Floor Statements

Mr. Speaker, with 80.2% of voters participating in Taiwan's recent Presidential election, I congratulate the country's 23 million citizens for once again demonstrating the strength and vibrancy of their democracy.

The very close margin of victory calls for a recount, and impassioned protests are not unfamiliar to voters in our own country who experienced the aftermath of the 2000 Presidential election. We know that protection of free expression and other personal freedoms are signs of a healthy democracy.

As Taiwan's democratic society has grown strong, its citizens have prospered. The transformation of Taiwan from an impoverished backwater into an industrial powerhouse, and from a one party dictatorship into a multiparty democracy is among the most impressive economic and political accomplishments of our time.

I send my congratulations to the people of Taiwan on the completion of their third direct presidential election.

Mr. Speaker, as a long time supporter and member of the Hellenic Caucus, I would like to recognize and congratulate the people of Greece on their Independence Day, which they celebrated last week. 183 years ago, the Greek people won their freedom and independence from the Ottoman Empire. This is a great event, not only for Greece, but for all countries because it represents and reaffirms our belief in self- determination and democracy.

Our nation is built on the principles of the ancient Greek philosophers. Our founding fathers looked to Greek political and philosophical ideals while forming our nation. Years later, we were able to return the favor when the United States independence movement helped fuel the strength of the Greek people in seeking their own sovereignty from a foreign empire.

I am also proud to say that the Greek community is especially prominent in New York State. We have the largest Greek Community in the U.S. and we are home to the Orthodox Archdiocese of America.

I am honored to join my colleagues in celebration of this significant achievement in history and to congratulate the Greek people on their independence day.

Mr. Speaker, the resolution before us today seeks to rewrite history. It recognizes that on March 16, 1988, Iraq used mustard gas and other nerve agents against the Kurds in Halabjah, Iraq, killing an estimated 5,000 people. This is an atrocity that is used by many, including members of the President's war cabinet, as justification for invading Iraq.

Yet, if the gassing of the Kurds was a reason for war, why did these same people in both the Reagan and the first Bush administrations work to increase aid, cooperation, trade and intelligence-sharing with Iraq after the gassing occurred? Before history is rewritten, it is important to set the record straight about what did happen in this tragic event.

Secretary of State Colin Powell was Ronald Reagan's National Security Adviser from December 1987 to January 1989 and was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs from 1989 to 1993.

Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz was Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from 1989 to 1993.

National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice was a director on the National Security Council from 1989 to 1993.

Vice President Dick Cheney was the Republican whip in the House in 1988 and the Secretary of Defense from 1989 until 1993.

Why then, when they were in positions of tremendous influence, did they not cry foul when this atrocious gassing happened? Briefly, here is what they did after the Halabjah gassing happened.

In 1988, the Reagan Administration sent $1.1 billion in loan guarantees to Iraq.

According to declassified State Department documents, the United States shared intelligence data with Iraq before and after this mass murder.

In early October 1989, President Bush signed a national security directive to expand political and economic ties with Iraq, including $1 billion in new aid to Iraq.

On October 31, 1989, Secretary of State Baker personally intervened with the Agriculture Department to get more money to go to Iraq.

On April 19, 1990, the National Security Council did the same thing.

Following the end of the Gulf War, U.N. inspectors discovered that front companies for every known site at which Iraq developed biological and chemical weapons bought American computers with licenses approved by the Reagan and Bush administrations.

Weapons of mass destruction did exist in Iraq, but that was 15 years ago. We missed our chance to do something about it, and we cannot allow history to be rewritten here today. This war was not about Halabja or other human rights abuses. It was a preordained preemptive war of choice based upon twisted intelligence and driven by an equally twisted ideological agenda.

Mr. Chairman, I very much appreciate the sentiments behind this bill. There is no question that indecency in the media is a disease that is infecting all of our society. The problem with this legislation, however, is that it deals only with the symptoms of the problem and not with the underlying cause.

The underlying cause of indecency in the media and other problems that we are witnessing as Americans in our electronic media particularly across the country is the incredible consolidation of the ownership of the airwaves into fewer and fewer hands.

On June 2, the chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, Mr. Powell, led an effort that was endorsed by his two Republican colleagues and opposed by the two Democrats which moved that consolidation effort even further so that now we are facing a situation whereby in any service area across the country, one corporation can own almost all of the radio stations, almost all of the television stations, the one daily newspaper and the cable television station, giving that corporate entity the power to control not only the entertainment but the critically important information that goes to the people who are served in that area.

Mr. Powell's action is not a new phenomenon. This is something that we have been witnessing in this country since the mid-1980s. In fact, it was the Reagan FCC back in 1987 which began this consolidation effort in earnest. They also did something else: they took from the American people the right of ownership of the airwaves. Up to that point, we had something called the equal access clause or the fairness doctrine, which allowed American citizens if they disagreed with a political viewpoint expressed by the owner of a radio or television station to have that right expressed. But that right was taken away in 1987 by the Reagan FCC, and that deprivation has been endorsed by this FCC. That is what needs to change. If we want indecency in the media, we have to attack what is really indecent, and what is indecent is this consolidation that is increasing and destroying the independence of the airwaves.

Mr. Speaker, it has now been 30 months, 2\1/2\ years, since the attack of September 11, 2001, on the World Trade Center in New York City, the Pentagon in Virginia, and the loss of the plane in Pennsylvania and the loss of all of those lives, more than 3,000 lives lost on that particular day, all the result of the attack of a group of organized criminals known as al Qaeda, the base, or the al Qaeda network.

It is a very important thing for us to examine that attack and to understand it in its full dimensions and implications. It is very important for at least two reasons. First of all, there are the families and the friends, associates of all of those Americans who were killed that day. They have a right to expect that we will provide them with every detail, that we will look into this event, this catastrophe, this disaster meticulously, and we will understand it in every aspect, and all of that will be done publicly and they will have access to all of that information. We owe them, the families of the victims, nothing less, not a scintilla less than that.

