Mr. President, how much time do we have remaining? Mr. President, in this 2\1/2\ minutes, I would like to thank some people for tonight. I would like to thank the staffers who are here on both sides. I would like to thank the Senate staff,…
Mr. President, how much time do we have remaining?
Mr. President, in this 2\1/2\ minutes, I would like to thank some people for tonight. I would like to thank the staffers who are here on both sides. I would like to thank the Senate staff, the Sergeant at Arms staff, the doorkeepers, the cloakroom staff, all the various people who make the trains run on time around here, because I certainly understand they have families to go home to, that they have lives outside of these halls. I know the sacrifice they are making tonight to be here.
I also want to thank my colleagues on the other side of the aisle for their viewpoints. We may differ on some of these issues, but I appreciate their opinions and respect their viewpoints and the zealousness by which they approach the subject at hand.
I want to thank colleagues on my side who are here in the wee hours of the night and will be here throughout the day tomorrow to talk about these issues that are very important to the people of this country. I know members of the Senate on our side of the aisle are equally passionate about these issues. Some of this is a matter of opinion. Some of it is a matter of fact and history and tradition. Certainly people on this side of the aisle are very passionate about this.
In the couple of minutes I have remaining, I want to acknowledge some of the hard work the people in this institution and around this institution have put into this 30-hour filibuster or marathon debate, whatever one wants to call it, because it has come at quite a sacrifice to the members of the staff in this body.
Do I have any time remaining?
I would again thank my colleague from Arkansas. We have a great tradition in our State of sending strong Senators to Washington, and certainly Senator Lincoln is one of those. She shows great leadership not just for the State but for the Nation. I want to thank her for her contribution tonight.
Mr. President, I would like to acknowledge and thank my colleague from South Dakota, who has done such an outstanding job tonight, and always.
Tonight I would like to read a portion of a book that won the Pulitzer Prize recently. It is called ``Master of the Senate.'' It is about Lyndon Baines Johnson as a Senator, not as President. It was written by Robert Caro. It is 1,040 pages. I assure you I am not going to read all thousand pages tonight. I am just going to read a few excerpts from chapter one. Chapter one is entitled ``The Desks of the Senate.'' I am only going to read a small portion of chapter one. I will be starting on page 3. But I think it is important for us to all put this in context and remember what the Senate is all about and how it works and how it is designed to function within our constitutional system. So, if I may start midway down, on page 3.
When a person stood on the floor of the Senate Chamber,
however--in the well below the dais--the dais was, suddenly,
not plain at all. Up close, its marble was a deep, dark red
lushly veined with grays and greens . . .
In fact, on this pilaster behind me you can see those colors Mr. Caro is referring to here.
. . . and set into it, almost invisible from the galleries--
We have a number of people in the gallery tonight.
. . . almost invisible from the galleries, but, up close,
richly glinting, were two bronze laurel wreaths like the
wreaths that the Senate of Rome bestowed on generals with
whom it was pleased, when Rome ruled the known world--and the
Senate ruled Rome.
From the well, the columns and pilasters behind the dais
were, suddenly, tall and stately and topped with scrolls,
like the columns of the Roman Senate's chamber, the
columns before which Cato spoke and Caesar fell, and above
the columns, carved in cream-colored marble, were eagles,
for Rome's legions marched behind eagles. From the well,
there was, embroidered onto each pale damask panel, an
ornament in the same pale color and all but invisible from
above--a shield--and there were cream-colored marble
shields, and swords and arrows, above the doors. And the
doors--those seven pairs of double doors, each flanked by
its tall columns and pilasters--were tall, too, and their
grillwork, hardly noticeable from above, was intricate and
made of beaten bronze, and it was framed by heavy, squared
bronze coils. The vice presidential busts were, all at
once, very high above you; set into deep, arched niches,
flanked by massive bronze sconces, their marble faces,
thoughtful, stern, encircled the Chamber like a somber
evocation of the Republic's glorious past. And, rising
from the well, there were the desks.
Let me pause here because these desks have a lot of history. In fact, I think it is safe to say almost all of American history in some way or another has flowed through the Senate. I don't think that is an overstatement.
The desks of the Senate rise in four shallow tiers, one
above the other, in a deep half circle. Small and spindly
individually, from the well they blend together so that with
their smooth, burnished mahogany tops reflecting even the dim
lights in the ceiling so far above them, they form four
sweeping, glowing arcs. To stand in the well of the Senate is
to stand among these four long arcs that rise around and
above you, that stretch away from you, gleaming richly in the
gloom: powerful, majestic. To someone standing in the well,
the Chamber, in all its cavernous drabness, is only a setting
for those desks--for those desks, and for the history that
was made at them.
