Mr. Speaker, one of the most important challenges facing our Nation is to transform the most successful military in the world so that it is better able to meet the security needs to the years ahead. I would like to submit for the record…
Mr. Speaker, one of the most important challenges facing our Nation is to transform the most successful military in the world so that it is better able to meet the security needs to the years ahead. I would like to submit for the record and commend to my colleagues an outstanding speech entitled, ``Transforming the Defense Establishment,'' by Dr. Stephen A. Cambone, Department of Defense Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation, which was delivered before Bear Stearns and Company on January 27, 2003. In my view, Dr. Cambone's emphasis on changing the culture of organizations is particularly important.
As we consider the President's 2004 defense budget request, we should give careful attention to the excellent insights offered by Dr. Cambone.
In his September 1999 speech at the Citadel, then-candidate
George Bush declared that, if elected, he would seize on an
opportunity created by what he called a ``revolution in the
technology of war.'' As a result of that revolution, he said,
power ``is increasingly defined not by mass or size but by
mobility and swiftness. Influence is measured in information,
safety is gained in stealth, and force is projected on the
long arc of precision-guided weapons. This revolution
perfectly matches the strength of our country, the skill of
our people, and the superiority of our technology. The best
way to keep the peace,'' he said, ``is to redefine war on our
terms.''
The President went on to sketch his vision of the armed
forces. He said, ``Our forces in the next century must be
agile, lethal, readily deployable, and require a minimum of
logistical support. We must be able to project our power over
long distances, in days and weeks, rather than months. Our
military must be able to identify targets by a variety of
means, from a Marine patrol on the ground to a satellite in
space, and then it must be able to destroy those targets
almost instantly with an array of weapons from the submarine-
launched cruise missile to mobile long-range artillery.''
``Our land forces,'' he said, ``must be lighter, our light
forces must be more lethal, and all must be easier to deploy.
And, these forces must be organized in smaller, more agile
formations, than cumbersome divisions.'' ``On the seas, we
need to pursue promising ideas . . . to destroy targets from
great distances.'' ``In the air, we must be able to strike
from across the world with pinpoint accuracy with long-range
aircraft and perhaps with unmanned systems.'' ``In space, we
must be able to protect our network of satellites essential
to our flow of commerce and defense of our country.''
As a way of underscoring his determination to bring about
the transformation of the military forces of the United
States, the President reminded the audience of another time
of what he called ``rapid change and momentous choices.''
``In the late 1930s, as Britain refused to adapt to the new
realities of war, Winston Churchill observed, `The era of
procrastination, of half-measures, of soothing and baffling
expedience, of delays, is coming to a close. In its place we
are entering a period of consequences.' ''
Well, that period of consequences arrived here in this city
just two years later, on September 11, 2001. The remainder of
this talk will focus on how we have answered the call laid
down by the President during his candidacy. Let me sum them
up: He asked us to do three things. He asked us to assure the
well-being of the men and women in uniform and the civilians
who work for the Department. He asked us to provide the means
to them to defeat today's threats. He asked us to take on the
transformation of the defense establishment to meet the
challenges of the future. Before I take on each in turn, that
is to say, what we've done for our people, how we've met
today's challenges, and what we are doing for the future, let
me take a moment to tell you what we think transformation is,
and what it is not.
What it is, we think, is a continuing effort over time. It
is not a static objective in time. So, if you are looking to
judge this transformational process or the progress that we
have made, and you try to pin it to a certain place in a
certain time and use a static measure, you will be
disappointed and probably mislead yourself and others.
Secondly, it is a change in culture. A change in culture
that is reflected in what we do, how we do it, and the means
we choose to accomplish our objectives. I can't stress enough
the importance of the change in culture that comes with the
transformation. Those of you who have watched various
companies merge and come apart over the last decade or so
will understand just how important changes in culture are to
a transformational effort.
It's also about balancing risk. We have identified risk in
four categories. The first area of risk has to do, not
surprisingly, with our people. Are we keeping them in proper
trim, as it were? Do they have the means to do their
training; are they able to see their families; do they live
in decent housing? Second, are we able to conduct operations
today at a minimum of risk not, mind you, without risk, but
at a minimum of risk, by assuring that our people are well
positioned, well led, and have the proper means to conduct
operations? Third, have we made the investments that are
necessary to prepare for the future? and lastly, our business
practices; have we gone any way toward reforming them? It is
our belief that those four categories of risk need to be
properly balanced. We cannot over-invest in any one and
expect to succeed in all.
