Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time and for his leadership, and I rise in support of the Ose- Maloney amendment, a compromise approach to deposit insurance coverage that holds standard account coverage at $100,000…
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time and for his leadership, and I rise in support of the Ose- Maloney amendment, a compromise approach to deposit insurance coverage that holds standard account coverage at $100,000 while offering increased protection for retirees.
Mr. Chairman, as a whole, this is an outstanding bill. As an original cosponsor of H.R. 522, I am supportive of the overwhelming majority of provisions in the legislation. It is long past time to merge the BIF and SAIF insurance funds. Additionally, eliminating the 23 basis point cliff and providing a new premium system that takes into account the past contributions of institutions are major steps forward.
The bill includes a mechanism for determining credit for past contributions to the insurance funds that is based on an amendment I cosponsored along with the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter) last session. This is a critically important provision as a matter of fairness to institutions that recapitalized the funds, and I thank the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Bachus) for including this balanced amendment in the legislation.
Despite these many positives, I believe the immediate 30 percent increase in insurance coverage in the bill is a serious mistake. This coverage increase to $130,000 is opposed by all the Federal financial service regulators, including Alan Greenspan, Treasury Secretary Peter Fischer, OCC Comptroller John Hawke and OTS Director James Gilleran.
Proponents of increased coverage argue that it poses no new risk to the insurance system, but the regulators who oppose this increase are the very officials whose job it is to protect the safety and soundness of the financial system. The unanimity of regulator opposition to increased coverage is an extremely powerful message.
Another argument put forth by proponents of coverage increases is that inflation has eroded deposit insurance. I do not believe this argument matches the actual situation of the banking industry. The fact is that only 2 percent
of insured accounts have more than $100,000 according to a study by the Federal Reserve. The same Fed study put the average account balance at merely $6,000. Any way you look at it the increase in coverage will benefit very, very few depositors.
Proponents of increasing coverage also contend that because insurance premiums are paid by banks, increasing coverage does not cost taxpayers. While I concede this point, I think we have to remember that behind the deposit insurance funds is the full faith and credit of the United States Government.
Since I joined the Committee on Financial Services at the close of the savings and loan crisis, I have been committed to protecting the safety and soundness of the financial service system. While the causes of the S&L failures were many, as my friend from Alabama pointed out, the fact is that standing behind the insurance system are our constituent taxpayer dollars. No matter what the reasons are for a future bank failure or string of failures, by raising insurance coverage we increase the potential liability of the government. Additionally, raising coverage may encourage the concept of moral hazard. Institutions will be encouraged to engage in riskier behavior to boost earnings if they know that failure is insured by the Federal Government.
Finally, I urge support for this amendment because it strikes a compromise. It holds the line on coverage for standard accounts while offering retirees additional insurance. I believe that there are many valid policy arguments for offering additional coverage and additional insurance for this special class of banking account. At its core this amendment represents a compromise. It allows Members the opportunity to support the concerns of the regulatory community on standard accounts while offering increased insurance on retirement accounts.
This is a good bill and I will support its passage. I simply think it would be much improved with the adoption of this amendment, and I thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Ose) for his leadership and I thank also the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Bachus) for crafting a fine underlying bill, along with the chairman, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Oxley), and the Democratic leader, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Frank).
Mr. Chairman, I include for the Record the following testimony from our committee hearing:
Prepared Testimony of the Honorable Peter R. Fischer, Undersecretary for Domestic Finance, Department of the Treasury, 9:30 a.m., Wednesday,
February 26, 2003--Dirksen 538
Mr. Chairman, Senator Sarbanes, and Members of the
Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to provide the
Administration's views on deposit insurance reform. I also
want to commend Chairman Powell and the FDIC staff for their
valuable contributions to the discussion of this important
issue.
The Administration strongly supports reforms to our deposit
insurance system that would, first, merge the bank and thrift
insurance funds, second, allow more flexibility in the
management of fund reserves while maintaining adequate
reserve levels and, third, ensure that all participating
institutions fairly share in the maintenance of FDIC
resources in accordance with the insurance fund's loss
exposure from each institution. The Administration strongly
opposes any increases in deposit insurance coverage limits.
