Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. (Mr. SCOTT of Virginia asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks, and include extraneous material.) Mr. Speaker, the conference report before us started out as…
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. SCOTT of Virginia asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks, and include extraneous material.)
Mr. Speaker, the conference report before us started out as an effort to quickly pass AMBER Alert, a bipartisan noncontroversial provision which had already passed the Senate. I am a cosponsor of the House version of the AMBER Alert so I am anxious to see that it be passed because it has been actually shown to help children. It will codify a program of grants and assistance to States and localities to establish a national communications system so that abducted children can be saved. As the gentleman from Wisconsin pointed out, that system works.
However, the bill now before us is loaded down with an array of crime sound-bite provisions that make the AMBER Alert bill just an afterthought in the legislation. The bill that has gone through the conference process, some provisions have been improved, some have been made worse; but I am unable to support the conference report at this time.
Mr. Speaker, the bill retains egregious provisions that expand the Federal criminal laws into areas traditionally left to State criminal laws. It expands the death penalty, despite the fact that almost 70 percent of death penalties imposed in the United States are found to be erroneous and the fact that over 100 people sentenced to death in the last 10 years have been subsequently shown to be innocent.
250 Members of the House, many supportive of the death penalty, have sponsored the Innocence Protection Act to provide reasonable assurances that fewer innocent people will be put to death. So we should certainly not be adding more death penalties before this act passes.
There are numerous provisions in the bill that create new mandatory minimum sentences, including the baseball-based sound byte, ``two strikes and you're out,'' which mandates life without parole for a second-offense requirement involving a minor. The offenses covered by that provision fortunately have been limited through the conference report process by eliminating some of the minor offenses involving a minor child, but it still includes as a child sex offense some consensual acts between teenagers.
The bill also adds a 5-year mandatory minimum for first offense crimes that are Federal crimes only because a person crosses State lines, such as when an 18-year-old and a 17-year-old conspire to cross State lines from Washington, D.C., to Virginia to have consensual sex. Just to show my colleagues how bizarre that provision is, if children are conspiring to cross from Virginia to Washington, D.C., to have sex, it would not be a child sex offense, and that is because consensual sex outside of marriage is not a crime in Washington, D.C., while it is in Virginia.
The bill also provides for a new wiretap authority in many of these cases including consensual sex and including some of the activities that do not even constitute a crime, and in some of those crime cases, bail may be denied during trial.
Of course, we are supposed to expect that prosecutors will ignore the law to carry mandatory minimum terms and not bring those cases. The reason we have mandatory minimums in the first place is because judges cannot be trusted to determine who should be sentenced to life and who should be sentenced to less, so we give everybody a life sentence. So our prisons are filled with people today who are serving time because they were convicted of just tangential involvement in somebody else's drug trade and end up serving more time than bank robbers.
We should let the sentencing commission and judges determine the appropriate sentences. Mandatory sentences have been criticized because they often require sentences which violate common sense in some cases, and that is why the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is a frequent critic. Not only do we mandate numerous mandatory minimums without regard to what the individual circumstances of the case might be, but one amendment, the Feeney amendment, reduces the discretion of the sentencing commission and judges to robot-like conformity without regard to how the sentence compares to equally serious offenses, nor does it recognize that circumstances can vary from one case to another.
There was a dramatic effort to fix that amendment, representing a brand-new version at the conference committee meeting, but it was ineffectual, as well as rife with errors. In just a cursory reading of that amendment, which was first seen by some of us at the meeting itself, it became clear that it had several major unintended effects. For example, it removed consideration in sentencing for exemplary military service. Another bizarre exchange occurred in which we were told that the word ``and'' actually meant ``or'' and it did not matter whether you had ``and'' or ``or.'' I do not know when the change took place, but the version before us now has the word ``or'' instead of ``and.'' Nevertheless the amendment still reduces the judge's ability to make the punishment fit the crime.