Now, let me say a word about what we think transformation
is not. It is not change for its own sake. Nor is it measured
as a success or a failure on the basis of programs that have
been cancelled, programs that have been completed, or
programs that have begun. It is easy to keep score that way,
and we will, in a few minutes, talk about some of the
programs that we have cancelled and programs that we have
begun. But, again, that is not a very good scorecard of
the progress of this transformational effort.
I call you back again to what transformation is. It's about
culture, about what we do, how we do it, and the means we
choose to accomplish those objectives. If you were going to
develop a checklist to measure transformation, I offer you
the following set of points. There are seven, and I'll give
them to you in fairly quick order.
The first would be to look at the guidance that we have
given both to our civilian and military personnel. Some of
that guidance is available to you, for example, in the form
of the National Security Strategy that has been published by
the White House and the Quadrennial Defense Review that was
published by the Department of Defense. Others are not
available to you--except when they're leaked to the
newspapers--for example:
The Nuclear Posture Review, which reconfigured our nuclear
forces, and allowed the President to take the steps to reduce
the size of our nuclear offensive arsenal and to incorporate
into our future strategic force conventional weapons as well
as nuclear weapons. The Contingency Planning Guidance, which
is given to our combatant commanders and signed out by the
President, and which directs combatant commanders to prepare
plans for contingencies now and into the future that reflect
the tenets of the strategy that was laid down in the National
Security Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review. But
guidance is fine going back to my point about culture,
however: Are we changing the culture? It is often changed by
changes in organizations. And I have to tell you, we have
changed organizations quite extensively within the
Department. We have done so with the aim of enabling what we
call joint operations, i.e., the ability of our land, sea,
air, and space forces to be combined under the control of a
single combatant commander and used in ways that are most
appropriate to achieving the objectives of the campaign that
he has laid out.
We have changed the structure of our commands: We have
added a combatant command for the United States called
Northern Command. It ``stood up'' just recently. We have
merged our Space Command and the old Strategic Command into a
new command designed to make use of the new instruments of
strategic power. We have changed the mission of our Special
Operations Command. We have undertaken changes to our
organization in the office of the Secretary of Defense. The
Army, the Navy, the Air Force--each of them has restructured
their staffs and their functions.
Third, I said we were interested in joint operations. Well,
it turns out the Department
of Defense does not have a joint concept to guide the conduct
of joint operations. What we have are concepts that have been
generated by each of the services about how they would prefer
to fight. We have, however, no overarching concept for the
employment of the joint force. So we have, indeed, set about
that task. I would expect by springtime, probably early
summer, that we will, indeed, have a joint operational
concept that will begin to frame for our services how they
ought to go about the task they have under Title X--to man,
train, and equip the armed forces of the United States.
But the services--the fourth point of the seven--have not
been lagging behind. If, for example, you look at what the
Navy is proposing, what the Army is proposing, what the Air
Force and the Marines are proposing, you will see their
effort to begin transforming their own service and to make it
friendly to the joint operational environment. But it's not
enough to say we want to fight joint, we have to train joint,
so we have taken steps to put in place a substantial amount
of funding to enable joint training, and we will do it for
the most part in a virtual environment, but this will be an
enormous step in the direction toward joint operations.
What about our investments? Investment is made up of a
combination of RDT&E--research, development, test and
evaluation--coupled to what we procure. We will talk in a few
minutes about that investment, but I do believe that, if you
look at it, you will begin to notice that it is favoring the
enabling of joint warfare. So, as we look through our choices
during the course of our just-completed program review, we
constantly came back to the same question: What will this
investment do for joint warfighting?
Lastly, processes and practices within the Department of
Defense. Under Secretary Wynne and Dr. Zakheim, both of whom
have spoken to you, and others are working very hard to alter
the manner in which we do our business. This will be the most
transforming thing the Department of Defense can do. We can
spend a great deal of time on any of these seven points, but
let me ask you to bear in mind a summary point that arises
out of them: Because we do not know who our adversaries may
be either in the near term or the long term; or how they may
choose to fight; but because we do know that modern
technology is available to our adversaries or potential
adversaries, as readily as it is available to us; and because
we know that as a democratic society we are vulnerable to
attack: We decided to pursue our strategy for transformation
in a way that would provide our combatant commanders with
what we are calling a portfolio of capabilities. We have
tried to avoid the point solution to any particular
problem. We are looking to equip them with a portfolio of
capabilities with which that combatant commander can
conduct joint operations. The reason I mention this to you
is that, as you begin to review the budget programs and
think your way through what that means, you've got to keep
coming back to the question: Has the Department chosen the
right set of capabilities to support joint operations?