Our current deposit insurance system managed by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) serves to protect
insured depositors from exposure to bank losses and, as a
result, helps to promote public confidence in the U.S.
banking system. I am concerned today that our deposit
insurance system has structural weaknesses that, in the
absence of reform, could deepen over time. I want to
emphasize that there is no crisis in the FDIC; both of its
funds are strong, well managed, with adequate reserves. This
is the right time to act--when we do not face a crisis--and
the Administration supports legislation focused on the repair
of these structural weaknesses.
Increases in FDIC benefits, however, including any increase
in the level of insurance coverage, are not part of the
solution to these problems and should be avoided. When I
testified before this Committee last April, I argued that an
increase in deposit insurance coverage limits would serve no
sound public policy purpose. Nothing has occurred since then
to change that view. The Administration continues to oppose
higher coverage limit in any form. Indeed, we feel that the
entire issue of coverage limits regrettably diverts attention
from the important reforms that are needed.
merging the bank and thrift insurance funds
We support a merger of the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) and
Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) as soon as
practicable. A larger, combined insurance fund would be
better able to diversify risks, and thus withstand losses,
than would either fund separately. Merging the funds while
the industry is strong and both funds are adequately
capitalized would not burden either BIF or SAIF members. A
merged fund would also end the possibility that similar
institutions could pay significantly different premiums for
the same product, as was the case in the recent past and
could occur again in the near future without this change. A
merger would also recognize changes in the industry. As a
result of mergers and consolidations, each fund now insures
deposits of both commercial banks and thrifts. Indeed,
commercial banks now account for 45 percent of all SAIF-
insured deposits.
Flexibility in the Management of FDIC Reserves
Current law generally requires each insurance fund to
maintain reserves equal to 1.25 percent of estimated insured
deposits, the ``designated reserve ratio.'' When the reserve
ratio falls below this threshold, the FDIC must charge either
a premium sufficient to restore the reserve ratio to 1.25
percent within one year, or a minimum of 23 basis points if
the reserve ratio would remain below 1.25 percent for a
longer period. Since the latter would be expected when the
banking system, and probably the economy as well, were under
stress, such a sharp increase in industry assessments could
have an undesirable pro-cyclical effect, further reducing
liquidity precisely when liquidity is needed. Were FDIC fund
contributions to come from resources that otherwise might be
part of capital, every dollar paid would mean a potential
reduction of 10 or 12 dollars in lending, or as much as $12
billion in reduced lending for a $1 billion FDIC
replenishment.
Reserves should be allowed to grow when conditions are
good. This would enable the fund to better absorb losses
under adverse conditions without sharp increases in premiums.
In order to achieve this objective and also to account for
changing risks to the insurance fund over time, we support
greater latitude for the FDIC to alter the designated reserve
ratio within statutorily prescribed upper and lower bounds.
Within these bounds, the FDIC should provide for public
notice and comment concerning any proposed change to the
designated reserve ratio. The FDIC should also have
discretion in determining how quickly the fund meets the
designated reserve ratio as long as the actual reserve ratio
is within these bounds. If the reserve ratio were to fall
below the lower bound, the FDIC should restore it to within
the statutory range promptly, over a reasonable but limited
timeframe. We would also support some reduction in the
prescribed minimum premium rate--currently 23 basis points--
that would be in effect if more than one year were required
to restore the fund's reserves.
Nevertheless, as we learned from the deposit insurance
experience of the 1980s, flexibility must be tempered by a
clear requirement for prudent and timely fund replenishment.
The statutory range for the designated reserve ratio should
strike an appropriate balance between the burden of pre-
funding future loses and the pro-cyclical costs of
replenishing the insurance fund in a downturn. A key benefit
to giving the FDIC greater flexibility in managing the
reserve ratio within statutorily prescribed bounds is the
ability to achieve low, stable premiums over time, adequate
to meet FDIC needs in bad times, with the least burden on
financial institutions and on the economy. We also believe
that with this reform, the possibility of recourse to
taxpayer resources is even further removed.