Secondly, it is important because the al Qaeda network still exists, and they have others that are operating with them, perhaps in many countries around the world, and some people suggest as many as 60. To the extent that is true, we can expect that they are contemplating additional attacks on our country. In fact, our intelligence agencies inform us that they believe that is the case; and they are working diligently to try to prevent that from happening.

But nevertheless, these plans are being laid and in order for our intelligence agencies and our government to prevent another attack from occurring, we need to know everything possible about the attack of September 11, 2001: precisely who was behind it, how they formulated it, why they did it, what were their motivations, what information and evidence did we have prior to the attack, when did we have it, who had the information, to whom was that information communicated, how was it communicated, under what circumstances, how was it not communicated, and what did we do as a government before, during, and immediately after that attack. All of that information is essential knowledge if we have any chance of preventing another attack from occurring in the future.

So the commission that has been set up to examine these questions is obviously crucially important, and we should be working with them in a fully cooperative way. We should be providing them with all of the resources and all of the time they need to complete this very essential work. To the extent that we are not doing so, either this Congress or the administration, we are failing in our responsibilities to the American people and failing in a very serious way.

The commission is in existence now, but there was a question initially as to whether or not it would actually exist. After initially opposing the creation of an independent commission to investigate the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration has consistently hampered the commission's investigation. They have done so by failing to fully cooperate and to share with the commission information that is necessary for it to be able to conduct its work. This is inexplicable. Why would the administration fail to cooperate with this commission? Why did the administration initially not want the commission to come into existence?

Should we infer from that that the administration had something to hide, has something to hide, does not want information to come out? It is hard to come to a different conclusion based upon the way in which the administration opposed the creation of the commission and the way in which the administration has hampered the work of the commission by failing to fully cooperate with it and to share with it necessary information. This has forced the commission, this failure to cooperate and to provide necessary information, has forced the commission to request an initial 2 months of time in order to fully complete the investigation that it is mandated to complete.

Now, while such a request would seem to be routine, President Bush and the Speaker of the House of Representatives opposed it. Both eventually relented, but they have not done so sincerely. The Speaker now refuses to allow the commission the original 60 days it was originally given after publishing its report to formally wrap up its work and communicate and work with the Congress on its recommendations. This extra time is crucial and should not be eliminated.

We are having the pretense of cooperation and the pretense of extending time but not the fact. The commission is given the same amount of time; it is just being told to do different things within the limited context of that time. The commission should have all the time it needs. Why does the administration and the leadership of this House not want to give it the time that it needs?

The Senate, on the other hand, has passed this legislation. Legislation passed in the Senate would extend the commission's report deadline and its eventual termination for an additional 2 months. The House must follow suit, and it must do so quickly or the commission will be forced to curtail its work and begin preparing its final report before the original deadline. This work is too important to rush. Why is the administration and the leadership of this House forcing this commission to work under a very tight, restricted deadline when its work is complex and complicated and it should have all of the time it needs to complete it because the information that it is going to provide is so essential to the safety and security of every American citizen?

Already the commission has produced findings. They have made great strides in uncovering the events that allowed the September 11 attack to occur. Let me give my colleagues just a few examples. The commission has exposed some of the immigration screening flaws that allowed the hijackers to enter the United States, including the dismal lack of cooperation among Federal agencies with security watch lists. In other words, our Federal agencies had watch lists, individuals that they were watching, that they were alerted to and watching for; but the information was not shared, and as a consequence, these people were able to slip through.

The commission has also highlighted the air security flaws that allowed the terrorists to board the planes and carry on with them makeshift weapons. The commission has uncovered evidence that United States intelligence agencies were given information that they did not use properly and information that they did not share with other elements of intelligence, other intelligence organizations within the context of our government. For example, they were given the first name and phone number of one of the hijackers. This information was provided by German intelligence. But no action was taken on it. The first name and the telephone number of one of the hijackers. Nothing was done about it. Why?

These questions must be answered, and the commission must be given enough time to develop the information which will enable these kinds of answers to be forthcoming. If given sufficient time, the commission will no doubt compile the most comprehensive and extensive report about the September 11 attack and provide Congress and the White House with concrete recommendations for improving the security of the American people. It is essential that we do that.

Throughout the commission's existence, cooperation from the administration has been grudging and delayed. The commission had to issue a subpoena to the Federal Aviation Administration in order to obtain detailed transcripts and other information about communications that took place on September 11. That subpoena had to be issued because the agency refused to cooperate. The Federal Aviation Administration would not give the 9/11 commission transcripts and information about communications that took place on the date of September 11, the date of the attack. It is just incomprehensible.

In October 2003, the commission had to threaten the White House with subpoena because the commission believed it was not being provided all the necessary materials for its investigation by the White House. While interviews have been scheduled with former President Clinton and Vice President Gore, similar cooperation has not been forthcoming either from President Bush or other members of his administration. President Bush and Vice President Cheney refused to meet with the entire commission. Instead, they have decided that they will only agree to separate, limited meetings with the chairman and the vice chairman. They will meet separately for 1 hour and only 1 hour, and only with the chairman and the vice chairman of the commission. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice continues to refuse to testify publicly. The commission is now considering whether to issue her a subpoena. Obviously, because of this lack of cooperation, the commission needs more time and the deadline needs to be extended.

In addition to studying the causes of September 11, there are other things about this circumstance that the Congress ought to be looking into. Congress should be conducting a vigorous examination of the administration's actions in Iraq prior to, during, and currently with regard to the war. With the exception of limited inquiries by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the House has failed to exercise its oversight responsibilities with respect to our operations in Iraq. The Constitution of the United States provides the responsibility to the House of Representatives to oversee the operations of the executive branch and to perform oversight functions and to carry out oversight responsibilities. What could be more important than the war in Iraq, which has now cost 550 American lives, American servicemen and -women killed, nearly 3,000 others seriously wounded, many of them lost limbs, wounds that they will carry for the rest of their lives, not to mention thousands of other lives that have been lost? What could be more important than that?

