Mr. President, pursuant to the order of November 14, I ask that the Senate now proceed to executive session to begin consideration of Executive Calendar No. 418, the nomination of Maj. Gen. Robert T. Clark to be Lieutenant General. Mr.…
Mr. President, pursuant to the order of November 14, I ask that the Senate now proceed to executive session to begin consideration of Executive Calendar No. 418, the nomination of Maj. Gen. Robert T. Clark to be Lieutenant General.
Mr. President, there are a number of Senators who desire to speak. I will just say a few words. To accommodate my distinguished colleague from Kentucky, who has been a valiant supporter of this nomination and very persistent over this long period of time, I will yield the floor. He then could be followed by the Senator from Massachusetts and then I would continue my remarks.
I wonder if I just might ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Virginia proceed for not to exceed 3 or 4 minutes, followed by the Senator from Kentucky for about 10 or 12 minutes, followed by the Senator from Massachusetts. How much time does my colleague desire?
Not to exceed a period of about 40 minutes for the Senator from Massachusetts.
I was not able to hear.
The Senator is correct on that.
Mr. President, I thank my colleague.
Major General Clark is a highly qualified officer for promotion to the rank of lieutenant general. I have met with him several times. His proposed assignment by the Secretary of Defense is to be Commander of the Fifth U.S. Army.
He was first nominated for this position in the fall of 2002. He has appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee in executive session on two separate occasions. On both occasions he conducted himself with deference and respect not only for the serious issues at hand but for all persons involved in this tragic sequence of facts which preceded his nomination.
He expressed great respect for the constitutionally-based advise and consent power and the responsibility of the Senate to look into this nomination with great thoroughness. Not surprisingly, General Clark has the full support of the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Schoomaker, and the civilian leadership of the Army for this promotion. Indeed, the Secretary of Defense personally, in a very respectful way, has talked to me about this nomination and his strong support for this nominee.
I will detail at length later on in the course of this debate the very thorough steps taken by the Senate Armed Services Committee. I commend my colleagues on the committee. There were unusual facts associated with this nomination involving tragic loss of life, a strong disciplinary action against those who brought about the direct harm to the victim who gave his life. In the course of that, I and other members of the committee took it upon ourselves to meet with the family members of the deceased victim in this particular case. I wish to commend them. They handled themselves in a manner of great distinction, given the depth of emotion on their part.
I also commend the former Vice Chief of the Army, General Keane. He took it upon himself time and time again, working with the distinguished Under Secretary of the Army, Les Brownlee, to repeatedly go back and reinvestigate certain aspects of this case, I hope to the satisfaction of all Members, certainly to this Senator and generally members of the committee.
Mr. President, I yield the floor to accommodate my colleague. I again thank him for his strong tenacity in supporting this nomination throughout.
Mr. President, may I express appreciation to my colleague from Kentucky again for his taking long hours to personally look into this case in a very objective way and in reaching his conclusions.
I yield the floor.
Mr. President, I was going to reply to some of the points my colleague from Massachusetts made. As you well know, the General----
Yes.
Mr. President, parliamentary question: We are on this nomination with 2 hours of debate and 1 hour each divided equally. I manage this side and Senator Kennedy manages that side. If the Senator wishes to go on to another matter, I am not sure how the Senator wishes to handle this.
Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator from Massachusetts will accommodate the Senator from Virginia. I would like to make some comments with respect to his important remarks while they are fresh in the minds of the listeners. I think it is appropriate that I take a little time. Then, as far as I am concerned, we will both yield back our time and the Senator from Massachusetts can take some time on another matter, if he wishes. Is that helpful?
I will summarize my comments in about 5 or 6 minutes, at the conclusion of which we could both yield our time.
That is under the order. I didn't realize he just walked in the Chamber. I am trying to do the best I can to accommodate everybody and manage the time efficiently. But I do desire at this point in time an opportunity to reply to my colleague from Massachusetts.
Mr. President, the Senate had a comparison between how General Keane and General Clark handled problems within their respective commands. General Clark was the convening authority, and the tragedy that occurred to which the Senator referred, and which is the subject of some comments here today, came up through the military command, was handled by the military courts and the military authorities, and adjudicated. As the convening authority, I think he took some prudent steps to make certain that in no way could he be accused of command influence. The tragedy in General Keane's command was tried in the civilian courts, and as such he was not the convening authority. He then had the opportunity to do some things which I believe General Clark did not.
Out of this tragedy, there were lessons learned in the Army. I think some important new policy matters were put into the regulations. Otherwise, not all was lost in this tragic situation.