Most cases are sentenced within the sentencing guidelines range; and according to the American Bar Association, 79 percent of the departures from the guidelines are agreed to by the prosecution. I would like to insert the letter from the ABA into the Record at this point.
American Bar Association,
Chicago, IL, April 9, 2003.
Dear Senator: I write on behalf of the American Bar
Association to express deep concern about the Feeney
amendment, which has been incorporated in the conference
report to accompany S. 151, legislation to ban ``virtual''
child pornography. Although we are pleased to see that some
of the more offensive provisions of this amendment were
modified in conference, we continue to believe that this
provision would fundamentally alter the carefully crafted and
balanced system established by the Sentencing Reform Act,
without any of the customary safeguards of the legislative
process. Indeed, to the extent the amendment would give
prosecutors a unique and absolute power to check the
discretion of sentencing judges, it would have an unsettling
effect on the constitutional balance of power.
The Feeney amendment would legislatively overrule a
decision of the United States Supreme Court, United States v.
Koon, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), and amend central provisions of the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. It would void numerous
sections of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and, for the
first time, amend the Guidelines by direct legislation. It
would preclude the exercise of judicial discretion in certain
cases, and make judicial departures in all cases subject to
de novo appellate review. It would impose very troublesome
reporting and oversight requirements on judges that will
certainly have a chilling effect on judicial independence,
and discourage the imposition of just sentences in many
cases.
Should Congress enact the Feeney amendment, all these
dramatic changes would be accomplished through a House floor
amendment to an unrelated bill, adopted without committee
hearings by either the House or the Senate, or the benefit of
consultation with the U.S. Sentencing Commission, the federal
judiciary, or the organized Bar.
The Feeney amendment is evidently a response to the
perception that judges have engaged in widespread abuses of
their departure power following the Supreme Court's Koon
decision in 1996. Based on the Sentencing Commission's
statistics, I believe there are reasons to doubt the accuracy
of this portrayal.
Although sentences below the guideline range are now more
common that in the early days of guidelines sentencing, the
primary responsibility for this result lies with the
Department of Justice. In FY 2001, of 19,416 downward
departures awarded federal defendants, approximately 15,318
came on government motion. Put another way, in 2001, 79
percent of downward departures in the United States were
requested by the Government.
Similarly, although the rate of non-substantial assistance
departures has increased since the Koon decision, the vast
majority of that increase is attributable to the fact that
the number of departures in the five `'fast-track'' border
districts more than tripled, from 1871 to 1996, to 5928 in
2001. In short, the increased rate of non-substantial
assistance departures since Koon is due primarily to requests
for such departures by the Department of Justice.
The foregoing figures do not, of course, present the whole
picture. The percentage of judicially initiated departures
has increased somewhat since Koon. It may well be that some
judicially initiated departures are inappropriate and that
some action to curb inappropriate judicial departures should
be considered. However, it would seem advisable to determine
the nature and extent of any problem with judicial departure
power before legislating a virtual end to that power. As
Senator Hatch wisely observed some years ago:
``[C]ongressional policy makers must take advantage of the
most current and complete information available when making
legislative decisions. Whenever possible, Congress should
call upon those with relevant empirical research, encouraging
those most knowledgeable of and most
involved with the guidelines--judges, prosecutors,
practitioners and the Commission--to express their views.''
I am informed that the U.S. Sentencing Commission is even
now in the midst of a study of judicial departures in white-
collar crime. Would it not be prudent to direct the
Commission to extend that study to departures generally and
report promptly to Congress on its results? (I understand
that the General Accounting Office has also undertaken a
study of departures, at the request of the House Judiciary
Committee.) Such a congressional directive could also
instruct the Commission to develop proposals to address any
deficiencies revealed by the study. Once armed with full
information, Congress could determine the true nature and
extent of any problem, and could, if necessary, craft an
appropriate, measured legislative response to any
deficiencies in departure practice left unaddressed by the
Commission.
