Trid Improvement Act Of 2017
Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Madam Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to H.R. 3978, the TRID Improvement Act of 2017. H.R. 3978 has been dramatically expanded without input from Democrats to include several…
Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to H.R. 3978, the TRID Improvement Act of 2017.
H.R. 3978 has been dramatically expanded without input from Democrats to include several highly problematic and damaging bills. If enacted, this amended package of bills would ease the ability of high frequency traders to manipulate the stock markets undetected, encourage a regulatory race to the bottom in our Nation's stock exchanges, and harm investors and small businesses by weakening efforts to prevent accounting fraud at smaller public companies.
Taken together, this deregulatory package could significantly undermine market stability and gut investor and consumer protections at a time when our financial markets are already rattled.
Madam Speaker, from January 26 until last Thursday, the stock markets plunged just over 10 percent, becoming what the financial services industry calls ``stock market correction,'' and for the past two trading days, markets have rebounded the most since 2016.
Although market corrections are not new, what distinguishes today's volatility is that it is driven by complex computer strategies designed to buy and sell stocks and options millions of times a day. As many of us have witnessed, the Dow Jones Industrial Average may be up 500 points and then down 600 in less than a few minutes. For the average American who was hoping to one day retire with dignity by investing her hard-earned savings in the stock market, it can be distressing to see such wild swings always wondering whether the markets are truly fair or whether she is going to be fleeced. Unfortunately, the passage of H.R. 3978 would likely make those swings more extreme and increase the likelihood of problems going forward.
I am going to walk through each of the problematic provisions in this bill. Beginning with title IV, this provision is identical to H.R. 4546, the National Securities Exchange Regulatory Parity Act, which would weaken the standards for listing public companies for trading at U.S. stock exchanges. Today, exchanges listing standards set minimum requirements for a company's shares to be sold to the public without having to comply with State law. Exchanges can only revise these standards if the Securities and Exchange Commission first finds that new standards are substantially similar to the listing standards of the New York Stock Exchange.
This bill would remove any separate analysis for changing the standards and, thus, automatically preempt State oversight. As a result, the bill would encourage a race to the bottom of listing standards as exchanges compete with each other to attract companies with less restrictions, even if the standards are beneficial to the investors.
I believe that we should be strengthening the current analysis to promote fair and rigorous listing standards and only preempt State law when companies meet high standards. This is why I worked with the cosponsors last Congress to strike a bipartisan compromise which passed the House unanimously to require the SEC to develop a core qualitative listing standard. Unfortunately, my Republican colleagues have reversed their position in favor of empowering the industry over the investing public.
Turning to title III which is identical to H.R. 1645, the so-called Fostering Innovation Act, this provision would eliminate the independent audit of a company's financial reporting controls for up to 10 years for newly public companies provided that they have $50 million or less in gross revenues and less than $700 million in outstanding shares. Passed in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom accounting scandals, the requirement that public companies conduct an independent audit of financial controls is one of the many accounting provisions required by the bipartisan Sarbanes-Oxley Act that directly benefits investors and public companies by improving the accuracy of their financial reporting.
In fact, companies that are not subject to such review by an independent auditor are more likely to issue corrections to their financial reports leading to investor losses and higher losses for the company.
Investors like these audits because they improve the veracity of the reports they rely on to make investment decisions. Today, truly small public companies--those with less than $75 million worth of shares--are already exempt from the audit requirement. But this bill would extend the exemption to large companies that are nearly ten times that size. The law already provides newly public companies with an exemption for 5 years. Extending it to a decade would harm investor confidence and all such companies, hurting the very companies the bill's supporters purport to help.
Title II of this bill is the same language as H.R. 3948, the Protection of Source Code Act. This bill bans the SEC from inspecting source code used by regulated entities to engage in algorithmic or computer-driven trading and other activities that impact the securities markets and investors without first obtaining a subpoena. This provision would severely hamper the ability of the SEC to effectively examine persons like high-frequency traders and to investigate market disruptions.