I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the Army Inspector General's Report on Fort Campbell at the conclusion of my remarks. That is the first section of it that addresses a number of points that are raised by the Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. President, I believe from reading this report--not in the words of the Senator from Massachusetts that no one was trying to stop these tragic situations--that it was generally a positive command climate. There were some isolated instances of harassment, sexual in nature. I concede that is in the Record. But the total quantity of these incidents, in my judgment, was not indicative of a breakdown in the command responsibilities under General Clark.
General Clark, as I said, came to the committee on two occasions and subjected himself quite willingly--indeed, under oath; I put him under oath at the second hearing--and he responded to the cross-examination, much of which the distinguished colleague from Massachusetts has raised today.
In conclusion, he has an extremely impressive record of military service stretching back to 1970. Much of that has been covered by my colleague from Kentucky.
Mind you, Fort Campbell is an installation that can at times host a daily population of 24,000 military personnel and over 200 company- sized units.
In July of 1999, this brutal murder was committed at Fort Campbell by an intoxicated 18-year-old soldier who used frightful force against PFC Barry Winchell. This resulted in his death, allegedly while he was sleeping. No one underestimates the seriousness of this crime.
Senator Levin and I met in May of this year with the parents of Private First Class Winchell. Like General Clark, we extended our sympathy and sorrow for their loss. The committee listened very closely to the assertions they made about a lack of appropriate treatment by General Clark and shortfalls in discipline and a secure environment at Fort Campbell during the time their son was stationed there.
At the conclusion of the meeting, Senator Levin and I asked Private First Class Winchell's parents to put the questions and concerns they had raised with us at that meeting in a letter, and we would obtain answers from the Department of Defense--specifically, the Department of the Army--and share those answers with them. That we did. The parents sent us a letter and Senator Levin and I forwarded these questions to the Department. In September, the Department responded to questions and expressed continued support for Major General Clark's nomination.
I ask unanimous consent that all of these matters be printed in the Record at the end of my statement.
Mr. President, not only the steps taken by the Armed Services Committee, together with my distinguished colleague Senator Levin, but indeed by the Department of the Army into other areas overall reflect, I think, that our committee carefully looked into this matter and that the Department of the Army was responsive to the questions raised by my colleagues.
Mr. President, MG Clark is highly qualified for promotion to the rank of lieutenant general assignment as Commander of the Fifth United States Army. He was first nominated for this position in the fall of 2002. He has appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee in executive session on two separate occasions, and, on both occasions conducted himself with deferrence and respect for the members of the committee, and with appreciation for the Constitutionally-based advise and consent power--and responsibility--of the Senate. Not surprisingly, General Clark has the full support of the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Schoomaker, and the civilian leadership of the Army for this promotion.
General Clark has an extremely impressive record of military service stretching back to his commissioning in 1970. General Clark's military record includes combat service in Viet Nam for which he was awarded the Bronze Star with Combat ``V.'' He has served as a Battalion Commander and a Brigade Commander with the renowned ``Screaming Eagles'' of the 101st Airborne Division. In this capacity, he participated in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Major General Clark later served as Chief of Staff for the 101st Airborne Division, and from 1998 through 2000 as Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division and Fort Campbell, KY.
Fort Campbell is an installation that can, at times, host a daily population of over 24,000 military personnel and over 200 company sized units. In July 1999, a brutal murder was committed at Fort Campbell by a drunken, 18-year-old soldier who bludgeoned Private First Class Barry Winchell to death in his sleep. This tragic and senseless crime was not foreseeable--not foreseeable by PFC Winchell's company commander and certainly not foreseeable by Major General Clark. General Clark capably and competently fulfilled his responsibility as General court-Martial convening authority in this murder trial and took steps necessary to ensure that the perpetrator of this crime and an accomplice were brought to justice. This was accomplished and the soldier who murdered PFC Winchell is serving a life sentence.
Senator Levin and I met in May of this year with the parents of PFC Winchell. We, like General Clark, extended our sympathy and sorrow for their loss. As leaders of the committee, we listened very closely to the assertions they made about a lack of appropriate treatment by General Clark, and shortfalls in discipline and a secure environment at Fort Campbell during the time their son was stationed there.
At the conclusion of our meeting, Senator Levin and I asked PFC Winchell's parents to put the questions and concerns that they had raised with us in a letter, and we would obtain answers from the department and share those answer with them. The parents did so, and we sent their questions to the department in June.