Next, let me outline what those capabilities and joint
operations are intended to provide. Let me tick off a list of
six points for you that we think are the appropriate
characteristics by which to measure these capabilities.
First, does it permit the force to rapidly transition from
its steady state peacetime garrison its training its presence
mission does it allow it to transition rapidly into combat
operations? Second, do we have a set of capabilities that
will provide timely and wide-ranging effects applied to
targets throughout the full depth--the full depth--of an
adversary's battle space? Third, can we apply those effects
to both fixed and mobile targets? Fixed targets are a
delight; they sort of stay right where you always thought
they were. It's the ones that move around that vex us all,
and it's very, very difficult trying to track and attack
those targets. Fourth, does it provide us the kind of
persistent surveillance we're going to need especially for
the purposes of tracking mobile targets.
Let me digress here for a moment. The difficulties we see
in the efforts to gain intelligence is a function of how hard
it is to gain that intelligence. If one has only a periodic
view of events, it is difficult to collect and stitch that
information together. To the extent that we are able to
provide a persistent level of surveillance for our combatant
commanders, they will be able to make their plans with a
great deal more knowledge and information than they have
today. We must continue to dominate the air, we need to learn
how to operate from sea bases, and we need to improve our
ground maneuverability. Fifth, the above capabilities need to
allow us, as well, to hold at risk an adversary's command and
control network as well as his weapons of mass destruction.
Sixth and last, but not least by any means, they are
capabilities that we must have in order to be able to force
any fight in which we find ourselves to a rapid conclusion.
That concludes the top-level chapeau of what we're trying
to do and why. Let me turn to our program proposals. I'll
begin with the most important resource that we have, which is
our people. We have, since 2001, made a substantial effort to
increase the pay and benefits of our troops. We have, in
fact, gone farther than others might have thought. We have
gone to a targeted pay raise for our senior enlisted and mid-
career officers to ensure that we keep the talent that we
need and develop the skill sets that a military 10 and 15
years from now is going to require. We have also managed to
reduce to near-elimination within two years the kinds of out-
of-pocket expenses that our personnel have to pay for their
housing when they live on the economy. In terms of housing on
bases, we will have eliminated most of (the substandard)
housing by 2007, and we will have privatized a lot of that
housing, particularly with respect to the Navy and Army. And,
as I said, we have gone a long way toward providing the kind
of joint, national training that we think our people are
going to need in the years to come.
In addition to our people, we need a firm foundation, a
solid foundation, in what we call our operations and support
activities and in the infrastructure that is part of the
Defense establishment. Toward that end, we have included in
the proposal that we sent to the President, and that he will
send on to Capitol Hill, a great deal of additional monies
over this program period designed to support our operations
and maintenance budgets. We did this for a very good and
sound reason. Over the years, what has happened is that funds
for operations and maintenance, the daily upkeep of the
force, has been systematically underfunded. The consequence
of systematically underfunding it has been that, in the
event, in any given year, when those bills begin to mount,
the services went looking for dollars. Where that money came
from traditionally has been out of the investment account,
that is, out of procurement and out of RDT&E. What we are
looking to do is to stabilize the investment programs by
funding the O&M accounts. That is a principled approach to
what we are trying to do. So, the hope is that over time,
those investments will be more stable than they have been in
the past.
Investments. With respect to the investments, as I said, we
have both RDT&E and procurement in the account.That account
is up substantially, on average, over what was in the plan
that we found when we arrived at the beginning of 2001. What
is interesting about it is that, proportionally, we have
increased the RDT&E accounts a bit more than we have the
procurement accounts. There's a reason for that. One is that
it signifies a certain leaning by the Department toward
reducing the risks of having inappropriate forces and
equipment in future years.
It also reflects an approach toward funding some of our
near-term efforts, particularly with respect to the Navy,
which will fund the first ship of four new classes of ships
that it intends to begin during the course of this program.
It will fund that first ship of each class out of its
RDT&E accounts because in fact those ships are, indeed,
experimental, from the point of view of the Navy. The
services, in trying to meet the demands of transformation,
have made some important decisions about shifting their
resources. You will discover, for example, when looking at
the Army's accounts, that: It will have moved roughly $20
billion out of programs it might have funded in its '02
program into different accounts. It has, since 2002,
terminated 24 systems, and it has reduced or restructured
another 24. It has done so for two reasons: first, in
order to be able to fund its highest priority for
modernization.