The recent stock market volatility, which has seen all of the major stock indices decline by more than 10 percent in less than 2 weeks, has been exacerbated by high-frequency traders using complex computer algorithms to determine when to buy and sell millions of trades per second by making it harder for the capital markets COP to detect and stop bad actors and rein in fraudulent trading schemes. This provision will inevitably harm everyday Americans and retirees who rely on fair capital markets to invest their hard-earned savings.
To make matters worse, Republicans added a provision to pay for the cost of the bill by taking $2 million from the Securities and Exchange Commission's reserve fund. As a result, our financial watchdog will have less resources to support its capacity to oversee the markets through investments in IT and to respond to unforeseen market events like the flash crash.
In short, this bill asks taxpayers to pay for the costs of diminished capital market oversight by taking away SEC's funding to respond to emergency market situations that threaten market stability. This provision doubles down on the irresponsible policymaking we often see by the opposite side of the aisle.
The bill before us today would also make two less significant changes which I believe the Republicans included to garner additional support for the legislation. Nevertheless, even with these provisions, the package should be soundly rejected.
Title I, which includes the version of H.R. 3978, TRID Improvement Act of 2017, that the committee previously considered, would amend a mortgage disclosure known as TRID or the know-before-you-owe disclosure that informs home buyers of the terms and conditions of their mortgage. Responding to the concerns of some in the real estate industry, this provision would amend the disclosure to account for the discounts paid to borrowers in States where simultaneous lender and buyer title insurance is issued. However, the revised form does nothing for bars in States that do not provide such special rates to home buyers, and the provision eliminates the Consumer Bureau's ability to fix this aspect of the form even if a problem arises in the future.
The final provision, title V, is identical to H.R. 2948, the SAFE Mortgage Licensing Act. This title would ease the ability of individuals employed as mortgage originators to change employers by creating a temporary 120-day licensing regime so that they can continue to work at their new employer.
This bill would effectively treat mortgage originators who work for State registered firms the same as federally registered firms and was unanimously supported by committee Democrats. Unfortunately, because this legislation has been packaged with other deeply problematic and destructive bills, sensible relief to these individuals that has broad bipartisan support is being held hostage by Republicans' efforts to roll back as many safeguards as they can this year.
Madam Speaker, H.R. 3978, as amended, threatens many of the important reforms Democrats made to restore investor confidence to our capital markets after the worst financial crisis in generations. As the stock markets continue to wobble ominously in ways that threaten the savings of hardworking Americans, Congress should be strengthening oversight of the financial system, not weakening it.
Not surprisingly, H.R. 3978 is strongly opposed by the North American Association of Securities Administrators who serve on the frontline combating securities fraud on the State level and by nonpartisan organization who speak on behalf of our Nation's consumers, investors, and unions, including Consumer Federation of America, Center for American Progress, Americans for Financial Reform, AFL-CIO, and Public Citizen, and so do I.
Madam Speaker, I urge everyone to reject this harmful package of bills and to vote ``no'' on H.R. 3978.
Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Speaker, given the extreme volatility in the stock markets over the past few weeks, I am particularly troubled by title II of this bill, which would make it easier for high-frequency traders to evade regulatory oversight of their potentially disruptive automated trading algorithms.
This provision is widely opposed by nonpartisan consumer and investor advocacy groups who recognize the impact automated trading has on our markets.
Let me read for you excerpts from a few letters from these groups that highlight the dangers of title 2.
Americans for Financial Reform--a coalition of more than 200 consumer, civil rights, investor, retiree community, labor, faith- based, and business groups--wrote: ``Title II would prevent regulators from inspecting not only their raw source code used in automated trading, but also any related intellectual property that `forms the basis for the design of' source code. Examination of such intellectual property would only be possible in an enforcement context pursuant to a subpoena. This implies that the SEC would have to wait until the damage was done through a `flash crash' or similar market disruption before taking any action, which would have to be retrospective.
``In light of the significance of automated trading to modern markets, and the potential risk of high-frequency trading, it makes no sense to tie the hands of regulators in examining detailed trading strategies and methods of high frequency traders.''