In late September, the department responded to the questions, and expressed continued support for Major General Clark's nomination. The Army undertook to conduct inquiries through the Army Inspector General in response to the questions raised by the parents, and, I believe, did respond fully to the issues that were raised.
In late September, Senator Levin and I forwarded the Department's response to PFC Winchell's parents inviting them to respond. They did so on October 8th. On October 10, Senator Levin and I forwarded their letter to the department together with additional questions from Senator Kennedy requesting comment. We received a response from secretary Abell and Acting Secretary Brownlee on October 21st and, shortly thereafter, we conducted our second executive session.
The committee compiled a very thorough record about all the issues raised by Senator Kennedy and others. I will not go into specific details, but it is important to note that the Army Inspector General conducted an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the July 1999 death of PFC Winchell after the court-martial was completed, and the IG found no basis to support accusations of dereliction of duty and failure of leadership by General Clark. To the contrary, the investigation found a positive command climate at Fort Campbell and refuted the assertions that Major General Clark should have done more or could have prevented this tragedy.
I am very concerned about ensuring accountability of military officers, and I have insisted at looking very closely at the actions of military leaders who are entrusted with command. I am satisfied that General Clark did not fail in his command responsibility and is fully deserving of promotion. I urge my colleagues to support this nomination.
Exhibit I
executive summary
Background
On 5 July 1999, Private First Class (PFC) Barry Winchell, D
Company, 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, Fort
Campbell, Kentucky, was murdered by a fellow soldier.
Following this incident, and amid claims that PFC Winchell
was murdered because he was or was perceived to be a
homosexual, allegations arose concerning the command climate
at Fort Campbell particularly as it related to the command's
enforcement of the Department of Defense (DOD) Homosexual
Conduct Policy [hereinafter the Policy]. The Army pledged
early on to assess the command climate and investigate the
alleged violations of the Policy; however, to avoid
interfering in the individual judicial proceedings underway,
the Army could not begin that effort until the conclusion of
the two courts-martial arising out of PFC Winchell's death.
On 10 January 2000, the Secretary of the Army (SA) directed
that the Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG)
conduct an investigation into the facts and circumstances
surrounding the death of PFC Winchell as it related to the
Policy (enclosed) [hereinafter referred to as directive]. In
addition, the DAIG was tasked to conduct an assessment of the
command climate then existing in PFC Winchell's unit prior to
his death and an overall assessment of the command climate
existing at Fort Campbell prior to PFC Winchell's death,
specifically as it related to the Policy. Finally, the DAIG
was directed to provide an overall assessment of the
Department of the Army's (DA) implementation of the Policy.
The Fort Campbell assessment provided the initial data for
the Army assessment of the Policy. The Army IG will continue
to assess these issues as part of their continuing inspection
program.
Task Force Composition, Training, and Methodology
A Task Force of 27 individuals was established to conduct
the investigation and assessment in accordance with the
directive. The Task Force was composed of inspectors general
(IGs), one legal advisor, and subject matter experts. During
early February, the Task Force received training from the
subject matter experts in the areas of the Policy itself,
Equal Opportunity (EO), interview techniques, and group
dynamics. Further, the Task Force conducted mock individual
interviews and group sensing sessions in order to validate
the assessment strategy. Finally, at the request of the
Servicemembers Legal Defense Network (SLDN), key leaders of
the Task Force met with representatives of the SLDN to
identify specific concerns of the organization. The SLDN is a
national legal aid organization that assists soldiers
affected by the Policy.
The scope of the assessment included the following:
Interviews with the commanding general, 101st Airborne
Division (Air Assault), both assistant division commanders
who were occupying those positions in July 1999, and
interviews with 47 brigade and battalion-level commanders
from both divisional and nondivisional tenant units.
In addition, the Task Force conducted 68 sensing sessions
composed of soldiers randomly-selected by utilizing the
last two digits of the social security number. In these
sessions, 568 soldiers were interviewed and 1,385 command
climate surveys were administered throughout Fort
Campbell. With respect to the sensing sessions, it should
be noted that all of these soldiers were assigned to Fort
Campbell from the period of April 1999 through February
2000. In addition, participants who completed a command
climate survey were informed that the responses would be
anonymous.
In addition to interviews conducted on Fort Campbell, the
investigation team conducted on-site interviews at Fort
Benning and Fort Leonard Wood, as well as telephonic
interviews with soldiers assigned to Korea, Fort Drum, Fort
Knox, Fort Jackson and the United States Military Academy.
