Mr. Speaker, in just over 3 years the United States has faced two acute intelligence failures. The first was the tragic events of September 11, 2001. The second can be found in the arguments made to go to war in Iraq. Weapons of mass…
Mr. Speaker, in just over 3 years the United States has faced two acute intelligence failures. The first was the tragic events of September 11, 2001. The second can be found in the arguments made to go to war in Iraq. Weapons of mass destruction have not been found. Anti-American sentiment has been strengthened and spread across the Islamic world. In the aftermath the United States has been saddled with a long-term commitment to pay the rising costs of war and endure the continuing loss of life in Iraq. It is in this context America's hard- won lessons from its past covert activities should be turned to, to guide us in our current endeavors.
Mr. Speaker, I would like to include in the Record a copy of the following speech by Professor Raymond H. Close delivered to the Princeton Middle East Society at Princeton University last month on the uses and misuses of intelligence in the conflict with Iraq.
Uses and Misuses of Intelligence
(By Raymond H. Close)
Today I want to describe to you the details of a few
specific situations that took place a number of years ago
where intelligence estimates and covert actions were
employed, and in some cases deliberately distorted, in a
manner calculated to support policy objectives of the U.S.
Government that might otherwise not have received the support
of the American people and the approval of the world
community. From an assessment of those experiences in the
past, perhaps we can draw some useful lessons to guide our
intelligence officials today in fulfilling their professional
obligations more honestly and appropriately.
My own experiences in the twenty years that I spent
actually engaged in clandestine operations in the Middle East
were entirely in the areas of old-fashioned espionage and so-
called covert action--which I define as the effort to achieve
specific strategic objectives for the United States through
secret intervention in the political processes of another
country. As you all know, the term ``covert action'' can also
include the employment of lethal violence in some situations
to accomplish objectives that could not otherwise be
justified by our own legal system or by humanitarian
principles, carried out by methods designed to hide our
government's role behind a shield of ``plausible denial''.
Let me start by telling you about some of my experiences in
Lebanon during the years 1952-1958, from which some lessons
can still be drawn, I think.
In 1957, I participated in a covert action operation in
Lebanon, explicitly ordered by President Eisenhower, in which
it was our objective to keep a government in power that was
committed to the open and enthusiastic support of American
policy objectives in the region, but was under assault by
internal elements determined that their country should adopt
a more independent stance. We were initially successful, but
our crude manipulation of the democratic process during
Lebanon's 1957 parliamentary elections contributed directly
to a civil war that was ended only on the landing of a large
U.S. Marine and Army military force one year later. To
justify that armed intervention, we deliberately and
knowingly provided false intelligence to the United Nations
purporting to prove that our forces had responded to indirect
aggression against the freely elected government by forces
inspired and supported by international communism. This was
pure fabrication. By the autumn of 1958, following our
military intervention, the government that we had supported
by our covert action had been replaced by a regime composed
primarily of individuals who had been leaders of the
political opposition, but who were not by any objective
standard enemies of the United States. The supreme irony, I
always thought, was that shortly thereafter Barry Goldwater
wrote a book in which he extolled the glorious success of our
ill-advised and ultimately counterproductive covert action
operation in Lebanon. Goldwater recorded that, in a
triumphant demonstration of how to employ U.S. power in the
cause of freedom, a communist regime had been overthrown in
Lebanon and replaced by a pro-western government. This
breathtaking contradiction of historical fact was an example
to me of how effective the big lie can be, and has,
particularly in recent months, reminded me to keep an open
mind when it comes to assertions of fact by senior American
policymakers. A case in point: On February 5th, 2003, just
one year ago, Secretary of State Colin Powell, in his now-
famous report to the United Nations Security Council, said
this: ``My colleagues, every statement I make today is
backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not
assertions. What we're giving you are facts and
conclusions based on solid intelligence.'' Secretary
Powell's use of the pronoun ``we'' in this statement was
clearly intended to include CIA Director George Tenet,
whose face appeared right over Powell's shoulder
throughout the presentation. Tenet's presence could only
have been intended to put the CIA's official stamp of
approval on everything Powell was reporting--even
information that Tenet must have known was highly
questionable.