The American Bar Association is confident that a period for
study of current departure practice would not only yield a
more accurate picture of any problems that may exist, but
could not fail to produce a better solution than the Feeney
Amendment.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 created a system of
distributed authority that was designed to ensure fair,
predictable sentences for defendants convicted in
federal court. As contemplated by the Act itself, the
Guidelines drafted by the Sentencing Commission and
approved by Congress channel judicial sentencing
discretion, but they do not eliminate it. This system
reflects two truths about the process of making sentencing
rules. First, no set of rules can anticipate the
circumstances of every individual defendant. Accordingly,
if justice is to be done, judges must retain the
flexibility to determine that some defendants do not fit
the mold envisioned by the Commission. Second, the
departure power is a means of providing feedback from
judges to the Sentencing Commission and Congress. By
studying departure patterns, the Commission can identify
those guideline rules that judges are consistently finding
to be inappropriate for certain classes of defendants.
In the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress conferred upon
Federal judges the power to depart whenever ``there exists an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a
degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines'' in the
enabling legislation that created the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(b). The Feeney Amendment is
inconsistent with the original judgment of Congress about the
necessity and value of a guided departure power and the
important role of judges in Federal sentencing. If passed,
the Amendment would severely compromise critical
institutional features of the Federal sentencing system.
By curtailing and burdening judicial departure authority,
the Feeney Amendment strikes a blow at judicial independence
and sends an unmistakable message that Congress does not
trust the judgment of the judges it has confirmed to office.
By overriding the Sentencing Commission and legislatively
rewriting the Guidelines, the Feeney Amendment threatens the
legitimacy of the Commission. The Commission was created by
Congress to ensure that important decisions about Federal
sentencing were made intelligently, dispassionately, and, so
far as possible, uninfluenced by transient political
considerations. Congress should accord the Commission and its
processes some deference unless and until the Commission has
demonstrably failed in its duties.
By bypassing the deliberative processes of Congress itself,
the Feeney Amendment reflects a profoundly troubling
disregard of the legislature's role in establishing Federal
sentencing policy. If passed, the Feeney Amendment would
alter core features of Federal criminal sentencing and
appellate practice. Yet the Amendment has never been the
subject of a hearing in either the House or Senate, and
neither house has had the benefit of meaningful consultation
with any of the institutions most affected by the Amendment.
The American Bar Association is firmly committed to the
maintenance of a just and effective Federal sentencing
system. I am confident that you and your colleagues will give
the Feeney Amendment the careful scrutiny it requires. I am
hopeful that such scrutiny will lead you to oppose the Feeney
Amendment and to support a careful study of judicial
departures by the Sentencing Commission. . . .
The bill before us defiantly enacts laws prohibiting such acts as what is called ``virtual child pornography.'' The United States Supreme Court gave us a bright-line test to determine whether or not computer- generated images can constitute illegal child pornography. The Court said that if the image is not otherwise obscene it must involve real children in the production to be illegal. Pornography which was produced without real children under the Ashcroft case is not illegal.
In a direct violation of that case, this bill prohibits such images, whether or not it was produced with real children, unless the defendant can prove his innocence.
The Court, of course, dealt with that issue and said that we could not require a defendant in an American judicial court to prove his innocence, so that provision is clearly unconstitutional.
Mr. Speaker, we have a number of problems with this case, including the mandatory minimums. I just want to point out that the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, United States Judicial Conference, the Sentencing Commission, the American Bar Association, the Federal Bar Association, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, the Washington Legal Foundation, the CATO Institute, and a host of other sentencing and judicial system experts have pleaded with Congress not to impair the ability of courts to impose just and responsible sentences.
I would ask also that a letter from the NAACP also be inserted into the Record at this point.
National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People,
Washington, DC, April 10, 2003.
Re NAACP opposition to S. 151, the ``Child Abduction
Prevention Act of 2003.''