House committees should be thoroughly investigating, not just our intelligence community's massive failures but how the President and members of his administration used the intelligence that they were given to support their case for making war in Iraq. We should also examine all the other reasons that President Bush and other members of the administration cited to support his war. All of this should be examined carefully and in detail.

House committees should be thoroughly investigating the Pentagon's postwar plans. The guerilla war is continuing despite Saddam Hussein's capture. Civil strife is at an all-time high after today's synchronized bombings of Shiite religious gatherings despite the apparent adoption of an interim constitution. Why did the civilian leadership in the Pentagon ignore Army recommendations for a more comprehensive occupation? Why? House committees should be thoroughly investigating how the administration secretly awarded billions of dollars in no-bid contracts to companies like Halliburton. It is only thanks to the work of Members of the Congress, like the gentleman from California (Mr. Waxman) and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Dingell), that we have begun to uncover the scope of some of these massive contracts and that the U.S. taxpayer is actually being overcharged, in fact grossly overcharged, for much of the work that is going on in Iraq by these companies.

House committees should be thoroughly investigating the administration's plan to hand over power in Iraq. How was this hand- over date chosen? It seems conveniently selected to take the upcoming Presidential election into consideration. Why did it take months to get the United Nations involved?

And then there is the whole matter of the case for the war itself. How did we come to go to war in Iraq? How was it that this resolution was presented to the Congress and passed in a very controversial and divisive way? Now that several months of searching have passed without finding any weapons of mass destruction and there remains no evidence whatsoever of a connection between Saddam Hussein, the leader of Iraq, and September 11, one thing is inarguably clear: President Bush and his surrogates intentionally misled the Congress, the American public, and the world about the evidence that such weapons existed in Iraq.

Some may say that this is a premature accusation because it remains possible that some weapons of mass destruction will be found. But such a discovery would not change the indisputable fact that the President, the Vice President, members of the Cabinet, particularly the Secretary of Defense, and other White House advisers were not truthful about the certainty of that evidence. The President would like us to believe that the discrepancies between what the White House said before the war and what we now know to be the truth resulted from failures in our intelligence. He has disingenuously appointed another commission to supposedly study these failures, but he has carefully bounded the commission's scope to prevent scrutiny of his own actions as well as those close to him who were involved in this decision-making process.

Gaps in our intelligence-gathering represent a gravely serious matter that needs to be examined fully. But it is even more important that we scrutinize the discrepancies between what the intelligence agencies told the White House and what the White House told the Congress and the world. If we cannot trust the President to tell us the truth about the need to send our troops into harm's way, then we have lost an essential component of our system of government. Whatever power our leaders have derives from the informed consent of the governed. This President failed to properly inform those we govern.

There are numerous documented examples of the White House's deception in this matter. Part of the administration's method of operation was to take the intelligence community's assessment that a threat may exist and transform that possibility into a certainty in its public statements. For example, United Nations inspectors found that Iraq had failed to account for a quantity of bacterial-growth media. Had this been used, the United Nations inspectors reported, it, and I quote, ``could have produced about three times as much'' anthrax as Iraq admitted to having.

This report was fed into the White House propaganda machine and came out somewhat differently in President Bush's October 7 address. It came out in the following form, and I quote: ``The inspectors, however, concluded that Iraq had likely produced already two to four times that amount. This is a massive stockpile of biological weapons that has never been accounted for and is capable of killing millions.'' The added rhetoric there did not come about by accident. Those words, used the way they are in that sentence, are designed to frighten people. And people who are frightened are more likely to bend to your will, even if your will is warped and taking them in the wrong direction. If you frighten people, they are more likely to follow you. That was the intention of those words and the misleading elements that are inherent in them.

A recent report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace described this particular act of trickery this way: ``In two sentences, possibility becomes likelihood, likelihood then subtly becomes fact, and a huge stockpile is created. Finally, biological agent is transformed into weapons, and not just any weapons but extremely sophisticated delivery systems, the only way such weapons could kill `millions.' Small changes like these can easily transform a threat from minor to dire.''

The Carnegie report has identified 40 distinct caveats or conditions included in the October 2002 national intelligence estimate that White House officials usually left out of their public statements. The Bush administration regularly omitted terms like ``probably'' or ``we suspect'' or ``we cannot exclude'' when telling the world what our intelligence agencies had reported. Sometimes the White House was less subtle. Secretary of State Colin Powell told the United Nations, and I quote, ``Every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we are giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid evidence.'' That is the end of Mr. Powell's quote. We now

know that what the Bush administration gave us was indeed nothing more than speculation, speculation presented as if it were fact.

Another trick the administration and its advisers employed was the lumping of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons under the single rubric ``weapons of mass destruction.'' In so doing, the White House could combine the likelihood that Saddam Hussein had chemical weapons, a relatively minor threat, with the potentially catastrophic scenario of an Iraqi nuclear program for which there was never any evidence whatsoever.

The administration further inflated the threat to the United States by insisting, with absolutely no supporting evidence, that Saddam would give weapons of mass destruction to terrorists. The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate concluded that this was unlikely. It was unlikely, said our National Intelligence Estimate, except under imminent threat of United States attack. Establishing this nightmare scenario was essential to securing public as well as congressional support for war. Only through terrorists did Saddam pose a threat on American soil. Without that threat, enthusiasm for an attack on Iraq would have been, no doubt, greatly diminished.

Using those methods, the White House presented us with the image of a ``mushroom cloud,'' without which they could not wage the war they had been wanting to wage for years.

Today's synchronized bombing of Shiite Muslim religious ceremonies in Baghdad and in Karbala are tragic reminders that Iraq remains an extremely dangerous place. At least 143 people were killed and thousands more were likely injured just today.