The first forty-eight of those desks--they are of a simple,
federal design--were carved in 1819 to replace the desks the
British had
burned five years before. When, in 1859, the Senate moved
into this Chamber, those desks moved with them, and when, as
the Union grew, more desks were added, they were carved to
the same design. And for decades--for most of the first
century of the Republic's existence in fact; for the century
in which it was transformed from a collection of ragged
colonies into an empire--much of its history was hammered out
among those desks.
Daniel Webster's hand rested on one of those desks when, on
January 26, 1830, he rose to reply again to Robert Hayne.
I am not going to go into that story because it should be known by most people who follow Senate history, one of the more famous exchanges in the history of the Senate. Let me skip on to page 7 and talk about what I really think is important for us to consider this morning:
The long struggle of the colonies that were now become
states against a King and the King's representatives--the
royal governors and proprietary officials in each colony--had
made the colonists distrust and fear the possibilities for
tyranny inherent in executive authority. And so, in creating
the new nation, its Founding Fathers, the Framers of its
Constitution, gave its legislature or Congress not only its
own powers, specified and sweeping, powers of the purse (``To
lay and collect Taxes . . . To borrow Money on the credit of
the United States . . . To coin Money'') and powers of the
sword (``To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal
. . . To raise and support Armies . . . To provide and
maintain a Navy . . .'') but also powers designed to make the
Congress independent of the President and to restrain and act
as a check on his authority: power to approve his
appointments, even the appointments he made within his own
Administration, even appointments he made to his own Cabinet;
power to remove his appointees through impeachment--to remove
him through impeachment, should it prove necessary; power to
override his vetoes of their Acts. And the most potent of
these restraining powers the Framers gave to the Senate.
While the House of Representatives was given the ``sole power
of Impeachment,'' the Senate was given the ``sole power to
try all Impeachments'' (``And no person shall be convicted
without the Concurrence of Two Thirds of the Members
present''). The House could accuse; only the Senate could
judge, only the Senate convict. The power to approve
presidential appointments was given to the Senate alone; a
President could nominate and appoint ambassadors, Supreme
Court justices, and all other officers of the United States,
but only ``by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate.'' Determined to deny the President the prerogative
most European monarchs enjoyed of declaring war, the Framers
gave the power to Congress as a whole, to House as well as
Senate, but the legislative portion of the power of ending
war by treaties, of preventing war by treaties--the power to
do everything that can be done by treaties between nations--
was vested in the Senate alone; while most European rulers
could enter into a treaty on their own authority, an American
President could make one only ``by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur.''
I will skip to page 8. It is a discussion of James Madison, the primary designer of our constitutional system of government. Certainly it was a committee effort, but James Madison has been historically credited with playing the major role in its creation, in its design:
How, Madison asked, is ``the future danger''--the danger of
``a leveling a spirit''--``to be guarded against on
republican principles? How is the danger in all cases of
interested coalitions to oppress the minority to be guarded
against? Among other means by the establishment of a body in
the government sufficiently respectable for its wisdom and
virtue, to aid on such emergencies, the preponderance of
justice by throwing its weight into that scale.'' This body,
Madison said, was to be the Senate. Summarizing in the
Constitutional Convention the ends that would be served by
this proposed upper house of Congress, Madison said they were
``first to protect the people against their rulers; secondly
to protect the people against the transient impressions into
which they themselves might be led.''
``The use of the Senate,'' Madison said, ``is to consist in
its proceeding with more coolness, with more system, and with
more wisdom, than the popular branch.'' It should, he said,
be ``an anchor against popular fluctuations.'' He drew for
parallels on classical history, which, he said, ``informs us
of no long-lived republic which had not a Senate.'' In two of
the three ``long-lived'' republics of antiquity, Sparta and
Rome, and probably in the third--Carthage (about whose
governmental institutions less was known)--senators served
for life. ``These examples . . . when compared with the
fugitive and turbulent existence of other ancient republics,
[are] very instructive proofs of the necessity of some
institution that will blend stability with liberty.'' Thomas
Jefferson had been in Paris during the Convention, serving as
minister to France. When he returned, he asked George
Washington over breakfast why the President had agreed to a
two-house Congress. According to a story that may be
apocryphal, Washington replied with his own question: ``Why
did you pour your tea into that saucer?'' And when Jefferson
answered, ``To cool it,'' Washington said, ``Just so. We pour
House legislation into the senatorial saucer to cool it.''
The resolution providing for a two-house Congress was agreed
to by the Constitutional Convention with almost no debate or
dissent.
And to ensure that the Senate could protect the people
against themselves, the Framers armored the Senate against
the people.