Members,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Representative: On behalf of the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the nation's
oldest, largest and most widely-recognized grass roots civil
rights organization, I am writing to urge you to oppose the
conference report to S. 151, the ``Child Abduction Prevention
Act of 2003'' in its current form.
While the issue of child abduction is a serious, heart-
wrenching and too often tragic issue that deserves to be
dealt with aggressively at a federal level, Title IV of the
final bill would radically limit federal judicial discretion
to impose just sentences for almost all federal offenses; not
just those relating to child abduction. Because this
provision overrules a key Supreme Court decision and
constitutes a dramatic encroachment on the judiciary, it is
opposed not only by civil rights organizations across the
board, but also by Supreme Court Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
Federal Judicial Conference, the Federal Sentencing
Commission, the American Bar Association, the Federal Bar
Association as well as countless law professors, prosecutors
and public defenders.
The potential impact of this provision on the African
American community and on ethnic minority American
communities throughout the nation is almost incomprehensible.
Racial bias in our nation's criminal justice system is
widespread and well documented. For example, according to
reports from the US Department of Justice and the US
Department of Health and Human Services, people of color
commit drug offenses at a rate proportional to our percentage
of the US population, roughly 25% for African Americans and
Hispanic Americans combined. Yet almost 75% of the people
charged in this nation with a drug offense are either
Hispanic or African American.
The impact this racial bias has on our communities is
devastating. According to the US Department of Justice report
issued just last week, an alarming 12% of all African
American men between the ages of 20 and 34 are in jail or in
prison. One out of every three black men born in the United
States will spend time behind bars in their lifetime.
The federal prison system now holds over 160,000 inmates,
more than any single state prison system. Furthermore, the
federal prison population has more than quadrupled in the
last 20 years for mostly non-violent offenses even while the
rate of incarceration has actually slowed in many states.
Under Title IV, the growth rate is predicted to be
staggering.
I hope that you will consider the far-reaching impact this
legislation will have on individual lives as well as whole
communities and even our nation. I urge you again to oppose
the final conference report unless Title IV is eliminated or
at least amended to address only child abduction cases.
Thank you in advance for your attention to this matter. If
you have any questions, I hope that you will feel free to
contact me at (202) 638-2269.
Sincerely,
Hilary O. Shelton,
Director.
Mr. Speaker, for those reasons we should vote against this report and send the measure back to committee for serious consideration. Many of the problems can be fixed if we would seriously consider the bill in a regular deliberative legislative process.
So I urge my colleagues not to vote on the conference report, and I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee) a member of the Committee on the Judiciary.
(Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks).
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume to read just one paragraph of the letter the gentleman from Wisconsin just referred to.
``We are troubled that the sentence for the crime was reduced to 30 months upon the court's consideration of mitigating facts. Such a reduction for mitigating factors may be appropriate in other circumstances.''
In other words, Mr. Speaker, we did not ask for a change in the law, we just asked for a review consistent with the law. This bill changes the law, changes the standard for review. What the Congressional Black Caucus asked for was just a review under the current law.
Mr. Speaker, I submit for the Record the letter just referred to by the gentleman from Wisconsin from the Congressional Black Caucus.
Congress of the United States,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, August 6, 1993.
Hon. Janet Reno,
Attorney General, Department of Justice, Washington, DC.
Dear Attorney General Reno: As members of the Congressional
Black Caucus, we are writing to you because of our concern
about the sentencing of Officer Laurence Powell and Sergeant
Stacey Koon by Judge John Davies in the Rodney King civil
rights case.
We are troubled that the sentence for the crime was reduced
to 30 months upon the court's consideration of mitigating
facts. Such a reduction for mitigating factors may be
appropriate in other circumstances. However, we feel that the
defendants' special status as police officers, with special
duties owed to the public, should have militated against such
a significant reduction.
As you well know, the maximum possible penalty was ten
years and fines of up to $250,000. Your federal prosecutors
were asking for seven to nine years. Our federal sentencing
guidelines recommended minimum sentences in a range of four
to seven years in prison.