The Bush Administration apparently felt under pressure to
strengthen its case for war in Iraq by persistent enhancement
of whatever intelligence happened to be available that seemed
to support their policy objectives. The details of how that
corruption was implemented are much less important, however,
than the violation of principles that allowed a preemptive
war to be initiated on the basis of evidence that was known
by the senior levels of our government to be inconclusive,
and even demonstrably false in some cases. This misuse of
intelligence will have long-term costs, first among which is
that American and world public opinion will, in future crisis
situations, be so dubious about the credibility of American
intelligence that approval and support of other U.S. military
actions overseas may be withheld by the international
community even in situations where intervention is urgently
called for. Secondly, the personal image of George W. Bush
relying on questionable information to make life and death
decisions has drastically compromised his credibility and
effectiveness as a national and world leader. Finally, the
present crisis has revealed flaws in the way various
intelligence agencies in Washington evaluate their product,
and how honestly and objectively it is packaged and marketed
to their customers in a competitive
political arena in which the possession of allegedly
``solid'' secret information can provide such a formidable
advantage.
Another appropriate example, from which valuable lessons
can still be derived today, concerns events in Africa in the
late summer of 1998, when the Clinton Administration
retaliated against terrorist bombings of the American
embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam by launching long-
range Tomahawk missiles at targets in Afghanistan and the
Sudan. The missile attack on Khartoum, in particular, because
it was based on embarrassingly inaccurate intelligence, made
subsequent American counter-terrorism strategy much more
difficult to implement. At that time, in September 1998, 1
wrote the following in an op-ed piece published in the Sunday
Outlook Section of the Washington Post under the headline:
``We Can't Defeat Terrorism with Bombs and Bombast''. This is
an extract from that article, written exactly three years
before 9/11:
``To launch missiles into countries with which we are
technically at peace--and to kill their citizens--is to
declare that the United States is free to make its own rules
for dealing with the international problem of terrorism. What
standing will we have in the future to complain about any
other country that attacks the territory of its neighbor,
citing as justification the need to protect itself from
terrorism? Did those who authorized these attacks think
through the long-term implications of this short-sighted and
dangerous precedent?
``Let's get down to practical realities. The new threat we
face is often stateless, without sovereign territory or
official sponsorship. Friendly governments around the world--
especially those with large Muslim populations such as India,
Pakistan, Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Gulf states and the new republics of Central Asia--share a
common need for internal and regional stability. Terrorism
is a weapon that threatens all civil authority. This set
of circumstances provides an unprecedented incentive,
which is to say a God-given opportunity, to establish new
systems and procedures for intergovernmental cooperation,
even among states that may differ on other basic issues.
But the fight against a silent and hidden common enemy
requires infinite patience and tact on the part of law
enforcement agencies and intelligence services. It demands
absolute secrecy, mutual trust and professional respect.
If the United States loses its cool without warning, if it
is seen by others as a loose cannon that resorts to sudden
violent action on a massive scale, the critically needed
cooperation will not be there.'' Later in the same article
I added: ``President Clinton and others have labeled all
Islamic terrorists as members or `affiliates' of the
`Osama bin Laden Network of Terrorism.' This is, of
course, the common mistake of demonizing one individual as
the root of all evil. In fact, elevating bin Laden to that
status only gives him a mantle of heroism now and, more
ominously, will guarantee him martyrdom if he should die.
Informed students of the subject have known for years that
although the various militant Islamist movements around
the world share a common ideology and many of the same
grievances, they are not a monolithic international
organization. Our recent attacks. unfortunately, may have
inflamed their common zeal and hastened their unification
and centralization--while probably adding hosts of new
volunteers to their ranks. We are rolling up a big
snowball.''