Civilian members of the Fort Campbell community as well as
former members of the Army were also interviewed by the
investigation team.
Finally, Task Force members gathered relevant data through
on-site inspections and additional periodic spot checks of
unit recreation centers, public use areas, and barracks
living areas. Finally, the Task Force secured information by
directly observing on-post soldier events to include physical
fitness training sessions.
History and Background of the Policy
On 29 January 1993, the President directed the Secretary of
Defense (SecDef) to review DOD policy on homosexuals in the
military. On 19 July 1993, the SecDef directed the following:
applicants for military service as well as current
servicemembers would not be asked nor required to reveal
their sexual orientation; sexual orientation would not be a
bar to entry into the service or continued service unless
manifested by homosexual conduct; and commanders and
investigating agencies would not initiate investigation
solely to determine a member's sexual orientation. On 30
November 1993, Congress enacted 10 United States Code (USC),
Section 654, policy concerning homosexuality in the armed
forces.
Assessment Results
Finding 1
Objective: Examine alleged violations of the DOD Homosexual
Conduct Policy during the period preceding PFC Winchell's
death.
Findings: 1. A preponderance of evidence indicated that two
noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in PFC Winchell's chain of
command and a fellow private (PVT) inquired into PFC
Winchell's sexual orientation. In addition, at least one NCO
referred to PFC Winchell as a ``faggot.''
2. In spite of this, however, the evidence gathered
demonstrated that the chain of command was proactive in
terminating the sporadic incidents of derogatory or offensive
cadences during unit marches and physical training (PT)
formations.
Summary: Evidence obtained from Fort Campbell indicated
that in late May 1999 PFC Winchell asked an NCO from his
unit, D Company, 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment,
``What would happen if a guy in the military was gay?'' In
responding to that question, the NCO asked PFC Winchell if he
was a homosexual. Testimony revealed that the NCO asked the
question in an effort to offer assistance to PFC Winchell in
getting professional guidance or assistance in addressing the
issue.
Evidence gathered indicated that an NCO in PFC Winchell's
unit referred to PFC Winchell as well as other members of the
unit as ``faggots'' in describing those who failed to perform
to his standards. On one occasion, the NCO referred to PFC
Winchell as a ``faggot'' after PFC Winchell reported to work
in what appeared to be an intoxicated state.
The preponderance of evidence demonstrated that PFC
Winchell's chain of command did not condone demeaning or
derogatory cadences made during the conduct of unit PT. In
those instances where inappropriate remarks were made,
company leaders made on-the-spot corrections.
Finding 2
Objective: Determine whether the local IG's office
responded appropriately to any complaints of violations of
the DOD Policy it may have received prior to PFC Winchell's
death.
Finding: The Fort Campbell IG office properly responded to
the only known complaint of a violation of the Policy prior
to 5 July 1999 when they followed standard Army IG guidance
by recommending PFC Winchell provide his commanders the
opportunity to resolve his complaint prior to direct IG
intervention with the command.
Summary: Immediately after the NCO called PFC Winchell a
``faggot,'' another NCO escorted PFC Winchell to the IG
office to file a complaint. Upon being advised that he should
provide his commander the first opportunity to address the
issue, PFC Winchell was then escorted to his company
commander. Evidence obtained indicated that the company
commander counseled the NCO regarding his inappropriate
remarks.
Finding 3
Objectives: 1. Conduct an overall assessment of the command
climate existing at Fort Campbell prior to 5 July 1999,
specifically as it relates to the application and enforcement
of the DOD Policy.
2. Assess the degree to which PFC Winchell's chain of
command understood the application and enforcement of the DOD
Policy.
3. Conduct sensing sessions with randomly-selected members
at Fort Campbell to determine the degree to which members
felt they understood the Policy and the degree to which the
Policy was being enforced.
4. Assess the command climate of D Company, 2nd Battalion,
502nd Infantry Regiment before 5 July 1999.
Findings: 1. Through sensing sessions, interviews, and
surveys across Fort Campbell, it was determined that the
command climate at Fort Campbell before 5 July 1999 was a
positive environment with exceptions related to medical
support, on- and off-post housing, after-duty-hours
recreation, and shortages of personnel in authorized grades.
Most soldiers indicated satisfaction with their mission,
training, and organizational leadership.
2. With respect to the Policy, it was clear that the chain
of command, from commanding general (CG) through company
leaders, responded appropriately to matters with respect to
enforcement of the Policy.