Full Risk-Based Shared Funding
Every day that they operate, banks and thrifts benefit from
their access to federal deposit insurance. For several years,
however, the FDIC has been allowed to obtain premiums for
deposit insurance from only a few insured institutions.
Currently, over 90 percent of banks and thrifts pay nothing
to the FDIC. This is an untenable formula for the long-term
stability of the FDIC.
Moreover, current law frustrates one of the most important
reforms enacted in the wake of the collapse of the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) and the
depletion of FDIC reserves: the requirement for risk-based
premiums. When 90 percent of the industry pays no premiums,
there is little opportunity to do what any prudent insurer
would do: adjust premiums for risk. Nearly all banks are
treated the same, and lately they have been treated to free
service.
For example, today a bank can rapidly increase its insured
deposits without paying anything into the insurance fund. As
is now well known, some large financial companies have
greatly augmented their insured deposits in the past few
years by sweeping uninsured funds into their affiliated
depository institutions--without compensating the FDIC at
all. Other major financial companies might be expected to do
the same in the future. In addition, most of the over 1,100
banks and thrifts chartered after 1996 have never paid a
penny in deposit insurance premiums. Yet if insured deposit
growth by a relatively few institutions were to cause the
reserve ratio to decline below the designated reserve ratio,
all banks would be required to pay premiums to raise
reserves.
To rectify this ``free rider'' problem and ensure that
institutions appropriately compensate the FDIC commensurate
with their risk, Congress should remove the current
restrictions on FDIC premium-setting. In order to recognize
past payments to build up current reserves, we support the
proposal to apply temporary transition credits against future
premiums that would be distributed based on a measure of each
institution's contribution to the build-up of insurance fund
reserves in the early-to-mid 1990s. In addition to transition
credits, allowing the FDIC to provide assessment credits on
an on-going basis would permit the FDIC to collect payments
from institutions more closely in relation to their deposit
growth.
We strongly oppose rebates, which would drain the insurance
fund of cash. Over much of its history, the FDIC insurance
fund reserve ratio remained well above the current target,
only to drop into deficit conditions by the beginning of the
1990s. Therefore, it is vital that funds collected in good
times, and the earnings on those collections, be available
for times when they will be needed.
There are other important structural issues that need to be
addressed sooner than later. It would be appropriate to
evaluate whether there are changes to the National Credit
Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF) that would be suitable in
light of the proposed reforms made of FDIC insurance so as to
avoid unintended disparities between the two programs.
Perhaps even more important is the need to address the long-
term funding of supervision by the National Credit Union
Administration, particularly in view of recent trends toward
conversions from federal to state charters and growing
consolidation of credit unions. Similarly, there are
structural problems in the funding of the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency and the Office of Thrift
Supervision, the resolution of which should not be delayed.
Deposit Insurance Coverage Limits
The improvements to the deposit insurance system that I
have just outlined are vital to the system's long-term
health. Other proposals, however, would not contribute to the
strength of the taxpayer-backed deposit insurance system and
may actually weaken it.
Increasing the general coverage limit up front or through
indexation, or raising coverage limits for particular
categories of deposits, is unnecessary. Savers do not need an
increase in coverage limits and would receive no real
financial benefit. Unlike other government benefit programs,
there is no need for indexation of deposit insurance coverage
because savers can now obtain all the coverage that they
desire by using multiple banks and through other means.
Higher coverage limits would not predictably advantage any
particular size of banks, would increase all banks' insurance
premium costs, and would mean greater taxpayer exposure by
adding to the contingent liabilities of the government and
weakening market discipline. An increase in coverage limits
would reduce--not enhance--competition among banks in general
as the efficient and inefficient offer the same investment
risk to depositors; in fact, perversely, investors would be
drawn at no risk to the worst banks, which usually offer the
highest interest rates.