The Center for American Progress cautioned that: ``But in an era of fast-moving, `flash-crash'-prone markets, the SEC may have a wide range of regulatory reasons for why it may need to examine source codes, including approvals of new trading products or the supervision of trading venues. The SEC should only exercise that authority carefully and under the strictest protections for confidential information, but blocking it by law dangerously limits the SEC's ability to address the significant technology-based challenges to financial markets.''
The Consumer Federation of America, an association of nearly 300 consumer advocacy groups, similarly opposed title 2 because it ``would weaken SEC oversight of algorithmic trading and hamstring the agency from responding quickly to flash crashes or other market breakdowns.''
Further, the CFA wrote that: ``At a time when algorithmic trading is taking on increased importance in our capital markets, this bill would make it more difficult for the SEC to properly oversee such trading.
``The bill would require the SEC to first issue a subpoena before it could compel a person to produce or furnish to the SEC algorithmic trading source code or `similar intellectual property.' This would undermine the SEC's examination authority by creating a gaping hole in its ability to gain access to firm records relevant to the examination. It would also have a devastating effect on the agency's ability to respond quickly in the event of another `flash crash' or such events in the future. In order to oversee the markets effectively, the SEC needs to be able to accurately and efficiently reconstruct order entry and trading activity, including for algorithmic traders.''
Public Citizen, a consumer rights advocacy group with over 400,000 members and supporters, wrote: ``Market volatility caused not by real events such as outbreak of a war, but by computers, including computer glitches, threatens to erase savings to some innocent investors and erodes general investor confidence. The recent swings in the markets attest to the need for robust and urgent supervisory inspection. The May 6, 2010 `Flash Crash,' where markets collapsed by more than $1 trillion in less than an hour, revealed that such a robust and urgent supervision has been lacking. The SEC required nearly a half year to investigate this incident before identifying a flawed algorithmic at one major trader. SEC oversight should be streamlined, not hampered. Trading instructions and records of human traders are already subject to inspection, so it should be no different for those instructions and records generated by a machine. Hiding source code from regulatory scrutiny will leave those responsible for mistakes as well as those attempting to manipulate markets unaccountable.''
These letters demonstrate the wide opposition to title II by groups that truly understand that robust oversight of algorithmic trading is necessary for the help of our makers.
Madam Speaker, I include in the Record letters from these groups.
February 13, 2018.
Please vote NO on H.R. 3299 and H.R. 3978.
Hon. Member,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Hon. Member: On behalf of more than 400,000 members
and supporters of Public Citizen, we ask you to vote NO on
H.R. 3299 and H.R. 3978, which are expected to be considered
by the full House on Wednesday, February 14, 2018. Provisions
in these bills would expose borrowers to abusive loans,
investors to dubious securities, and Americans generally to a
riskier financial system.
H.R. 3299, the Protecting Consumers' Access to Credit Act
of 2017, would allow predatory lenders to escape state limits
on high interest rates. The bill would nullify the Second
Circuit Court ruling in Madden v. Midland Funding. That
decision provided that a financial institution that buys
loans originated by a national bank could not benefit from
the National Bank Act's preemption of state interest rate
caps. While the Madden decision did not limit interest rates
that banks charge on credit, it does limit nonbanks from
evading state interest rate caps. This bill would pave the
way for payday lenders, financial technology (fintech)
companies and others to exploit that loophole and use a
``rent-a-bank'' arrangement in order to charge high interest
rates. Twenty state Attorneys General have written to oppose
this measure, noting that it undermines their efforts to
protect borrowers from abusive loan rates. We urge you to
oppose this bill.
H.R. 3978, the TRID Improvement Act of 2017, is actually a
package of bills that were considered separately in the House
Financial Services Committee. One of these is the Financial
Stability Oversight Council Improvement Act (formerly H.R.
4061). This measure would add numerous procedural
requirements for the Financial Stability Oversight Council
(FSOC) when it considers the designation or continued
designation of a nonbank firm as a systemically important
financial institution (SIFI). Current rules already make SIFI
designation a high hurdle. The case of MetLife, for example,
shows that firms enjoy more than ample methods to contest
designation. After FSOC designated MetLife as systemically
important, it contested it in court and the case is pending.
