statute from First
Amendment challenge, here the defense is incomplete and
insufficient, even on its own terms.'' Justice Thomas,
concurring, stated that the ``Court does leave open the
possibility that a more complete affirmative defense could
save a statute's constitutionality, see ante, at 1405,
implicitly accepting that some regulation of virtual child
pornography might be constitutional.'' No member of the Court
took exception with his conclusion.
Congress clearly has a compelling interest to protect
children from sexual exploitation. That interest extends to
the prosecution of those who exploit children. These
prosecutions are seriously threatened by the mere possibility
that technology exists to create a depiction of a virtual
child. This possibility allows those who harm real children
to claim that the child pornography they possess does not
contain real children.
Computer technology already exists today to disguise
depictions of real children to make them unidentifiable and
to make depictions of real children appear computer
generated. Furthermore, evidence was presented to the
Congress that the technology may already exist to depict
virtual children to look real and completely
indistinguishable.
Compounding the problem, is the fact that the vast majority
of child pornography prosecutions today involve images
contained on computer hard drives, computer disks, or related
media and that a computer image seized from a child
pornographer is rarely a first-generation product. These
pictures are e-mailed over and over again or scanned in from
photographs of real children being abused and exploited. The
transmission of images over an e-mail system can alter the
image and make it impossible even for an expert to know
whether or not a particular image depicts a real child. If
the original image has been scanned from a paper version into
a digital format, this task can be even harder since
proper forensic delineation may depend on the quality of
the image scanned and the tools used to scan it.
To prove a child is real will require identifying the
actual child. This is usually an impossible task. The
quandary is that while there is no substantial evidence that
any of the child pornography images being trafficked today
were made in any other way than by the abuse of real
children, technological advances are leading many criminal
defendants to suggest otherwise. These defendants are
claiming that the images they possess are not those of real
children, insisting that the government prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the images are not computer-generated.
This is not a new defense, but without a narrowly drafted
statute intended to prohibit the use of virtual child
pornography that an ordinary person viewing the depiction
could not distinguish from a depiction of a real child, it
will be impossible for the government to prosecute child
pornography cases involving computer images. Some in the
Court are cognizant that technology may threaten the
Government's compelling state interest of effective
prosecution of those who sexually exploit children and thus
threaten the Government's ability to protect children.
A representative from the Department of Justice testified:
As Justice Thomas noted in his concurring opinion, ``if
technological advances thwart prosecution of `unlawful
speech,' the Government may well have a compelling interest
in barring or otherwise regulating some narrow category of
`lawful speech' in order to enforce effectively laws against
pornography made through the abuse of real children.'' 122 S.
Ct. at 1406-07 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
Similarly, Justice O'Connor noted in her opinion concurring
in part and dissenting in part that, ``given the rapid pace
of advances in computer-graphics technology, the Government's
concern is reasonable.'' Id. at 1409. Moreover, to avert
serious harms, Congress may rely on reasonable predictive
judgments, even when legislating in an area implicating
freedom of speech. See Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC 520
U.S. 180, 210-11 (1997). We believe that Congress has a
strong basis for concluding that the very existence of
sexually explicit computer images that are virtually
indistinguishable from images of real minors engaged in
sexually explicit conduct poses a serious danger to future
prosecutions involving child pornography. Indeed, we already
have some sense of the impact of the Court's decision. The
Ninth Circuit had invalidated the same provisions of law in
1999, and all accounts indicate that the number and scope of
child pornography prosecutions brought by our prosecutors in
the Ninth Circuit has been adversely impacted.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Free Speech
Coalition, evidence of this growing threat is clear as
defendants in almost every child pornography case contend
that the depictions could be virtual, requiring the
prosecutors to prove that the children depicted are real.
Some of the defense efforts are succeeding. For example,
after Free Speech Coalition, a court granted the defendant's
motion to withdraw a guilty plea and held that the government
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew
that the images depicted real children.
Moreover, the existence of computer generated images of
child pornography that is indistinguishable from depictions
of real children will bolster the child pornography market
and those who abuse children to produce such pictures. The
majority opinion in Free speech Coalition stated, in dicta,
that ``if virtual images were identical to illegal child
pornography, the illegal images would be driven from the
market by the indistinguishable substitutes.'' Contrary to
that belief, the President and CEO of NCMEC ``believe[s] that
the Court's decision will result in the proliferation of
child pornography in America, unlike anything we have seen in
more than twenty years.'' He concluded that ``as a result of
the Court's decision, thousands of children will be sexually
victimized, most of whom will not report the offense.''