Second, at the same time, the Army, over this coming
program period, will shift something on the order of $13-14
billion into the development of its Future Combat System.
That is, indeed, its transformational system. The Navy, from
the period of 2002 until the end of this program period: will
have retired 36 ships. Some of those ships could have been
modernized. Service life extension programs could have been
conducted for those ships. The Navy decided to retire them,
take the savings, and invest those savings into a number of
new classes of ships. Those ship classes include a new
littoral combat ship, a new cruiser, a new destroyer, a new
helicopter-deck ship, and a new prepositioning ship, and it
includes resources shifted to a new design for the next
generation of aircraft carrier. The Air Force, for its part,
has moved something on the order of $20 billion in its
budget. It has retired a number of older aircraft, it has
done some internal consolidations of its squadrons. It has
funded its highest priorities which are its readiness and
people and, importantly, it has made commitments to a number
of programs which I will discuss in a moment.
So, there is a great deal of work going on inside the
Department in terms of reallocating resources. It's not
simply a matter of having been afforded more money by
Congress, but rather, we have taken steps to move dollars
inside the accounts in the Department. Now, when we're done,
what we think, is that that capabilities package that I
talked about will enable us to better perform what we think
are six of the most important operational goals for our
force. Let me give them to you: First, we have to defend what
we call our bases of operation, that is to say, the United
States, our people, our forces abroad, and our allies. We
have to protect them not only against the kinds of attacks
that occurred two years ago in New York and at the Pentagon,
but also against missile strikes and other forms of offensive
operations. We have to be able to project and sustain our
forces abroad. Recalling the President's words, we need to be
able to move quickly in order to bring the fight to a quick
conclusion. Third, we need to be able to deny sanctuary to
our adversary. This is where the issue of persistent
surveillance, for example, comes into play. If we're trying
to find terrorists hiding in remote places, we have to have
the ability to essentially sit on top of them and their
activities and watch them and follow them as they go about
their business. But having done that, we have to be able to
attack an adversary no matter where they are and no matter
how deep inside the land mass they may be or where they might
be on the oceans or in the air. Fourth; we have got to
enhance our space capabilities. We are highly dependent upon
space for both commercial and defense needs, and we will have
made a substantial investment in enhancing those
capabilities. Fifth, we need to do what is necessary to
leverage our information advantage Last, we need to ensure
that the information on the network is secure.
So, in making our investment set, let me tick off for you
some of those which have probably gotten your attention for a
variety of reasons. The first is missile defense. The
President committed to bringing about a missile defense for
the United States. We have invested quite heavily in the
RDT&E program for missile defense. The President has decided
that, beginning in 2004, we will begin to deploy a small
number of interceptors inside a test bed arrangement that we
have developed for the testing of our land-based missile
defense capabilities. Those interceptors will give us a
modest capability against a small number of long-range
ballistic missile warheads launched at the United States.
That test bed is located on land, so the President has asked
us as well to see if we couldn't put some missile defense
interceptors aboard ship by about the 2004 time frame as
well, and we have committed to doing so.
We have made a very large investment in transformational
communications. What do I mean by that? It has three parts.
We are committed to the development of a laser-based
communications satellite, which will allow us to communicate
by light via space. Today, we do it by radio-frequency waves,
both from ground to satellite and from satellite to
satellite. What we hope to be able to do is to do that by
light. Essentially, we hope to move fiber optics into space.
We have, as well, made a very large investment in expanding
what we call our global information grid which is, itself, a
fiber-optic net, which will be expanded substantially. We
have made major investments in command, control,
communications, and computing systems. We have made a similar
investment in assuring the information net will work within
that transformational communications system.
In order to gain the persistence that I have talked about,
we have made investments in systems like Global Hawk, which
is an unmanned drone aircraft that is loaded with sensors.
You have read, I'm sure, of the exploits of Predator, a much
smaller drone that has been used extensively in Afghanistan.
But we have also invested in a space-based system, which is a
radar. The idea is that, if we are able, around 2012, to
put up a constellation of satellites, these radar
satellites would enable us to have the kind of persistent
surveillance that I talked about a few moments ago. If you
take the information that is available on the space-based
radar and other surveillance assets and imagine moving
them through a system that I described that is essentially
a fiber-optics system, you can understand how fast we can
move that information, how much information we can move,
and the fact that we can move it and deliver it in formats
that are useful to the receivers. If we can do that, and
we believe we can, we will be able to see, bear, talk,
act, and assess much more rapidly than any adversary we
could encounter. If we can do that, in near-real time, we
will have achieved what many might want to call
information superiority.