Increasing the government's burden for designation would
restrict its ability to apply enhanced supervision to major
institutions. However, the largest bailout of the 2008
financial crash went to AIG, a nonbank engaged in reckless
derivatives activity beyond the purview of banking
supervisors. We oppose this measure.
Another bill contained in H.R. 3978 is the Fostering
Innovation Act (previously H.R. 1645). This bill amends
Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) law by increasing
from five to 10 years the time that CEOs of firms with less
than $50 million in revenue must attest to the accuracy of
their financial reporting. Congress approved SOX in response
to the accounting scandals at the turn of the millennium. The
rules are designed to promote accounting accuracy to the
shareholders who have entrusted their savings to these firms.
A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that
companies with inferior financial reporting controls have a
significantly higher likelihood of issuing a restatement of
their financial accounts. Firms that are unwilling to oblige
SOX should not be trusted with the capital of savers.
Extending the CEO attestation requirement from five to 10
years exacerbates the problem. From an investor perspective,
accounting safeguards are more important for smaller
companies, since larger companies generally attract a larger
and more sophisticated base of stock and bond holders who can
perform effective oversight. We oppose this measure.
A third bill that is part of the H.R. 3978 package is the
National Securities Exchange Regulatory Parity Act (formerly
H.R. 4546). This bill would eliminate state supervision of
securities if they are listed on an exchange, even if the
exchange has reduced standards compared with those of major
exchanges such as the New York Stock Exchange. Under current
law, state supervision is pre-empted only if the security is
listed on exchanges with rules overseen by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). Rules may differ between
exchanges, but they must be approved by the SEC to ensure
that they prevent fraud, serve the public interest and
protect investors. Moreover, exchanges must adopt and enforce
rules that are ``substantially similar'' to the major
exchanges, known formally as ``Named Markets,'' under current
law. The existing system deters a race to the bottom, where
an exchange may attempt to attract companies with weaker
rules. Conversely, this bill would actually promote that race
to the bottom by removing the requirement that the exchange
adopt rules that are substantially similar to those of the
Named Markets. We oppose this measure.
A fourth measure in H.R. 3978 is the Protection of Source
Code Act, (formerly H.R. 3948). This measure would impede the
ability of the SEC to conduct effective compliance
examinations of market volatility involving computer-driven
algorithms. The bill imposes a strict subpoena requirement
before staff could inspect otherwise routine business records
that involve source code. Market volatility caused not by
real events such as the outbreak of a war, but by computers,
including computer glitches, threatens to erase savings to
some innocent investors and erodes general investor
confidence. The recent swings in the markets attest to the
need for robust and urgent supervisory inspection. The May 6,
2010 ``Flash Crash,'' where markets collapsed by more than $1
trillion in less than an hour, revealed that such robust and
urgent supervision has been lacking. The SEC required nearly
a half year to investigate this incident before identifying a
flawed algorithm at one major trader. SEC oversight should be
streamlined, not hampered. Trading instructions and records
of human traders are already subject to inspection, so it
should be no different for those instructions and records
generated by a machine. Hiding source code from regulatory
scrutiny will leave those responsible for mistakes as well as
those attempting to manipulate markets unaccountable. We
oppose this measure.
Because of our opposition to these elements in H.R. 3978
and to H.R. 3299 we urge you to vote NO on these bills. As we
are marking the 10th anniversary of the Wall Street Crash,
it's clear that American consumers and investors deserve
stronger financial reforms, not weakened protections that
will make our economy more susceptible to another collapse.
Thank you for your consideration. For questions, please
contact Bartlett Naylor.
Sincerely,
Public Citizen.
Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Madam Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
Madam Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
Madam Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
Madam Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
Madam Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
Madam Speaker, may I inquire as to whether or not the chairman has more speakers?
Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Madam Speaker, it has become par for the course for the majority to recklessly advance harmful deregulatory packages like H.R. 3978. My friends on the other side of the aisle are moving forward with regulatory roadblocks at a furious pace, pushing dangerous bills through the House nearly every week.