3. The specific assessment of D Company, 2nd Battalion,
502nd Infantry Regiment's command climate prior to 5 July
1999 was determined to be poor due primarily to leadership
failure of a senior NCO, perceptions pertaining to underage
drinking, and other factors beyond the direct control of the
company, such as shortages of personnel in authorized grades
and quality of life (QOL) issues.
Summary: In evaluating the overall command climate at Fort
Campbell, personnel were asked to compare the command climate
as it existed in February 2000 with the command climate the
year prior. Overall, personnel indicated that the command
climate was favorable. The majority of personnel questioned
believed that the leadership at Fort Campbell was effective
and concerned and treated personnel favorably. In addition,
the majority of personnel questioned felt that the chain of
command responded appropriately to issues presented to them.
Finally, personnel believed that the leadership led by
example.
QOL issues contributed to low morale at Fort Campbell.
Specifically, issues relating to the conditions in the
barracks, problems associated with medical care at Fort
Campbell, and treatment received by soldiers from the
civilian employees and individuals in the surrounding
civilian communities were the major areas of concern to those
questioned.
In general, the application and enforcement of the Policy
did not appear to be a problem at Fort Campbell. Most leaders
took appropriate action in instances where application of the
Policy was warranted and appeared to be operating well within
the confines of the Policy. Soldiers acknowledged, however,
that the joking and bantering that had occurred prior to July
1999 on a regular basis could be viewed as harassment.
Following training on the Policy and Consideration of Others
(COO), soldiers are now more apt to reconsider uttering
phrases that would likely be considered harassment.
However, the command climate of D Company, 2nd Battalion,
502nd Infantry Regiment, in the period prior to PFC
Winchell's murder was poor. In addition to the QOL issues
identified above, soldiers in PFC Winchell's unit believed
that personnel shortages and underage drinking in the
barracks to the poor command climate. The most significant
factor contributing to the poor command climate, however, was
the presence of an abusive NCO in a leadership position in
the unit.
Finding 4
Objective: Review and resolve allegations by Private Second
Class (PV2) Javier Torres and others of specific violations
of the Policy.
Summary of Findings: The preponderance of evidence did not
support PV2 Torres' allegation that he was personally
harassed at Fort Campbell; however, evidence does support his
allegation of routine personal harassment at Fort Benning and
occasional personal harassment at Fort Knox. The
preponderance of evidence supported PV2 Torres' allegations
that during initial entry training (IET) at Fort Benning, one
drill sergeant improperly addressed or referred to him as a
homosexual, and another PVT provoked a fight with him by
routinely taunting him and referring to him as a homosexual.
The evidence also supported PV2 Torres' allegation that at
Fort Campbell a senior NCO improperly used terms derogatory
to homosexuals while trying to motivate male soldiers to
perform to standard and two NCOs improperly used terms
derogatory to homosexuals while singing cadences during a
physical training run. It did not support his allegations
that an NCO in his unit at Fort Campbell improperly used
anti-homosexual language while conducting training on the
Homosexual Conduct Policy, that a soldier at Fort Knox
improperly inquired into his sexual orientation, and that an
NCO in his unit at Fort Campbell improperly inquired into his
sexual orientation.
The preponderance of evidence supported allegations that an
NCO at Fort Campbell read a joke to soldiers that was
demeaning to homosexuals; anti-homosexual graffiti was
present on a wall of a latrine in a unit area, a latrine
in a public recreation area, and a latrine in a work area
at Fort Campbell; and a nongovernmental civilian, not a
soldier, sent an e-mail containing anti-homosexual
language to a former soldier at Fort Campbell. The
preponderance of evidence did not support allegations that
anti-homosexual comments made by soldiers at Fort Campbell
were the ``norm,'' soldiers made threatening and
inappropriate comments during training on the Policy, an
e-mail with a sound wave file attached that contained
language demeaning to homosexuals was circulated at Fort
Campbell, and an NCO's chain of command improperly
inquired into his sexual orientation.
Finding 5
Objectives: 1. Assess the degree to which PFC Winchell's
chain of command understood the application and enforcement
of the Policy.
2. Conduct an overall assessment of the command climate
that existed then at Fort Campbell, specifically as it
relates to the application, enforcement, and training
conducted on the Homosexual Conduct Policy.
3. Conduct sensing sessions with randomly-selected military
members at Fort Campbell to determine the degree to which
members felt they understood the Policy and the degree to
which they believed the Policy was being enforced.