One layer of armor was bolted on to allay the fears of the
states with fewer people, that the more populous states would
combine to gain a commercial advantage or to control
presidential appointments and national policies; the small
states were determined that all states should have an equal
voice in the Congress, so, in what became known as the
``Great Compromise,'' it was agreed that while representation
in the House would be by population, in the Senate it would
be by states; as a result of that provision, a majority of
the people could not pass a law; a majority of the states was
required as well. But there were other, even stronger,
layers. One was size. ``Numerous assemblies,'' Madison
explained, have a propensity ``to yield to the impulse of
sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by factious
leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions.'' so the
Senate would, in Madison's phrase, be ``less numerous.'' Each
state, the Farmers decided, would be represented by only two
senators; the first Senate of the United States consisted of
just twenty-six men.
Now I am going to skip to page 10.
Senators would also be armored against the popular will by
the length of their terms, the Framers decided. Frequent
elections mean frequent changes in the membership of a body,
and, Madison said, from a ``change of men must proceed a
change of opinions; and from a change of opinions, a change
of measures. But a continual change even of good measures is
inconsistent with every rule of prudence and every prospect
of success.'' What good is the rule of law if ``no man . . .
can guess what the [law] will be tomorrow?'' Guarding against
``mutable policy,'' he pointed out, requires ``the necessity
of some stable institution in the government.'' Edmund
Randolph, as usual, was more blunt. ``The object of this
second branch is to control the democratic branch,'' he said.
``It it not be a firm body, the other branch being more
numerous and coming immediately from the people, will
overwhelm it.'' Senators, he said, should ``hold their
offices for a term sufficient to insure their independency.''
The term sufficient, the Farmers decided, would be six years.
Senators would hold office three times as long as the members
of the ``democratic branch.'' They would hold office longer
than the President held office. And around the Senate as a
whole there would be an additional, even stronger, layer of
armor. Elections for senators would be held every two years,
but only for a third of the senators. The other two-thirds
would not be required to submit their record to the voters
(or, to be more accurate, to their legislatures) at that
time. This last piece of armor made the Senate a ``stable
institution'' indeed. As a chronicler of the Senate was to
write almost two centuries after its creation: ``It was so
arranged that while the House of Representative would be
subject to total overturn every two years, and the Presidency
every four, the Senate, as a Senate, could never by
repudiated. It was fixed, through the staggered-term
principle, so that only a third of the total membership would
be up for re-election every two years. It is therefore
literally not possible for the voters ever to get at anything
approaching a majority of the members of the Institution at
any one time.''
Now I'm going to skip to page 11.
The coat of constitutional mail bolted around the Senate
was sturdy indeed--by design. Under the new Constitution, the
power of the executive and the power of the people would be
very strong. So to enable the Senate to stand against these
powers--to stand against them for centuries to come--the
framers of the Constitution made the Senate very strong.
Wanting it to protect not only the people against their
rulers but the people against themselves, they bolted around
it armor so thick they hoped nothing could ever pierce it.
And for many years the Senate made use of its great powers.
It created much of the federal Judiciary--the Constitution
established only the Supreme Court; it was left to Congress
to ``constitute tribunals inferior,'' and it was a three-man
Senate committee that wrote the Judiciary Act of 1789, an Act
that has been called ``almost an appendage to the
Constitution.'' The Judiciary Act established the system of
federal and district courts, and the jurisdictional lines
between them, that endure to this day, and established as
well the principle, not mentioned in the Constitution, that
state laws were subject to review by federal courts. And
when, sixteen years later, this new creation was threatened
by a concatenation of the very forces the Framers had
feared--presidential power and public opinion--the Senate
saved the Judiciary.
By the way, Mr. President, the Senate has a history of saving the judiciary in critical times. That should be a discussion for a later time. But there is no question that the Senate has served
as protector of the judiciary in our system of government.
The desks (there were thirty-four of them by 1805) had been
removed for this occasion, and the Old Senate Chamber had
been arranged as if it were a tribunal. In the center of one
wall stood the chair of the presiding officer, Vice President
Aaron Burr, as if he were the chief judge, and extending on
his right and left were high-backed, crimson-covered benches,
on which the senators sat, in a long row, judges in a court
from which there was no appeal.
Mr. Caro goes on to explain the impeachment trial of Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase; here again, the rule of law and the fact we are a nation of laws and not men built up by the Senate. It is the Senate's tradition to stand up for our liberty and for our law.
I wanted to bring this to the Senate's attention. I know my time is drawing to an end. At this point, I yield the remainder of my time.
I object, Mr. President.
I object, Mr. President.
Mr. President, I am not sure we have anybody in this Chamber or in this body who is more knowledgeable about the economy and economic principles than our colleague from New Jersey. He has proven himself on the field of battle on these economic issues.
How much time do I have left?
