Mr. Speaker, today Representatives Nancy Johnson (R- CT), Charles Rangel (D-NY) and Richard Neal (D-MA) are joining me in introducing legislation to correct a problem that is impairing the liquidity of the market for investments in…
Mr. Speaker, today Representatives Nancy Johnson (R- CT), Charles Rangel (D-NY) and Richard Neal (D-MA) are joining me in introducing legislation to correct a problem that is impairing the liquidity of the market for investments in Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (housing credit) properties. The housing credit has been a remarkably successful incentive for encouraging investment in residential rental housing for low-income families. Under Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code, a tax credit is available for investment in affordable housing. The credit is claimed annually over a period of ten years. Qualified residential rental projects must be rented to lower- income households at controlled rents and satisfy a number of other requirements throughout a prescribed compliance period (generally, 15 years from the first taxable year the credit is claimed).
Today, virtually all of the equity for housing credit investments comes from widely held corporations investing through housing credit funds. A significant number of corporate investors have transferred these fund interests in recent years, typically due to a change in their income tax status. An investor wishing to dispose of an interest in a Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (``housing credit'') property during its 15-year compliance period is subject to a recapture of housing credits previously claimed unless a bond or U.S. Treasury securities are posted to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The amount of the bond to be posted is based on the amount of housing credits claimed and the duration remaining in the compliance period. The purpose of the bond is to guarantee to the IRS that it can collect the appropriate recapture amount in the event that the property is no longer in compliance with the requirements of the housing credit program.
At the time the housing credit program was enacted in 1986, the drafters of the statute were concerned that owners would claim the benefits of the tax credits and then avoid the continuing compliance requirements by transferring the credits to a straw party with minimal assets that the IRS could go after to collect recapture liability. This was a potential
concern because housing credits are provided on an accelerated basis in the sense that they are claimed over a ten-year period, while the property must remain in compliance with the targeting rules over a minimum 15-year period.
However, the experience with the housing credit over the past 15 years demonstrates that this concern is no longer valid. When the housing credit program was enacted, policymakers thought in terms of previous affordable housing tax incentives that supported an aggressive tax shelter market dominated by individual investors. As it turns out, virtually all (99% today) investment capital in the housing credit program is from publicly traded corporations that pose none of the risks of noncompliance that motivated enactment of the recapture bond rules. Ironically, sales of individual partnership interests in public partnerships with more than 35 investors are exempt from the recapture rules.
There are also other provisions in Code section 42 that adequately address potential noncompliance. In 1989, Congress added the requirement that all state allocating agencies adopt ``extended use agreements'' to be recorded as restrictive covenants on housing credit properties, which require the property to remain in compliance. In addition, the state allocating agencies were given oversight responsibilities to ensure continued compliance through site inspections and property audits.
The requirement to purchase recapture bonds forces investors to incur unnecessary costs and has produced a complex administrative burden on the IRS. Since bond filings are done building by building, and since single sales transactions frequently involve hundreds of properties, each with dozens of buildings, bond filings may involve thousands of separate filings. Worse yet, the few remaining surety companies writing this type of business operate in an inefficient market. Recapture surety bonds are priced in a fashion that does not measure the true risk of non-compliance, but rather relies solely on the credit rating of the company requesting the bond. This is a function of the fact that surety underwriters do not understand the housing credit program in general or the risk of noncompliance in particular.
At the same time, the incidence of non-compliance with housing credit program rules is exceedingly rare. Meanwhile in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist acts and the spate of corporate accounting scandals, the surety market is in turmoil. Recapture bond premiums, even for highly rated public companies, have more than tripled over the past two years. This has imposed dead weight costs on the housing credit program. By making it more difficult to transfer credit investments, the recapture bond rule impairs the liquidity of housing credit investments, reducing credit prices generally, and undermining the overall efficiency of the program.
The IRS recently responded to a series of questions we posed about the recapture bond requirement. According to the IRS, since just 1997, recapture bonds covering approximately $1.8 billion of tax credits have been posted--but in the 17 years since the requirement was enacted, the Service has never made a claim on a recapture bond. That works out to bond premium payments of about $150 million, to ensure against an event that has never occurred. These costs are unnecessary and are imposing a real drag on the market for investments in housing credit properties.
Our bill will solve this problem by repealing the recapture bond requirement effective for disposition of interests in LIHTC properties after the date of enactment. An owner of a building (or interest therein) (generally, a limited partnership) that has been the subject of a disposition and is still within the remaining 15-year compliance period with respect to such building would be required to submit a report to its former investors when a recapture event with respect to such building occurs. A copy of recapture event forms sent to investors would be required to be filed with the IRS in order to provide the Service with the information necessary to ensure that all recapture liabilities are timely paid. The general statute of limitations applicable to taxpayers would be modified so that investors who dispose of a building after the effective date of the legislation would remain liable for any potential recapture liability for a period extending through the compliance period for such building to provide the IRS with additional time to audit the partnership's return to ensure the building's continuing compliance with the credit's requirements. Taxpayers who disposed of a building (or interest therein) prior to the date of enactment would not be required to maintain existing recapture bonds (or other alternative security), but cancellation of existing bonds would trigger an extension of the statute of limitations provided for in the legislation.
We encourage you to join us in cosponsoring this important legislation.