Higher Coverage Limits Not Sought by Savers
First of all, the clamor for raising coverage limits does
not come from savers. The evidence that current coverage
limits constitute a burden to savers is scant; there has been
little demand from depositors for higher maximum levels. The
recent consumer finance survey data released by the Federal
Reserve confirm what we found in the previous survey, namely
that raising the coverage limit would do little, if anything,
for most savers. Median family deposit balances are only
$4,000 for transaction account deposits and $15,000 for
certificates of deposit, far below the current $100,000
ceiling. The same holds true even when considering only older
Americans, a segment of the population with higher bank
account usage: median transaction account balances and
certificates of deposit total $8,000 and $20,000,
respectively, for those households headed by individuals
between the ages of 65 and 74.
Examining the Federal Reserve data for retirement accounts
shows present maximum deposit insurance coverage to be more
than adequate. The median balance across age groups held in
IRA/Keogh accounts at insured depository institutions is only
$15,000. For the 65 to 69 age group, median household IRA/
Keogh deposits total $30,000.
A small group of relatively affluent savers might find
greater convenience from increased maximum coverage levels.
But it is a tiny group. Only 3.4 percent of households with
bank accounts held any uninsured deposits, and the median
income of these households was more than double the median
income of all depositors in the survey.
Under current rules, these savers have plenty of options,
with the market place presenting new options for unlimited
deposit insurance coverage without changing federal coverage
limits. At little inconvenience, savers with substantial bank
deposits--including retirees and those with large bank
savings for retirement--may place deposits at any number of
banks to obtain as much FDIC coverage as desired. They may
also establish accounts within the same bank under different
legal capacities, qualifying for several multiples of current
maximum coverage limits. Firms are now developing programs
for exchanging depositor accounts that could offer seamless
means of providing unlimited coverage for depositors without
any change in current limits.
One of the fundamental rules of prudent retirement planning
is to diversify investment vehicles. Many individuals,
including those who are retired or planning for retirement,
feel comfortable putting substantial amounts into uninsured
mutual funds, money market accounts, and a variety of other
investment instruments. Just 21 percent of all IRA/Keogh
funds are in insured depository institutions. There is simply
no widespread consumer concern about existing coverage limits
that would justify extending taxpayer exposure by creating a
new government-insured retirement program under the FDIC.
Coverage Limits and Bank Competition
Banks, regardless of size, continue to have little trouble
attracting deposits under the existing coverage limits.
Federal Reserve data have shown that smaller banks have grown
more rapidly and experienced higher rates of growth in both
insured and uninsured deposits than have larger banks over
the past several years. After adjusting for the effects of
mergers, domestic assets of the largest 1,000 commercial
banks grew 5.5 percent per year on average from 1994 to 2002;
all other banks grew 13.8 percent per year on average. Nor
are smaller banks losing the competition for uninsured
deposits. Uninsured deposits of the top 1,000 banks grew 9.9
percent annually on average over this period, while such
deposits at smaller banks grew on average by 21.4 percent
annually.
Higher Coverage Limits for Municipal Funds Erode Discipline
Proposals for substantially higher levels of protection of
municipal deposits than of other classes of deposits would
exacerbate the inherent moral hazard problems of deposit
insurance. Rather than keep funds in local institutions,
state and municipal treasurers would have powerful incentives
to seek out not the safest institutions in which to place
taxpayer funds but rather those offering the highest interest
rates. Since these are usually riskier institutions, state
and municipal treasurers would be drawn into funding the more
trouble banks. Local, well run, healthy banks might have to
pay a premium in increased deposit rates to retain municipal
business. Today there are incentives for state and local
government treasurers to monitor risks taken with large
volumes of public sector deposits. Should the FDIC largely
protect these funds, an important source of credit judgment
on the lending and investment decisions of local banks would
be lost.
conclusion
In conclusion, I reaffirm the Administration's support for
the three-part general framework that I have outlined to
correct the structural flaws in the deposit insurance system.
I encourage Congress to pursue these improvements with a
steady focus on the important work that needs to be done. The
Administration does not support legislation that raises
deposit insurance coverage limits in any form, and we urge
that Congress avoid such an unneeded and counterproductive
diversion from real and necessary reform.