These bombings are just the latest in a series of attacks against Iraqi civilians and against United States soldiers. Five hundred and fifty United States soldiers have died in Iraq, and over 2,700 have been wounded, seriously injured. While there is no accurate figure available for Iraqi casualties, it is reasonable to assume that that number is in the thousands. The vast majority of these deaths occurred after the end of major combat, after the end of those major combat operations was announced by President Bush on May 1 of last year.

It is now conventional wisdom that the President and his administration failed abysmally to plan for the conditions in postwar Iraq. Vice President Cheney's predictions of a rosy welcome were shattered long ago. Our troops remain engaged in a guerilla war, and Iraq's civilian population lives under constant threat by the same adversary.

Why is the House, this House, ignoring this reality? The CIA, the State Department, the Army, the Marine Corps, the Army War College, and various nongovernmental organizations have produced thousands of pages of recommendations that were ignored. These predictions have proved extremely accurate after the fall of Baghdad. Outside experts are saying that the ongoing financial, diplomatic and human costs of the Iraq occupation are far worse than expected because the administration did not take its own agencies' suggestions.

This is an extremely serious charge, yet no House committee is currently investigating what went wrong with our postwar plans. We are in this House ignoring our responsibilities to oversee the operations of the administration on matters of great and grave seriousness.

Tonight is an opportunity to outline some of the advice that has been ignored by the administration, first with regard to U.S. military recommendations. War games run by the Army and the Pentagon's Joint Staff in preparation for war with Iraq led to very high troop levels. The Army's recommendation for an invasion force was 400,000 troops. Secretary Rumsfeld envisioned the force level of 75,000.

The Army's recommendation took into account the invasion and subsequent occupation. It argued a larger force would actually be more useful after Baghdad fell as opposed to the initial invasion. A large force would allow the Army to restore order quickly and perhaps allow for a much smaller occupation force 6 months or so later.

In Bosnia the Army stationed 200,000 troops to watch over 5 million people. In Iraq, with a population of 25 million, the Army dispatched fewer than 200,000 troops for postwar action. The heart of the Army's argument was that the U.S. would win the war and do so quickly but could be trapped in an untenable occupation if there were too few soldiers.

Marine General Anthony Zinni, who preceded Tommy Franks as CENTCOM Commander, agreed with the Army's recommendation for higher troop levels. The Army had also worked out cost projections prior to the war, despite claims by Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz that it was impossible to produce such numbers.

The State Department's Future of Iraq Project is also important for us to look at. Starting in late 2001, the State Department began contemplating postwar plans and created the Future of Iraq Project. It brought in outside experts and teams of exiles and created 17 working groups designed to systematically cover what would be needed to rebuild Iraq's political and economic infrastructure. Congress authorized $5 million to fund the project's studies in May of 2002. The final report consisted of 13 volumes of recommendations on specific topics. Among the list of recommendations were these:

First, restore electricity and water supplies as soon as possible after regime change by employing Iraqis, thereby creating jobs and engendering goodwill toward the coalition by the indigenous population.

Secondly, they recommended do not disband the entire Iraqi army. The project suggested purging the Iraqi army of its Baathist elements but retaining most members to help restore public order and provide for the country's defense when the U.S. departs. It also stressed, however, that ``all combatants who are included in the demobilization process must be assured by their leaders and the new government of their legal rights and that new prospects for work and education will be provided by the new system.'' The report later detailed steps on how this could be accomplished.

The project went on to stress how disorderly Iraq would be soon after liberation, despite Vice President Cheney's rosy predictions. The report predicted the power vacuum and the crime and looting that followed Saddam's removal would be extensive, and, of course, they were entirely accurate.

The report also suggested that despite the need for a long United States postwar commitment, instituting a long-term military government would alienate the Iraqi people.

The report also warned against the ill will that would result from Iraqis being seen as working for foreign contractors instead of having foreign contractors be seen as assisting the Iraqi people. We have seen all of that come to pass because the recommendations of that report were ignored.

There were other suggestions that came from the Central Intelligence Agency that were forwarded to the administration. The common theme among all CIA predictions was that disorder would follow the fall of Baghdad. The CIA believed that rivalries in Iraq were so deep that quick transfer of sovereignty would invite chaos. The CIA began running war games to plan for the postwar Iraq. These included representatives from the Defense Department. But when the Secretary of Defense's office heard of this kind of cooperation between Defense and the CIA in the early summer of 2002, the Office of the Secretary of Defense reprimanded the Department of Defense employees who participated and ordered them to stop cooperating with the Central Intelligence Agency. It is astonishing.

These war games were intended to make cost predictions and simulate potential problems. Because of that they were seen as weakening the case for launching this ``war of choice.''

There were also numerous recommendations from nongovernment organizations and the relationship of NGOs and USAID. In the fall of 2002, USAID began planning for postwar Iraq. Since it was the natural contact for nongovernmental organizations, these NGOs were concerned with relief operations in Iraq. At the time most high-ranking officials in the Bush administration were comparing the eventual fall of Iraq to the fall of Germany and Japan. The NGOs strongly disagreed with this assumption and made those views known to USAID.

The NGOs believed Iraq would likely fall into chaos following regime change and requested that sanction restrictions be lifted from them so that they could prepare for postwar Iraq. The NGOs should be allowed to go there and make the arrangements so that postwar Iraq could be organized and people would see that there were organizations that they could relate to and that chaos would not ensue. This request was denied. The NGOs continued to stress the disorder that would follow war, but all they received back from USAID representatives were broad assurances that everything was taken care of.

There was a report from the War College. In January, 2003, the Army War College produced a report that addressed Iraq reconstruction challenges. It predicted long-term gratitude towards the United States was unlikely and that if the United States had to supply the bulk of the occupation force this would lead to many more problems in postwar Iraq. The Army War College report strongly recommended that a large international force would be ideal for postwar occupation. It also provided a 135-item checklist of what tasks would have to be done right after the war and by whom those tasks would have to be accomplished.