Shipbuilding. Let me take a moment there. We have committed
to about seven ships a year if we can do it. That will enable
us to stabilize the shipbuilding base over the course of the
FYDP, but we also have made a major decision with respect to
the Navy's follow-on aircraft carrier, called CVN-21. The
Navy has taken many of the improvements that would have been
included in a ship that they had believed would begin
building in FY2011 and has moved many of those technologies
and changes in the organization and internal structure of the
ship and its equipment sets back to the carrier that is
slated to begin construction in FY2007. With respect to
combat air forces, we have studiously gone about the business
of attempting to create competition for the missions in this
area. As you know, we have the F-22, the F/A-18. They are the
main aircraft in production. The Joint Strike Fighter is
intended to follow on toward the end of this decade, but in
addition, we have made investments to improve our
capabilities with respect to unmanned combat aerial vehicles
(UCAVs), unmanned aerial vehicles like Global Hawk and
Predator, and their successors. We have made an investment in
a national aerospace initiative which will stress hypersonic
missile technology which will allow us to move at very rapid
speed. As the principal proponent of that program likes to
say, ``Speed kills.'' You can imagine that hitting a target
at 7 or 8 Mach will do real damage to that target. Lastly, we
have tried to look at whether or not we can revive a
conventional ballistic missile capability which would, as the
President said, allow us to strike around the world at a
moment's notice with pinpoint accuracy.
The Army, for its part, is deep into its transformational
effort in keeping with the President's words about being more
lethal and quicker to move and not taking so long to build
up. The Army is attempting to do so with its objective force
and its so-called ``Future Combat System.'' They are hopeful
to come in this Spring with their proposals on how they
intend to proceed with this program, and as I said a moment
ago, they have invested near to $14 billion over the FYDP for
that program. Those are some of the highlights of the
investment strategy, and let me just tick off for you some of
those changes. When we started in 2001 on this process of
transforming our capabilities, we didn't have a missile
defense capability; by 2004, we hope to have a limited
capability. We were using conventional radio-frequency waves
for our satellite communications; we hope to move to laser-
based communications. We didn't have a space-based radar
program; we do now, and we hope we can deploy it by 2012. We
had no submarines that could launch large numbers of
conventional cruise missiles. Well, we've taken four
submarines out of the strategic force, took the nuclear
weapons off them, and we intend to put conventional cruise
missiles on them and use them as strike platforms well into
the next decades. I've already mentioned the carriers. We
will have a CVN-21 beginning in FY-07. The surface fleet was
aging. It will shrink a bit in the coming years, only to
begin to increase its numbers as we go into the 2006-7-8 time
frame. We will have four new ship classes. We merged the
tactical air programs of the Navy and the Air Force. I've
mentioned the family of UAVs and the UCAVS, and I've
mentioned the housing and the facilities improvements. So,
let me conclude. We are a nation at war; we do not know how
long it will last, but it is unlikely to be short. We cannot
know where all of its battles will be fought.There are
multiple fronts in this war, and there is no single theater
of operations. We do know that we are all at risk, at home
and abroad, civilians and military alike. We do know that
battles and campaigns will be both conventional and
unconventional in their conduct. Some of those battles and
campaigns will be fought in the open, and others will be
fought in secret, where our victories will be known to only a
few. For the Department of Defense, it means that we now plan
and fight today's battles even as we prepare for that longer
campaign. In light of this, let me remind you of how the
President assesses his 1999 speech at the Citadel. Two years
later, in December of 2001, he returned to the Citadel and
said the following: ``The need for military transformation
was clear before the conflict in Afghanistan and before
September 11. At the Citadel in 1999, I spoke of keeping the
peace by redefining war on our terms. We have,'' he said, ``a
sense of urgency about this task, the need to build this
future force while fighting the present war is an urgent
need.'' And then he said, ``It's like overhauling an engine
when you're going 80 miles an hour, but we have no other
choice.'' So, mindful of the urgency to transform, as the
President expressed in his Citadel speech a year ago, I can
say that we will press this war to its conclusion. But even
as we do, we will plan and prepare for the future when that
war is won, and the world itself has been transformed. Thank
you very much.