Finding: There was no sustainment training conducted at
Fort Campbell on the Policy before 5 July 1999 because there
was no clearly articulated requirement on how often personnel
were to be trained and who was to receive the training. The
published guidance indicated: ``All officers and enlisted
personnel of the Active Army and Reserve Components will
receive briefings upon entry and periodically thereafter.''
Institutional training of personnel on the implementation and
enforcement of the Policy was ineffective. Most officers,
NCOs, and soldiers at Fort Campbell lacked an understanding
and working knowledge of the Policy prior to 5 July 1999.
Summary: Nearly all soldiers, NCOs, and officers at Fort
Campbell had received training on the Policy at some point in
their military career. The training that was conducted,
however, did not contribute meaningfully to an understanding
or working knowledge of the Policy.
As a result, most personnel did not demonstrate a clear
understanding of their responsibilities under the Policy and
the standards contained within the Policy.
Finding 6
Objective: Assess whether current training materials
adequately convey the substance of the Policy.
Findings: 1. Currently, commanders, leaders, and soldiers
at Fort Campbell do not have a clear understanding of the
Policy because training and informational materials do not
adequately convey the substance of the Policy.
2. Training and informational guidance contain key words
(Don't Ask, Don't Tell) that are not defined in doctrine.
Summary: Based on interviews with commanders, leaders, and
soldiers, the results of the command climate survey, and a
review of records and files at Fort Campbell, it was
determined that the training provided on the Policy is not
clearly written, not tailored to specific audiences based on
rank and duty positions, fails to adequately convey the
substance of the Policy, and is presented in a format which
does not foster open and meaningful discussion on the issues.
Informational materials distributed to Army personnel, to
include a Hot Topics pullout in Soldiers Magazine and a
trifold pamphlet, suffered from the same defects according to
personnel. The use of the terms ``Don't Ask'' and ``Don't
Tell'' in the informational materials without providing
definitions to explain these phrases created a large amount
of anxiety and confusion.
Finding 7
Objective: Provide an overall assessment of the DA's
implementation of the DOD Policy by assessing:
1. Whether the Policy is being fairly applied within units.
2. Whether there are currently any other perceived
deficiencies in the Policy which preclude effective training,
application, and enforcement of the Policy.
Findings: 1. The Policy is being fairly applied at Fort
Campbell; however, the Policy with respect to discharges and
substantial investigations is not being implemented as
intended because commanders perceive an unacceptable risk to
the unit and soldier by retaining soldiers who make
admissions of homosexuality.
2. Commanders have difficulty in balancing their
responsibility to maintain morale, unit cohesion, good order,
and discipline while enforcing the Policy. They perceive that
the current implementing instructions restrain their latitude
to conduct inquiries and preclude them from exercising
reasonable discretion in initiating inquiries.
3. AR 600-20 and subsequent Army guidance and messages
regarding the reporting of harassment based on homosexual
orientation do not adequately advise soldiers where or how to
report harassment, and do not adequately advise commanders
and agencies how to process these complaints.
Summary: The Task Force determined that the Policy was
being fairly applied by commanders at Fort Campbell. The
soldiers discharged under Chapter 15 were overall satisfied
with their treatment during the process. The Fort Campbell
commanders expressed concern in complying with the Policy.
They believe it places them in a professional dilemma by
requiring them to choose between retention of a soldier who
declares a propensity for homosexual conduct and discharge
when the truthfulness of his statement of homosexuality is
suspect. They are
reluctant to conduct inquiries of the truthfulness of an
admission because of the perceived risk to both the unit and
the individual soldier.
Commanders stated to the Task Force that they had
difficulty in balancing the enforcement of the Policy and the
requirement to maintain morale, unit cohesion, good order,
and discipline. Commanders expressed concerns that the Policy
precludes them from conducting an inquiry when presented with
credible information of behavior that demonstrates a soldier
may have a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct. They
believe the Policy precludes them from exercising reasonable
discretion in determining the necessity to conduct an
inquiry.
Information gathered by the Task Force determined that
guidance on reporting harassment based on sexual orientation
by soldiers and investigation into such harassment by leaders
is unclear and confusing. Soldiers and leaders expressed
frustration with knowing how and to whom to report harassment
and how to handle incidents of this type of harassment. They
expressed the belief that all harassment should be dealt with
uniformly.
In summary commanders and leaders at all levels have an
inherent responsibility for establishing a command climate
that promotes good order and discipline essential to
accomplishing the Army's mission. This responsibility
includes promoting unit cohesion by identifying and
eliminating harassment before it occurs or results in reports
of violations of Army Standards.
I thank my colleague.