It appears that they may have already completely forgotten a way that lacks financial regulation and allowed the crisis in 2008 to occur. That crisis badly damaged the whole economy and harmed all of our constituents. The impact was enormous: $13 trillion in household wealth was lost; 11 million people lost their homes to foreclosure; and the unemployment rate reached 10 percent.
Democrats responded by enacting Wall Street reform to ensure that consumers, investors, and our economy are protected from reckless actors and bad practices, but now Republicans cannot wait to take us back to the bad old days. It makes no sense.
As we have discussed, the package of bills now before us guts important financial protections at a time when markets are already experiencing turmoil. It would allow high-frequency traders to manipulate the stock markets undetected, encourage a regulatory race to the bottom at our Nation's stock exchanges, and harm investors by weakening efforts to detect accounting fraud at smaller public companies. This package of bills threatens important progress we have made to reduce risk in the financial system and return investor confidence.
In recent weeks, we have seen volatile markets that threaten the savings of hardworking American families. These circumstances should serve as a clear reminder that Congress should be strengthening oversight of the financial system, not weakening it by undermining or removing important protections.
H.R. 3978 is strongly opposed by our State's security cops, who are at the front line of combating fraud, and it is opposed by groups representing consumers, investors, and unions.
Madam Speaker, for all of these reasons, I urge Members to oppose H.R. 3978, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record the following letters of opposition.
Center for American Progress,
Washington, DC, February 13, 2018.
Hon. Paul Ryan,
Speaker, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Nancy Pelosi,
Democratic Leader, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Speaker Ryan and Leader Pelosi: The Center for
American Progress (``CAP'') is writing today to express
opposition to H.R. 4061, the Financial Stability Oversight
Council Improvement Act of 2017, which is included as Title
VI of the revised H.R. 3978 package. It is our understanding
that the revised H.R. 3978 package will be considered on the
floor of the House of Representatives this week, so we
welcome the chance to share our concerns regarding this
legislation with you and your Members.
In short, this bill erodes a vital new financial regulatory
tool implemented following the devastating 2007-2008
financial crisis. If enacted, the U.S. financial regulatory
structure will be less equipped to handle risks that build up
outside of the traditional banking sector--making the
financial sector as a whole more vulnerable to another shock
and economic downturn. Americans paid for the last crisis
with their jobs, homes, and savings, while banks and other
financial institutions were bailed out. This bill
inexplicably makes a repeat of that economic calamity more
likely.
The 2007-2008 financial crisis demonstrated that excessive
risk could build up outside of the traditional banking
sector. Nonbank financial institutions like Lehman Brothers,
Bear Stearns, and AIG did not face the type of oversight and
regulatory standards warranted by their systemic importance.
The failure or near-failure of these institutions threatened
the stability of the U.S. financial sector. AIG and Bear
Stearns were bailed out accordingly, while the failure of
Lehman Brothers brought the global financial system to the
brink of collapse. The crisis also revealed that no one
financial regulator had a system-wide mandate, meaning
individual regulators were only focused on their respective
segments of the financial sector. This left financial
regulators in the dark regarding risks that built up across
different parts of the sector or that emerged in
underregulated parts of the sector.
In the wake of the financial crisis, President Obama worked
with Congress to pass the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act--the most significant financial
regulatory reforms enacted since the Great Depression. One
important pillar of Dodd-Frank was the creation of the
Financial Stability Oversight Council (``FSOC''), a new
systemic risk regulatory body. The FSOC was created to bring
the disparate financial regulators together to identify and
mitigate threats to financial stability. The most important
tool given to the FSOC to fulfill this mission is the
authority to subject a nonbank financial company to enhanced
oversight and regulation by the Federal Reserve Board if
material distress at the company, or the company's
activities, could threaten financial stability. The FSOC has
used this designation authority sparingly and only after a
thorough, multi-stage review process in which the FSOC
communicates extensively with the company and the company's
primary regulators.