According to those involved with this report, the Pentagon paid little attention to any of its postwar recommendations.

There were, of course, unrealistic assumptions. Exaggerations during the buildup for war were not limited to weapons of mass destruction. Administration officials often made widely ridiculed assumptions about postwar Iraq. Here are just a few: Both President Bush and Vice President Cheney claimed we would be greeted as liberators. USAID Administrator Natsios claimed rebuilding would cost U.S. taxpayers $1.7 billion. Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz repeatedly claimed it was impossible to guess any costs for the war. Secretary Rumsfeld called former Economic Adviser Lawrence Lindsey's claim that the war would cost $200 billion way off. He thought that was a gross exaggeration. Wolfowitz claimed reconstruction would cost U.S. taxpayers very little. What is the record? To date, the United States Government has spent approximately $150 billion in Iraq, and we know that the President has an additional bill of at least $50 billion which he will present to the Congress sometime after the November election. Lawrence Lindsey's recommendation seems quite good now based upon the experience. It is too bad he was not listened to at the time.

The House of Representatives must investigate. These examples are just the tip of the iceberg. There are literally thousands of pages of postwar planning that were prepared and then ignored.

Why was the Defense Department and not the State Department initially put in charge of postwar Iraq? Why were we not more prepared? Why did the administration not take its own recommendations? Why were we told there were no cost estimates when of course there were?

Postwar plans were available and they were ignored. The House of Representatives must investigate this to ensure that legislative remedies are examined and to put in place mechanisms that will prevent another failure of this magnitude.

Just for a moment let us take a look at the no bid contracts. Halliburton and Bechtel already have contracts in Iraq worth $3.14 billion. Those contracts result from the conflict in Iraq and the reconstruction efforts. Yet the gentleman from California (Mr. Waxman) and his staff at the Committee on Government Reform have found that the cost of many of the reconstruction projects could be reduced by 90 percent if the projects were awarded to local Iraqi companies rather than contractors like Halliburton and Bechtel. The American people, in other words, could be saving 90 cents on the dollar if this reconstruction activity were done in a way that is not designed to benefit the people who benefit the administration.

There is ample evidence of overcharging. We have learned that Kellogg Brown & Root, a Halliburton subsidiary, is overcharging the United States for fuel delivered to Baghdad from Kuwait. They are charging as much as three times the amount for gasoline that can be purchased there on the market, inflating the price three times.

We have also learned that Kellogg Brown & Root employees received kickbacks from a Kuwaiti subcontractor in exchange for awarding that subcontractor a reconstruction contract. But that is all. How much of a kickback was there? Who were these people who received the kickback? Who at Halliburton knew about it? Who at the Defense Department may have known about it? Who else in the administration may have known about it? There is an awful lot of information we do not have, and that is why this investigation needs to go forward.

Members of Congress were informed of these sole-source noncompetitive contracts by media reports, by investigative reporters in the media. Despite repeated requests by Members to Federal agencies, the administration has been slow to respond, or simply has declined to provide details about why these large private contracts were awarded on a non-competitive basis.

Here are two brief examples. USAID awarded several contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars to a few companies it hand-picked to compete against each other, yet repeated inquiries from the minority on the Committee on Government Reform to USAID have been brushed aside, and now USAID has refused to provide copies of the contracts or information on how it chose which companies would bid on these initial contracts.

This is the taxpayers' money. We are spending enormous amounts of money, and it is being spent secretly, and the Congress is not being allowed to look at the contracts or examine how this bidding process went forward.

The administration has also failed to disclose information about its sole-source oil field contract with Halliburton's Kellogg Brown & Root. Kellogg Brown & Root was awarded a no-bid contract on March 8, 2003, but the Defense Department did not disclose until April 8 that this contract has a potential value of $7 billion. Today, despite a recommendation by the Army Corps of Engineers to open this contract to public scrutiny, the Defense Department continues to keep its content classified for allegedly national security reasons. Whose security is at stake, we have cause to wonder.

House committees must investigate. It is clear that Members of Congress are receiving grudging and delayed cooperation, if they receive any cooperation at all, from the administration regarding reconstruction contracts. Only a formal committee investigation will be able to answer the serious questions and allegations that have arisen from these no-bid contracts and this no-bid process.

Ambassador Bremer has set the deadline for transferring power back to the Iraqi people as June 30, 2004. This date falls conveniently close to the beginning of the summer Presidential campaign. The date was set solely by the United States, despite recent events indicating that Iraq will not be able to make a peaceful transition without the United Nations leading negotiations. This begs the question, Was this date set for political purposes?

The House should be asking these questions and demanding clear proof of the reasoning behind this date. Part of the original reasoning was that elections in Iraq would be held shortly after the transition deadline to ensure the legitimacy of the new government. But that is no longer the case. The United States plan for such an election was roundly rejected, and it was the United Nations that had to step in and negotiate a solution to the election question.

Does this administration still believe the United Nations is a ``worthless debating society''? I wonder.

Under the United Nations plan, national elections will take place in the late fall of 2004. Should this new development not affect the transfer date? The Congress and the American people deserve answers to these questions that at this late date still remain unanswered.

So, Mr. Speaker, we have two issues. One is the 9/11 commission and why that commission is not being allowed the time it needs to complete its work comprehensively and completely and provide answers to questions that beg

answers, answers that we need as Representatives and which the administration should have also, if it does not have them already.

The 9/11 commission should be given more time to carry out its work, and the 2-month extension is not too much to ask. Why are we rushing the completion of the work of that commission? That question ought to be on the mind of every Member of this House, and every Member of this House ought to demand an answer. The extension ought to be granted, and it ought to be granted sincerely and accurately so that they have the full time that they need to complete their work.