I received many complimentary messages after that article
appeared in the Washington Post, including one from Robert
Bryant, Deputy Director of the FBI, who invited me to lunch
and told me that he had instructed all his officers who were
working on the terrorism target to read it. He particularly
appreciated the emphasis that I had put on dealing with
terrorism by patient criminal investigation and cooperation
with other international law enforcement agencies rather than
by what I had dubbed ``bombs and bombast''. The intelligence
indicating that the pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum was
producing a precursor of biological weapons was completely
incorrect--another case of bad intelligence having been
seized upon to justify a violent military initiative that
proved to be unjustified and seriously counter-productive.
Thomas Pickering was Deputy Secretary of State for Political
Affairs at the time. I clearly remember when this
distinguished and highly respected statesman, a former U.S.
ambassador to Jordan, Israel, India, the Philippines and the
United Nations, appeared on national television to explain
and defend the Clinton Administration's Tomahawk missile
attack on the Sudan, offering confident and positive
assurances of the accuracy of U.S. intelligence reports that
the Daral-Shifa plant was a critically dangerous
installation--putting himself in exactly the same humiliating
position that Colin Powell is in today as a result of his
similarly inaccurate testimony before the United Nations one
year ago.
Finally, I would like to take a look at some important
features of the present situation in Iraq, looking again for
lessons that should have been drawn from earlier experience,
but were ignored. Here I am prepared to go out on a limb with
some current intelligence estimates of my own. In other
words, I'm ready to make some predictions about the future,
based on my own past experiences. I offer these predictions
with confidence, but with sincere hopes that they will prove
to be wrong.
The United States began its invasion of Iraq operating
under a number of seriously flawed expectations that were
based on nothing other than bad intelligence, construed by
dedicated ideologues to suit their own preconceived
misjudgments.
One expectation was that gratitude toward the United States
for liberating their country from Saddam's terrible
dictatorship would be the determining factor in shaping
Iraq's political future, in defiance of overwhelming evidence
that their own social and cultural heritage would inevitably
take precedence over American dictates. Secondly, the U.S.
has maintained a confident expectation that a new government
of Iraq would grant the U.S. long-term leases on military
bases from which the U.S. could project its power throughout
the entire Middle East and Central Asian region for a long
time into the future. Another expectation has been that the
new Iraqi government will continue in the future to cooperate
closely with the United States in the management of its oil
and gas resources, even when Iraq's own economic and
political needs might be in conflict with American
objectives. And fourthly, the Bush Administration leadership
(and especially the neo-cons and their allies in Congress)
have all confidently expected that Iraq would become a fully
cooperative partner in dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian
problem, even when U.S. policies are in conflict with Iraqi
conceptions justice. It is as if our intelligence experts
have suffered total amnesia when it comes to the historic
realities of nationalism in the Arab world.
My prediction is this: Any new political group aspiring to
leadership of Iraq must recognize that its popularity and its
credibility will depend on the degree to which it can
demonstrate its independence (read that as ``defiance'') of
American influence. When this finally becomes apparent, the
United States Government will decide to interfere with the
political process to whatever extent, and by whatever means,
are necessary to ensure that control of the country remains
with acceptably cooperative and compliant Iraqis. I think
that such an operation would of necessity be anything but
covert, and I'm ready to predict that it will be a messy
failure. My conviction that the CIA will be directed to
ensure the installation of a compliant new regime in Iraq is
based on my experiences in Lebanon and elsewhere, which
demonstrated that men who occupy the Oval Office seem
inevitably to develop an irrational confidence that by
pushing a button they can have their dirty tricks department
across the Potomac River in Langley perform a covert action
operation to fix the problem--justifying the action as
necessary to protect the freedom of the American people and
the welfare of all humanity.
In my opinion, the hard reality is that when push comes to
shove, the Bush Administration, for all its exalted
protestations of virtue and Godliness, is not going to allow
a government that defies U.S. policy objectives to take power
in Baghdad. High principles will, as I have seen so many
times in my own experience, be compromised as necessary to
produce results that can be presented as justification for a
preemptive war costing thousands of human lives and uncounted
billions of dollars. The end result will be that the entire
Middle East will be destabilized, while the forces supporting
and sustaining terrorism will be injected with new vigor.