H.R. 4061 would add multiple additional hurdles to the
FSOC's already-rigorous designation process. The proposed
changes would add an estimated two years to the designation
process, meaning it would take roughly four years for the
FSOC to designate a nonbank financial company that could
threaten U.S. financial stability. The four-year estimate
does not even factor in the time it will take for the legal
proceedings to play out when a company challenges the
designation in court. The legal challenge by MetLife took
years, and likely would have taken longer if the Trump
administration didn't agree to stop pursuing the case. If
anything, this bill increases the procedural issues a
designated company could raise in court. H.R. 4061
practically invites a legal filibuster of the designation. It
renders the designation authority nearly useless. Hollowing
out this crucial post-crisis authority makes it far more
likely that an underregulated systemically important nonbank
will cause or aggravate the next financial crisis.
Contrary to critics of the FSOC, it is not a rigid body and
has in the past responded to legitimate process and
transparency suggestions. In 2015, after soliciting public
comment, the FSOC adopted 17 changes to its designation
process and transparency policies The current designation
process in place is rigorous and appropriately thorough. H.R.
4061 would add no less than nine new bureaucratic steps.
These proposed changes are excessive, and the intent is
clear: To prevent the FSOC from using this vital tool.
This legislation is even more concerning given the actions
Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, Chairman of the FSOC, has
taken since the start of the Trump administration. The FSOC,
under Mnuchin's leadership, has: (i) rescinded the
designation of AIG, the company that received a $182 billion
bailout during the crisis; (ii) slashed the FSOC's budget and
staff; (iii) dropped the legal proceedings regarding
MetLife's designation; (iv) signaled that Prudential's
designation may be rescinded this year; and (v) recommended
some deeply concerning additional changes to the FSOC's
designation process in a report published in late 2017.
Further restricting the FSOC's authority at a time when it is
being dismantled from within would be a grave mistake.
For these reasons, CAP recommends that Members vote ``NO''
when the revised H.R. 3978 package of bills, which includes
H.R. 4061, is considered on the floor.
If you have any questions about this letter or would like
to discuss these issues further, please contact Gregg
Gelzinis.
Sincerely,
Gregg Gelzinis,
Research Assistant, Economic
Policy, Center for American Progress.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
Mr. Speaker, the current language of title II of H.R. 3978 would require SEC examination staff to obtain a subpoena before it could inspect any source code whatsoever, including, for example, computer code reflecting a firm's adherence to the SEC's cybersecurity regulations.
The amendment offered by Mr. Foster would narrow the requirement in title II to only apply to proprietary source code related to algorithmic trading. While I applaud Mr. Foster and the amendment's cosponsor, Mr. Scott, for narrowing the overbroad language of title II, the amendment cannot fix this untimely and ill-advised legislation. Even as amended, title II would undermine effective oversight of the high-frequency traders that simultaneously create and stand to benefit from the kind of extreme market volatility that we have seen in the past few weeks.
Let's not forget that, on May 6, 2010, in an event referred to as the ``flash crash,'' major U.S. stock indices inexplicably plummeted nearly $1 trillion in less than an hour before mostly rebounding. Alarmingly, market regulators took nearly 5 months to determine that the flash crash was caused by a combination of a flawed execution algorithm of one institutional investor and aggressive algorithmic trading by HFTs.
While it is too early to tell exactly what created the recent volatility in the U.S. stock market, market analysts have suggested that algorithmic trading has played a central role. In fact, just last Tuesday, the day after the Dow Jones Industrial Average saw its biggest one-day point drop in history, Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin testified before the House Financial Services Committee that algorithmic trading ``definitely had an impact on market moves.''
Given the importance of algorithmic trading in our stock market, it makes no sense to obstruct the SEC's access to the information that enables such activity merely because it exists in an electronic format. Americans who have trillions of their dollars in 401(k) and other retirement and savings plans deserve the SEC's best efforts in investigating and mitigating computer-driven market disruptions. For this reason and for all of these reasons, and given my broader concerns that the bill would significantly harm investor confidence in our markets even if the amendment is adopted, I am urging a ``no'' vote on
Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.