Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and insert extraneous material on the subject of this special order. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to be joined…
Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may
have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and insert extraneous material on the subject of this special order.
Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to be joined this evening by my colleague the gentlewoman from Ohio (Ms. Kaptur) and my colleague the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Brown).
Let me begin with a question. On Election Day, how will you know if your vote is properly counted? In many precincts, in many States around this country, the answer is you will not. Imagine, it is election day and you enter your polling place to cast your vote on a brand new electronic touch-screen voting machine. The screen is large; it is well lit; it is accessible if you have physical disabilities. Your choices are clearly spelled out before you. In fact, it looks as easy to use as the ATM at your bank. You breathe a sigh of relief that you no longer have to figure out a complicated butterfly ballot. It seems more modern than the old lever machines.
So you make your choice and you touch the submit button and cast your vote. The screen says your vote has been counted. You exit the polling place with a sense of satisfaction, and then you begin to wonder. How do I know if the machine actually recorded my vote the way I intended? The fact is you do not. You have to trust the software in the machine to be error free.
After the 2000 election, we in Congress recognized that we had to act to restore the integrity and reliability of our electoral system by making dimpled chads and other voting irregularities things of the past. Last October, we passed the Help America Vote Act, known as HAVA. It is groundbreaking election reform legislation that is currently helping States throughout the country replace antiquated and unreliable punch cards and other machines.
However, HAVA is having an unintended consequence. HAVA has done some good things. It is giving people with disabilities access, access that they have been denied for years. In fact, they have always been denied. HAVA is doing some great things, but it is leading a headlong rush by States and localities to purchase computer voting systems that suffer from a serious flaw. All models, even the most convenient and accessible, have the problem that once the voter touches the button, the voter has no way of knowing whether the vote has been counted as the voter intended. No one will ever know. It is a secret ballot and must be secret.
This uncertainty, this lack of confidence can be disastrous to voter confidence and can prevent an accurate recount and can be a step on the way to the undoing of our democracy. I am not an anti-technology Luddite. I am a physicist. I am something of a techie. I see real advantages in these electronic machines.
There are several important advantages such as their accessibility if you have physical disabilities. Their speed and efficiency, so that the results will be communicated to the county clerk quickly. They are probably more reliable than the county clerk. I certainly had an experience with the clerk in my county when she awarded one precinct to my opponent by a margin of 9,000 votes when there were not 9,000 people who lived in that precinct. It was a simple pencil and paper clerical area. The electronic machines will do away with that, but there is one fundamental problem. They are inherently unverifiable.
To again make the point that this is not the concern of an anti- technology Luddite, I would say that hundreds of nationally renowned computer scientists have raised a cry of alarm, saying that unless there is an independent verification method to safeguard the accuracy and the integrity of the voting process there will be, might not might be, these computer scientists say there will be problems. There might be accidental software errors. There might be, God forbid, malicious hacking, and if there are concerns, if the voter is uncertain, if the candidate is uncertain whether the votes have been recorded the way they were cast, a recount is meaningless. The computer that has a faulty tally 2 minutes after the polls closed will have the same faulty tally a day later when the recount is held or the next month when the judge opens it up. If there are errors, they will go unnoticed and unknown.
The history of progress in our system of self-government here in America is in many ways a history of increasing the franchise, extending the right to vote and the ability to vote, increasing accessibility and reliability of the process of voting, but we still have some problems. We see declining voter turnout, and we have all heard, my colleagues here from Ohio I am sure have heard, constituents say, well, my vote does not count. Some people when they say that mean that special interests dominate the process and overwhelm my vote in secret back room deals. And we all work hard to see that that concern is removed, but they often mean something else when they say my vote does not count. They mean, literally, my vote does not count, my vote will not be counted.
The level of concern around the country is astounding. The Internet is burning up with back and forth chat of concerns about our voting process, and the loss of confidence in the process leads to a loss of failure to vote, leads to a cheapening and eventual breakdown of our democracy.
Every voter who stays home, whether it is because the voting places are physically inaccessible to them or because of a lack of trust in the voting process is a loss to democracy. We must find, we must find a way to keep the voter directly connected to the verification process so the voter knows that her vote or his vote is the vote that is counted.
It is not good enough to give them reassurance that the manufacturer says the machine works fine. Without taking steps to return the verification to the voter and to restore trust in the process, we face a crisis, pure and simple.
I have with me someone who has paid close attention to the electoral process. My colleague, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Brown), was the Secretary of State of Ohio, and one of his responsibilities, as I believe, was to ensure the accuracy and the reliability of the voting system. And I think he understands, as well as anyone, the potential crisis we face or maybe it is not even potential anymore. I would be pleased to yield to my friend from Ohio (Mr. Brown).
Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for his insight, and he makes this important distinction about having confidence in the way the votes are cast and having confidence in the way the votes are counted, and it is not necessarily the same thing. It is the electronics inside the machine that connects those two, and it is that gap which makes them inherently unverifiable.
I have legislation that would, I believe, overcome this shortcoming. But before I talk about the details, and I will not go through all the details, but before I outline that legislation, I would be pleased to yield to my friend, the gentlewoman from Ohio (Ms. Kaptur), who has deep and strong concerns about this.
So that the voter can vote. If there is any question about eligibility or other questions about the vote, those will be settled later and the voter will be able to cast the vote on election day. That is what the gentlewoman means, I believe, by no-fault voting.
The appointments have been made, but the other body has not acted and the commission does not yet exist.
I thank the gentlewoman, and I think her insertions in the Record will be very useful to people. I thank her for her insightful comments.
I would make the point that even though HAVA does not require action immediately, the sooner we implement HAVA, the better. There are many people with physical disabilities who have been denied the privilege and the satisfaction of voting in person and in private. HAVA would correct that. But we must not let HAVA lead us to unverifiable voting. That is why I am proposing legislation that would, I think, correct this problem. It would require that all voting systems produce a paper record, an audit trail that is verified by the voter. In other words, each voter will see and verify a paper record of the vote. That will allow manual audits. It will mean that recounts actually mean something. This would be the vote of record. It would be kept safely with the election records for recounts.
My legislation would do some other things such as banning undisclosed software and would accelerate the date by which the provisions for people with disabilities would have to be met. But the fundamental point I wanted to make is that voting should not be an act of faith as my colleagues have said. It should be an act of record. It is also important to make the point that what I am talking about here is nonpartisan. It is preserving the sanctity of the ballot. This is not a Republican matter or a Democratic matter. It is fundamental to the American system.
I am sorry to say that the Internet is buzzing with conspiracy theories. In other words, voters are afraid that something is afoot. It was reported in this week's Newsweek by Steven Levy that suspicions, as he says, run even higher when people learn that some of those in charge of the voting technology, the manufacturers of the voting machines, are themselves partisan. The CEO of a major company is a major fund-raiser for the Presidential reelection campaign. He recently said that he was ``committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes for the President next year.'' According to this article, he later clarified that he was not talking about rigging the machines.
Whew. That is actually Mr. Levy's expression. Whew.
By the proposal that I have, the legislative proposal I have, the printout would be at the voting machine at the time that the voter votes, available for the voter's inspection and verification. And it would go into a secure lockbox. If there is a need for a recount, the paper ballots would be tallied. It may not be a perfect system, but it is a way to assure the voters that the process is honest.
It is troubling that this is not getting as much attention here in this body as it should. An article appeared in the New Zealand Herald a few days ago. The article begins, ``The possibility of flaws in the electoral process is not something that gets discussed much in the United States Congress. The attitude seems to be, we are the greatest democracy in the world, so the system must be fair.''
That is not good enough. We are a great country because we constantly try to do better, because we constantly try to increase the franchise, increase accessibility to democracy, increase the reliability of the process. That is what we need to do. Yet from all over the country, I get e-mails. For instance, from Georgia: ``If we can't verify our elections, then we can't verify our freedom.''
From Idaho someone writes: ``Those who cast the votes decide nothing. Those who count the votes decide everything.''
From Michigan: ``The act of voting is the most essential issue. This issue is the most essential issue our representatives will vote on and they should be judged accordingly.''
From North Carolina: ``A paper trail is the only reasonable solution to any computer-mediated transaction. As a corporate system security analyst, I find the electronic devices as they now stand without this verifiable backup simply irresponsible.''
From North Dakota: ``There is no confidence nor integrity without it.''
From Ohio: ``I work with computers every day. We need to check that what goes in is what comes out.''
From Oregon: ``Without this, I will no longer view this country as a democracy.''
From Tennessee: ``If there is no accountability in election, there is no reason to vote and we descend into anarchy.''
From Wisconsin: ``If voters perceive,'' the key word here is perceive, ``that their votes are being miscounted and are meaningless, they will simply stop voting.''
That gives you some sense of the seriousness that voters assign to this issue. It is very important. This body should turn its attention to restoring the voters' trust in every way we can. One important way we can do that is by making sure that they have confidence in the process that makes this democracy work, the process of voting and then, of course, the process by which we fulfill the trust that they place in us.
As I have talked about this with people, I have run into a number of opinions. I was talking with an election official from another State who said, Well, we've had these electronic machines for several years now and we've had no problems. To which I said, How do you know?
He did not have an answer. We have to help him get that answer.