There, of course, remains all of the questions that I raised, and many, many more. I have just begun to scratch the surface of the questions that remain with regard to what happened prior to our going into Iraq in that war, what has happened during it, and what is continuing to happen and what we will do subsequently with regard to that country. Many questions remain unanswered.

The responsibility to develop those answers lies with this House of Representatives. The leadership of this House should appoint appropriate bipartisan committees to look into these matters. We are derelict in our duty. We are not fulfilling our responsibilities to the American people on an issue that is of paramount importance, an issue that involves thousands of lives, hundreds of billions of dollars in American treasure and the future safety and security of the American people. Those answers should be forthcoming, and there should be no delay in setting up the mechanisms which will allow them to come forward.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to commemorate the recent visit to Washington, DC by the President of the Republic of Tunisia, His Excellency Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. President Ben Ali met with President Bush on Wednesday, February 18, 2004. During the meeting President Bush praised the social progress in Tunisia and welcomed its leader as a partner in the fight against terrorism.

The United States and Tunisia have maintained a strong relationship throughout both our histories. Tunisia has been a crucial partner in the Mediterranean region through first the Cold War and, more recently, in our current efforts to fight terrorism. Our relationship has grown even stronger in the last few years. In December 2003, Tunis was chosen as the regional center for the Middle East Partnership Initiative, a Near Eastern affairs program to promote democracy and political reform in the region. This is a welcome development because Tunisia plays a crucial role in stabilizing Middle East politics.

President Bush rightly praised the government in Tunisia for working with the United States in fighting terrorism, for a ``modern and viable'' education system and for giving equal rights to women. Tunisia can help the Middle East achieve greater reform and freedom, something that is necessary for peace for the long term.

As a friend of Tunisia, I again commemorate the recent visit by His Excellency President Ben Ali. This meeting was an opportunity to highlight the longstanding relations between our two countries and the friendship shared by our two peoples. It was also an occasion to strengthen our joint efforts on the international scene for the causes of peace, security, human dignity and development.

Mr. Speaker, the referendum offered by Taiwan's President, the Honorable Chen Shui-bian, for the March 20, 2004 election ballot will not alter the status quo of cross-strait relations.

This referendum does not seek a declaration of independence. Rather, it is intended to express the Taiwanese people's immediate and legitimate concerns regarding the peace and security of the region. Taiwan is a thriving democracy that promotes freedom and the rule of law. The upcoming referendum will allow its people to freely express their views, which is a fundamental human right guaranteed by international law.

Mr. Speaker, it is becoming increasingly obvious to people across the country that this House of Representatives is failing in its responsibility with regard to its oversight of the executive branch. I am referring here, of course, specifically to the assertions that have been made by various people in the administration, Secretary of Defense, the Vice President, others, even the President himself, with regard to the necessity to go to war in Iraq.

This Congress was told and the American people were told that we needed to go to war in Iraq because of the association that existed between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda and also because the regime of Saddam Hussein possessed so-called weapons of mass destruction. Time and time again people in the administration raised the specter of the mushroom cloud to create the impression that the government of Iraq was in the process of creating nuclear weapons that could be used either directly or indirectly against the United States and therefore that the government of Saddam Hussein constituted a direct and immediate threat to the people of our country.

Here, for example, are some of the words of President Bush himself. On September 12 of 2002 he said: ``The history, the logic, and the facts lead to one conclusion. Saddam Hussein's regime is a grave and gathering danger. To assume this regime's good faith is to bet the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble, and this is a risk we must not take.''

We know that he was wrong, and we have every reason to suspect that he knew he was wrong when he said that. But what has happened, more than 500 American lives have been lost, more than 530 to be exact. Tens of thousands of Americans have been wounded and taken out of Iraq as a result of those wounds. Hundreds of thousands of others have been killed and wounded all on the basis of what now increasingly seems clear to be fraudulent information presented to this Congress and to the American people.

This House of Representatives has a responsibility. It has a responsibility to ensure that the executive branch is acting within the confines of the Constitution. It has a responsibility to make sure that the laws of this country are being obeyed, and it has a responsibility to make sure that the administration is not acting in ways that put American citizens in danger unnecessarily.

It is increasingly clear that the war in Iraq was not a war of necessity but rather it was a war of choice, and that choice was made by high-ranking people in the Bush administration.

So what is our obligation? Our obligation is clear. This Congress should at this moment be preparing to conduct a comprehensive and complete investigation into the allegations made by members of the administration. Supposedly those allegations were based upon intelligence that was supplied to the administration from the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies within the Federal Government. But evidence that we have now suggests that the intelligence supplied to the administration was manipulated by people within the administration, perhaps even falsified, in order to justify our war in Iraq.

If that is the case, and it increasingly seems obvious that it is, this Congress has a responsibility to engage in an investigation to get at the truth. To what extent have our intelligence agencies been compromised by this administration? To what extent are our intelligence agencies now less reliable than they were before? And if they have been compromised, as it seems they have, and if they are less reliable, as it seems they are, as a result of the administration's activities, then this Congress has a responsibility to engage in that investigation.

The President just recently has said that he is going to establish a commission to look at some of the intelligence; but we know already, based upon the language coming out of the administration, some of the names of the people who have been suggested as members of that commission, and the limited direction and responsibility of the commission, we know that that commission is not going to conduct the kind of investigation that needs to be conducted if the American people can have some sense of security in the sanity and proper conduct of their intelligence agencies and the way that that information is used by the administration. This Congress needs to begin that investigation, and it needs to begin it immediately.

Mr. Speaker, as we begin this second session of the 108th Congress, there is a great deal of very important work that remains for us to accomplish.

Primarily, among those things that need to be done is simply this: this Congress needs to focus its attention on the basis for the war in Iraq, why we are there; why that war was carried out; and what were the basic reasons behind it.

We were told initially by the administration that there was a connection between Iraq and the attack on our country of September 11, 2001, and that there was a relationship between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein. That has proven to be completely false.