I want to spend the next few minutes talking about a man who was one of President Bush's nominees for a judicial post in the Eastern District of Arkansas. He is from Arkansas. While I was not consulted on his nomination, I do support his confirmation. Actually, this ties in a little with Senator Talent's question of a few moments ago. I notice Senator Talent did not accuse the Democrats of being obstructionists. Some have, of course, but I know he did not do that tonight.
This is, as Paul Harvey might say, the rest of the story, or at least a part of the rest of the story. Leon Holmes is a very distinguished lawyer in Little Rock. His academic accomplishments and his love of academia are more than evident when you look at his background and qualifications for office. He has been a clerk for the Arkansas Supreme Court. He has worked for some very prestigious, very well known Little Rock law firms. He has been appointed judge on a couple of occasions for the Arkansas Supreme Court. In fact, I had the privilege of practicing with Leon Holmes in Little Rock in a law firm called Wright Lindsay & Jennings, which is truly a wonderful place to practice law. I got to know Leon well there and saw his legal acumen up close.
I understand Leon's qualifications for office. He has won different awards. The American Bar Association gave him a well qualified/ qualified stamp. He and I may differ on some issues; nonetheless, he is very broadly supported by members of the Arkansas bar, and I support him.
Let me tell you a little bit about the nomination. He was nominated by President Bush on January 29 of this year. He went to the Judiciary Committee. He got out of Judiciary on May 1--over 6 months ago. He got out of Judiciary and he has been languishing on the Executive Calendar ever since. In fact, today I sent a letter to the Senate majority leader, Bill Frist, and the Judiciary chairman, Orrin Hatch, inquiring about the status of Leon Holmes' nomination, asking them to bring his nomination forward. If I may, I would like to read a portion of this letter into the Record. It says:
I am writing to express my concerns regarding the
nomination of Leon Holmes to the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas.
Mr. Holmes has garnered overwhelming support from the
Arkansas State Bar, of which I am a member, and received the
rating of Qualified/Well Qualified from the American Bar
Association. He possesses the skill, ability, and experience
to enable him to serve as a member of the judiciary. While
Mr. Holmes and I may differ on some issues, I believe he is
well able to carry out his duties according to the
Constitution and that he will apply established precedent as
judicial canons require.
The letter goes on basically asking the majority leader and chairman of the Judiciary Committee to bring his nomination to an up-or-down vote. There is no effort on the Democratic side to filibuster Mr. Holmes' nomination, even though I have no doubt a number of my Democratic colleagues will vote against him. I remain perplexed as to why he has not come to the floor yet.
I am puzzled why the Republican leadership has yet to bring up his nomination. I hope I will receive a response to the letter soon. So as Paul Harvey says, that is the rest of the story.
One reason I wanted to tell this story is because I receive phone calls in our office from Arkansas and around the country asking me to vote for certain of President Bush's nominations. Our staff will tell them: Senator Pryor already voted for 67 of President Bush's judicial nominations, and their response is, ``no, he hasn't.''
Well, sure I have. See, the rest of the story is not being told. I think a lot of people around the country perceive we are blocking every single judicial nomination that comes down the pike, but that is not true. As Senator Corzine mentioned a few minutes ago, the 168 nominations is a historically high number, just like the 98 percentage number is a historically high percentage for approved judicial nominations. I don't think you will find that repeated in American history.
We need to keep this in context. Here I am from Arkansas, and I support one
of the President's nominees, but I cannot get him to the floor. There is no obstruction on Mr. Holmes, and there is not going to be a filibuster. I have talked to many Senators on our side and on the Republican side. Yet he has not come up for a vote yet.
There is one other thing I want to mention in the time I have remaining, and that is, back in April, I signed a letter with a number of my Republican colleagues, freshman colleagues, about this judicial nomination process. I asked the leadership, Senator Frist and Senator Daschle, to try to work together with the White House to try to make sure we don't get to this point where we are this morning--that is, gridlock over some of these nominations.
There is enough blame to go around, and the last thing I want is a 30-hour blame-a-thon. I don't want to participate in that. But I do think we need to revisit what we are doing. I think we need to put things in the past and leave them there and move forward on these nominations. If it is payback upon payback, we are never going to get anything done. Both sides have some responsibility there.
Also, I say I believe a big portion of the responsibility rests with the White House. After all, the White House starts this process. The President is the one, under the Constitution, who does the nominating, and I know many of my Democratic colleagues feel they have not been consulted--I know I have not been. They feel they have not been consulted and, in fact, they have been deliberately shut out of the process. I think we need to work with the White House to try to make this better.
I think the White House has a responsibility. We all have some responsibility. I think if we work hard, we can make this process work much better.
How much time do we have on our side?