The Court stated that ``[f]ew pornographers would risk
prosecution by abusing real children if fictional,
computerized images would suffice.'' This conclusion is
simply wrong. The individuals who produce, trade, and
exchange child pornography are rarely profit motivated.
Pictures of abuse of real children are sold, but they are
also traded and displayed--they are trophies and signs of
validation for deviant behavior.
While the Supreme Court has certainly opened the door for
the adult entertainment industry to enter the child
pornography market, legalizing virtual child pornography will
not reduce the market for real children. Rather, the result
will be a market that contains both real and virtual children
(as it does now). The only difference is that now child
molesters will be able to hide their abuse with altered or
merely e-mailed photographs of their victims and the market
will no longer be underground but will return to the public
``adult book stores.''
Child pornography--virtual or otherwise--is detrimental to
the nation's most precious and vulnerable asset, our
children. Regardless of the method of its production, child
pornography is used to promote and incite deviant and
dangerous behavior in our society. As the President and CEO
of the NCMEC
testified ``there is compelling evidence that visual
depictions of sexually explicit conduct involving children
cause real physical, emotional and psychological damage not
only to depicted children but also to non-depicted children.
It is just as insidious, whether it is a photographic record
of a child's actual victimization, or a photographic
depiction used as a tool or device to subsequently victimize
other children.''
Sex predators produce, trade, and use child pornography for
several insidious purposes. Pedophiles not only like to
create a permanent record for arousal and gratification, but
also like to trade these pictures with other pedophiles to
validate their actions. Additionally, sex offenders use child
pornography to lower children's inhibitions to make them
believe that such behavior is acceptable and normal. There
are also those who sell it for profit.
Prior to 1982, child pornography lined the shelves of many
``adult'' entertainment stores. This changed after the 1982
Supreme Court's New York v. Ferber decision that found child
pornography was not entitled to First Amendment protection.
In Ferber, the Court found that: ``[i]t is evident beyond the
need for elaboration that a State's interest in `safeguarding
the physical and psychological well-being of a minor' is
`compelling.' '' Further the Court found that: ``[t]he
distribution of photographs and films depicting sexual
activity by juveniles is intrinsically related to the sexual
abuse of children in at least two ways. First, the material
produced are a permanent record of the children's
participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by
their circulation. Second, the distribution network for child
pornography must be closed if the production of material
which requires the sexual exploitation of children is to be
effectively controlled.''
While child pornography disappeared from bookstores
following Ferber, it did not disappear from existence.'' The
child pornography market merely went underground, but this
underground market was spurred by the advent of the Internet.
Nevertheless, law enforcement had begun to make enormous
strides in the enforcement and prosecution of child
pornography crimes.
Again, the Government has a compelling state interest in
protecting children from those who sexually exploit them
including both child molesters and child pornographers. The
Supreme Court in New York v. Ferber, concluded that ``[t]he
prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children
constitutes a government objective of surpassing
importance.'' In Osborne v. Ohio, the Court recognized that
this compelling state interest extends to stamping out the
vice of child pornography ``at all levels in the distribution
chain.''
It follows that the Government has a compelling interest to
ensure that the criminal prohibitions against child
pornography remain enforceable and effective. As the Court
stated in Ferber, ``[t]he most expeditious if not the only
practical method of law enforcement may be to dry up the
market for this material by imposing severe criminal
penalties on persons selling, advertising, or otherwise
promoting the product.''
It became apparent in the 1990's that advances in
technology threatened the Government's compelling state
interest in protecting real children through the effective
prosecution of the child pornography laws that cover the
visual depictions of real children. In 1996, the Congress
attempted to address this concern with the Child Pornography
Prevention Act. The 1996 language included a prohibition of
any virtual depictions as well as pictures of youthful-
looking adults. The Supreme Court found the 1996 statutory
language overbroad, and therefore, unconstitutional.
This legislation is constitutional as it narrows the
definition in significant ways and strengthens the
affirmative defense. Furthermore, there is a compelling state
interest for the narrowly drawn prohibition. The Government's
compelling state interest is to protect children from
exploitation. And the protection includes the prosecution of
those who would or do exploit children. The Court gave the
Congress an opportunity to addresses its concerns, and the
Congress has an obligation to do so.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from North Dakota (Mr. Pomeroy) for his remarks.
Mr. Chairman, may I ask how much time remains on our side.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Green) the vice-chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security.
Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentlewoman from Pennsylvania (Ms. Hart), a very active member of the Committee on the Judiciary.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote; and pending that, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.