Subsequently, this Congress was told repeatedly, even in classified briefings right here on the floor of the House of Representatives, carried out by the Secretary of Defense and others, that the reason we were going to war in Iraq was because of the fact that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, so-called weapons of mass destruction. And as the President put it, Iraq constituted a deep and ongoing threat to the United States; and as Vice President Cheney put it, Iraq constitutes an imminent threat to the United States because of these so-called weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological weapons, which were alleged to be in Iraq in large numbers.

We have now come to learn quite clearly that that was wrong, that there were no weapons of mass destruction, no chemical or biological weapons in any significant amount held in Iraq by Saddam Hussein or by anyone else. Many of us knew that. Many of us knew that 15 months ago when this Congress voted on a resolution authorizing the administration to carry out a war in Iraq. We knew it, we said so, and we voted against that resolution.

Nevertheless, many others were taken in by what was coming out of the White House and elsewhere within the administration. And they voted for the war in Iraq, many of them, based on the belief that they were being told

the truth about the possession of weapons of mass destruction by the regime of Saddam Hussein. Again, now we know very clearly that that was not the case and that the administration knew it was not the case.

Most recently we have the report from the outgoing head of the American weapons inspection team in Iraq, David Kay. David Kay has now completed his report as he retires from that position, and he has said to us very, very clearly in that report that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, no chemical or biological weapons; that the biological and chemical weapons that were there, many of them were destroyed in the first Gulf War in 1991 and the rest were discovered and destroyed by the ongoing United Nations weapons inspection program.

We also have information from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which has done a very comprehensive study of the issue of so-called weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has set forth in a very detailed report that there were no weapons of mass destruction held by the Saddam Hussein regime not since the end of the first Gulf War, and shortly thereafter they were destroyed as a result of weapons inspection program, the U.N. weapons inspection program.

Again, another clear indication that the premise that was laid forth by the administration to this Congress in order to get a resolution passed authorizing the carrying out of that war was false. It was fabricated. And this Congress was misled.

That leaves us with the very serious problem of finding out why that was done and who was responsible for doing it. That is important because of the situation we currently find ourselves in in Iraq, including the situation we find ourselves in with regard to the war on terrorism.

Our attention has been diverted away from al Qaeda and away from the war on terrorism. And we find ourselves in Iraq in a war that has already cost more than 500 American lives. The lives of more than 500 American servicemen and -women have been lost. Another more than 2,500 American servicemen and -women have been seriously wounded, all on the basis of pretense.

Therefore, we must conduct a complete and thorough investigation as to what happened, and that investigation must commence immediately.

Mr. Speaker, just to correct the record with regard to the first vote of the day, House Resolution 492, I noticed that I am recorded as having voted in the negative. That is in error. I am in favor of the resolution, and I wish the record to reflect that I intended to vote in the affirmative.

Mr. Speaker, I want to commend the Chairman of the Energy and Water Subcommittee, Mr. Hobson and the ranking member, Mr. Visclosky for their good work on this bill. This conference report deserves the overwhelming support it is about to receive.

I do want to bring attention to one provision in this bill that has not received the scrutiny it deserves. Section 115 is an affront to our nation's environmental laws. It was not included in either the House or Senate bills and was added in conference. The provision waives all environmental laws and directs the construction of a road from the village of King Cove, Alaska through the sensitive Izembek National Wildlife Refuge and right to the boundary of the fragile and internationally significant Izembek Wilderness Area.

Specifically, Section 115 directs the Corps of Engineers to build a road proposed in one Alternative from a draft Environmental Impact Statement prepared to evaluate several modes of transportation between the villages of King Cove and Cold Bay, Alaska. The Environmental Protection Agency has raised significant concerns with the alternative mandated by Section 115. The Corps of Engineers is still reviewing public comment on the draft EIS.

The King Cove Access Project first surfaced as legislation in 1998. Proponents attempted to add the provision to an appropriations bill that year but were not successful. A compromise was reached later that year with the King Cove Health and Safety Act which was included as Section 353 of Public Law 105-277, the Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. The measure appropriated $40 million to address the access needs of the communities of King Cove and Cold Bay; however, the Act did not approve a road through the Izembek refuge or the Izembek Wilderness. In fact, the legislation specifically required that expenditure of the funds allocated in the bill ``must be in accordance with all other applicable laws.''

Five years after a satisfactory compromise was agreed upon, this rider inappropriately short-circuits the public process. An administrative decision on a project to enhance marine-road access for the community of King Cove is proceeding in a timely manner and does not require intervention by Congress. However, the King Cove Access Project mandates one alternative in the EIS, thereby effectively ignoring the advice of the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, other federal agencies and the American public.

Section 115 is an affront not only to public process, but also to our nation's environmental

laws. Unlike the King Cove Health & Safety Act, which is subject to national environmental laws, the King Cove Access Project is ``notwithstanding any other provision of law.'' It is inappropriate to exempt the Izembek refuge from federal environmental laws in this manner.

The Izembek National Wildlife Refuge, on the Alaska Peninsula, is internationally recognized as one of the most important wetland reserves in the Northern Hemisphere. Home to threatened and endangered species, as well as millions of migratory birds, the Izembek National Wildlife Refuge and Izembek Wilderness are keys in the fight to conserve the natural diversity of wildlife populations and habitats. A road through the refuge will inevitable damage the refuge's critically important habitat.

The King Cove Access Project ignores environmental laws, threatens important wildlife habitat and sets a dangerous anti-wilderness precedent. The 17-mile road proposal is not compatible with the purposes of the refuge, as established by ANILCA, or with the Wilderness Act. The King Cove Access Project rider is terrible policy and terrible process.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to recognize the distinguished career of Dr. Norman N. Burg. Through more than 40 years of medical practice in Ulster County, New York, Dr. Burg has touched the lives of countless people and has improved the delivery of regional health care services immeasurably. I am pleased to join the health care community in Ulster County in congratulating Dr. Burg on his outstanding career.