Instead, Judge John Davies made broad use of subjective
factors. He stated that he read only letters addressed to him
from the friends and families of Officer Powell and Sergeant
Koon. He argued that much of the violence visited on Rodney
King was justified by King's own actions. However, these
officers were convicted on charges of violating Rodney King's
civil rights. We believe these mitigating factors did not
justify so large a reduction given the defendants' special
responsibilities as police officers.
In addition, Judge Davies did not afford proper weight to
the racist comments made over police radio by those convicted
on the night of the beating in discounting race as a
motivation for the beating. He similarly failed to take into
account the remarkable lack of remorse shown by Officer
Powell and Sergeant Koon since their conviction.
People of good will all over this country and of all races
were heartened when Officer Powell and Sergeant Koon were
convicted by a jury of their peers, a verdict made possible
by the Justice Department's resolve to file civil rights
charges and by the phenomenal performance of federal
prosecutors. With these severely reduced sentences, however,
we are sending a mixed message. Are police officers going to
be held responsible for excessive use of force or not?
We think what has been lost, in all this, is that police
officers have an enhanced responsibility to uphold the law.
Notwithstanding Judge Davies' authority to modify the
sentencing guidelines, most experts agreed that the minimum
four to seven years sentence should have been followed in
this case.
We realize that the trial judge is afforded sufficient
latitude in sentencing, but we urge the Department of Justice
to appeal these sentences. We need to reexamine these
sentences so that justice can finally be done in this
difficult, painful case. Only then can we begin to put this
behind us.
Sincerely,
Maxine Waters; Sanford Bishop; Eddie Bernice Johnson;
Floyd H. Flake; Albert R. Wynn; Carrie P. Meek; Eva M.
Clayton; Major R. Owens; Walter Tucker; William Clay;
Charles B. Rangel; William J. Jefferson.
James E. Clyburn; Earl Hilliard; Bennie M. Thompson; Cleo
Fields; Cynthia McKinney; John Lewis; Corrine Brown;
Donald M. Payne; Alcee Hastings; Kweisi Mfume; Louis
Stokes; Melvin L. Watt; Ronald V. Dellums.
Mr. Speaker, could you advise how much time remains on both sides?
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I would like to point out that the Congressional Black Caucus did not complain about the Supreme Court reinstating the law as it was.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Waters), a member of the Committee on the Judiciary.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from North Dakota (Mr. Pomeroy).
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I am frequently asked what we can do to repeal some of the mandatory minimum sentences which frequently impose bizarre, Draconian, and unreasonable sentences. Sometimes these requests come from relatives or friends of people, women whose boyfriends deal drugs, and the young lady does not deal drugs, does not use drugs, but she is around the boyfriend enough so that there is no question, she probably broke the law, took a message, drove a car to a meeting, so prosecutors can show she was involved, but not involved to the point where she ought to serve 20-some years, more than bank robbers serve.
When they ask what they can do about these kinds of Draconian sentences, I tell them the first thing they have to do to repeal the existing mandatory minimums is to stop passing new ones. Today we are going to pass a new set of mandatory minimum sentence laws. If anybody asks in the future where these mandatory minimums come from, Members can point to bills like the one today.
Finally, Mr. Speaker, a lot has been said about the Ashcroft decision. The Ashcroft decision was clear. You cannot prohibit child pornography, illegal child pornography unless real children were involved. The provisions in this bill allow prosecution whether or not real children are involved. The Court goes to great lengths to say whatever problems there are in prosecution, it is a problem for the defense. And if nobody knows whether they are computer-generated or involving real children, in that case they cannot successfully prosecute. They require real children to be involved in the production; and without real children, it cannot be illegal. This statute plainly on its face violates that Supreme Court decision and is unconstitutional.
Mr. Speaker, I hope we can send this back to committee, improve some of the provisions, and pass the AMBER Alert bill like we should. But in its present condition, I hope we will reject the conference report with a ``no'' vote.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.