During his four decades of service in Ulster County, Dr. Burg has operated a private practice, served on staff at two local hospitals, having been president of the medical staff at both. He has also contributed his leadership skills to serving the Ulster County Infirmary, Ferncliff Nursing Home, St. Francis Hospital in Poughkeepsie and Northern Dutchess Hospital.

Throughout his career, Dr. Burg has taken great pride in sharing his accumulated knowledge of medicine and worked diligently to educate aspiring physicians. Among his many accomplishments, he was a founder and the first program director of the residency program at Family Medicine in Kingston. This program has trained more than 100 family physicians, the majority of whom continue to practice medicine in New York. It also paved the way for the creation of the Mid Hudson Family Health Institute that currently provides health care services to under- insured and uninsured residents of the Hudson Valley. The Institute stands as a testament to Dr. Burg's deeply held belief that all citizens should be afforded access to health care regardless of their economic situation.

Dr. Burg has also been extremely involved in his community since coming to Ulster County. His list of activities include serving as the school physician and football team physician for Onteora High School, president and coach of the Woodstock Little League, EMT instructor, board member of the Woodstock Volunteer Ambulance Squad and chairman of the Woodstock Narcotics Guidance Council.

Mr. Speaker, it is my privilege to recognize the outstanding accomplishments of Dr. Norman Burg. His deep commitment to improving the lives of people around him has yielded a distinguished record of service and has made Ulster County and much of New York, a better, healthier place to live.

Mr. Speaker, this is an example of not just an act that will destroy good policy, but it also destroys the language; and it is consistent with the kind of thing that has been happening here recently, particularly with regard to environmental policy.

What is the name of this bill? The Healthy Forest Restoration Act. It reminds me very much of the Clear Skies Initiative that the President was pushing and the majority in this House was solidly behind. What did we get from the Clear Skies Initiative? Increased greenhouse gases, increased acid rain, a big gift to the polluters so that they do not have to upgrade their equipment. The same kind of thing occurs here.

The rationale behind this legislation as it is stated is that we need this act in order to carry out thinning processes in places where fires are likely to occur. Now, one would have the idea, based upon that, that these thinning processes are being held up. That is what they want us to believe, these thinning processes are being held up by litigation and things of that nature.

Well, what does the General Accounting Office say? The General Accounting Office has a lot of credibility around here. The General Accounting Office tells us that the appeals and litigation are not slowing thinning projects at all. In fact, 92 percent of the thinning projects are being completed without delay.

Now, why, then, are we engaged in this?

Well, the real reason is, just like under the Clear Skies Initiative, we were not interested in cleaning up the skies, and here we are not interested in healthy forests. What we are interested in is a big giveaway to the people who want to go out and cut down the trees that are on public land. That is what this is all about.

Now, another interesting aspect of it to me is a lot of people in this House who are dead set against any activity by the Federal Government, they want the Federal Government out of everything. Now, however, under this piece of legislation it is, no problem, just give them this authority, trust the administration, trust the Federal Government. They will do everything right. Totally inconsistent, obviously.

So what else does this bad bill do? It fails to focus on projects in communities that are actually in need of protection. It undercuts NEPA by eliminating the requirement to consider a full range of reasonable alternatives. It fails to treat or provide assistance to State, tribal, and private lands. It throws up unprecedented roadblocks to citizens across the country and their access to the courts, and it is a direct threat to the independence of the judiciary in this country on this specific issue. It curtails the rights to appeal bad projects and authorizes a new appeals process with no sideboards to be created by the Secretary.

This is an example of a bad bill and specious arguments driving bad policy.

Mr. Speaker, very few people are surprised that as soon as the Republican Party has control of both Houses of the Congress and the White House they move to destroy Medicare, and that is what this bill essentially will do. It will drive Medicare into the ground.

The disguise that they seek to use in order to accomplish that is a prescription drug program, but just today the National Center on Policy Analysis told us that only $1 out of every $16 in this bill will be spent to provide drugs for senior citizens who would not otherwise get them. Most of the rest of the money goes to drug companies and to insurance companies.

But the thing that surprises me about this bill is the Republican party is engaging in price fixing. They fixed the price of drugs so that they cannot go down, they can only go up. They have made sure that we cannot import drugs from Canada or other places at a cheaper price, and they guarantee that every time the prices change it will go up. Price fixing, increasing the cost of drugs.

Mr. Speaker, I want to join those who have congratulated the Members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, particularly the chairman of the committee, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), as well as the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), our ranking member, for the job that they have done under some very difficult circumstances. This is an issue that really needs the kind of attention that it seems to be getting under their leadership.

I think that this motion to instruct is very appropriate, particularly at this moment. There has been some recent criticism from a variety of sources with regard to the quality of intelligence that was available to the administration prior to their advocacy of war in Iraq, and prior to the resolution passing this Congress a year ago October. It is very important that we understand every aspect of that intelligence.

Now, what we have heard is that the administration has not gotten very good intelligence, that they were misled, perhaps, by poor intelligence with regard to the connection of Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda, and also on the issue of weapons of mass destruction. But there is another aspect of that that ought to be looked at very, very carefully and that is essentially this: The administration, many of the important people of the administration, Mr. Rumsfeld, Mr. Cheney, particularly, were given intelligence, but there is a substantial amount of evidence to indicate that when they were given the intelligence that there was little or no connection between Saddam Hussein and Usama bin Laden and that there was little or no evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, their instructions back to the providers of that intelligence, to Mr. Tenet and others, was this: We do not like that intelligence, will you go back and get other information. And they got that instruction a number of times. That is an issue that needs to be looked at very, very carefully.

The quality of intelligence, yes, but what about the way in which that intelligence was received by policymakers within the administration. I believe that those policymakers corrupted that intelligence, and that is a question that needs to be examined in great detail and with complete accuracy.